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Socrates discusses and defines the terms ἀνδρεία (courage), σοφία (wisdom), φθόνος (envy), σχολή (leisure), βασιλεύς and ἄρχων (king and commander), εὐπραξία (good conduct), and εὐτυχία (good fortune). See Introd. §§ 20, 22.


ἀνδρεία πότερον: for the same order, see ii. 7. 8. Cf. iv.6.10, 11, and i. 1. 16, where Xenophon speaks of Socrates as discussing just such themes as these in this chapter.

διδακτὸν φυσικόν: capable of being taught, or a gift of nature. For the gender, see on χρησιμώτερον ii. 3. 1.

οἶμαι μέν: corresponds to νομίζω μέντοι in 2. Cf. ii.1.12, and An. ii.1.13

ἰσχυρότερον φύεται: is by nature stronger.

τὰ δεινά: as in i. 1. 14.

γίγνεσθαι: grows.


μαθήσει καὶ μελέτῃ: cf. ii.6.39.

πρὸς ἀνδρείαν: as regards courage.

Σκύθαι καὶ Θρᾷκες: races often cited by Greek writers as examples of half-savage daring. “Yet even these, brave as they are, would scarce venture to fight with shield and spear against the veteran infantry of Lacedaemon.” Cf. the story of David in Saul's armor, 1 Sam. xvii. 39.

τολμήσειαν: for the potential opt., see G. 1328; H. 872.

διαμάχεσθαι: to fight it out.

οὔτ᾽ ἄν, ἐθέλοιεν ἄν: for the repetition of the particle, see on i.4.14.

πέλταις: Thracian peltasts formed a considerable part of the army of Cyrus the Younger. Cf. An. i. 2. 9.


ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων ὁμοίως: similarly in all other matters.

ἐπιδιδόντας: intr., improving. Cf. Lat. proficere.

εὐφυεστέρους: more highly endowed by nature.


σοφίαν καὶ σωφροσύνην: prudence and temperance. Σοφία (wisdom or prudence) is right judgment about what ought to be done; σωφροσύνη is temperance, self-control or self-regulation, in acting. Cf. Socrates primus philosophiam devocavit a caelo et in urbibus collocavit et in domos etiam introduxit, et coëgit de vita et moribus rebusque bonis et malis quaerere Cic. Tusc. Disp. v. 4. 41.—ἀλλὰ τῷ τὰ μὲν καλὰ κτλ.: “but by a man's knowing and practicing the higher virtues, and recognizing and avoiding baseness, he judged him to be both wise and virtuous.” τῷ χρῆσθαι is dat. of instrument, and as inf. has for its subj. ἄνθρωπον understood, with which γιγνώσκοντα agrees. The condensed form of expression in this sent. seems to emphasize the identity of ‘knowing’ and ‘doing.’


δικαιοσύνην: it is difficult to find an Eng. equivalent; perhaps righteousness is nearest it.

ἐὰν ἐγχειρῶσιν: direct discourse const. retained for vividness.—ἐπεὶ οὖν τά τε δίκαια κτλ.: the logical form which this argument takes may be condensed as follows: “righteousness is included in wisdom. For, (a) upright and virtuously-wrought actions are καλὰ κἀγαθά, (b) the wise and they alone choose τὰ καλὰ κἀγαθά. Hence the wise and they alone choose righteousness; so wisdom includes righteousness.” See Introd. § 19 ff.

δικαιοσύνη: for the omission of the art., see on i.2.23.

ἄλλη ἀρετή: reliqua virtus. Cf. Plato Prot. 323 A.


μανίαν: in accordance with the definition of Socrates, madness (μανία, insania) is logically opposed to wisdom (σοφία, sapientia), and hence is ignorance of one's own strength and weakness; wisdom being distinguished by its knowledge of these. But people in general give the name of madness to the ignorance of other things. Cf. the vagaries of μαινόμενοι as described in i. 1. 14.

γὲ μήν: as in iii. 8. 10.

οἶδε: the subj. (τὶς) is to be supplied from the subj. (τινά) of the infs. ἀγνοεῖν etc.

ἐγγυτάτω: for the adv. as pred., cf. i.6.10.

τοὺς μέντοι πολλούς: subj. of φάσκειν and καλεῖν.

... ἀγνοοῦσι: rel. clause preceding its grammatical antec. τούτων.


μέγας: tall.

οὕτως: placed with emphasis after μέγας. See on i. 2. 4.

ἄλλῳ τῳ ἐπιθέσθαι: to attempt anything else.

τῶν πᾶσι δήλων ὅτι ἀδύνατά ἐστι: see on ἀδήλων (ὄντων) i. 1. 6.

φάσκειν: sc. τοὺς πολλούς as subject.—ὥσπερ τὴν κτλ.: just as they call strong desire love, so they call great mental disorder madness.


φθόνον, τι εἴη: for the ‘prolepsis,’ see on i.2.13. So σχολήν, τί εἴη in 9.

λύπην τινά: a kind of pain.

οὔτε τὴν ἐπ᾽ ἐχθρῶν εὐτυχίαις γιγνομένην: for this feature of the Socratic ethics, see on ii.6.35.

εἴ τις φιλῶν τινα: that any one who really loved a friend. For εἰ after verbs of wondering, cf. 7. 8.

βοηθεῖν: grammatically co-ord. with δύνασθαι, but opposed in thought to περιορᾶν.

ἀτυχοῦσιν: “in their misfortune.”

φρονίμῳ: sensible.

πάσχειν αὐτό: have this feeling. Cf., on this passage, Rochefoucauld's cynical maxim, that ‘there is something not wholly displeasing to us in the misfortunes of our best friends.’


τί εἴη: for τί in indir. questions, see on i.1.1.

καὶ γὰρ τοὺς πεττεύοντας: cf. i.2.57, where τοὺς κυβεύοντας (dicers) is the term used for gamblers. The game of πεττοί was something like our draughts and was played on a board of thirty-sixsquares.

γελωτοποιοῦντας: buffoons.

σχολάζειν: were idlers. Idleness, thus, is a relative term; when we could be better employed than we are, we are idle.—ἐξεῖναι γὰρ αὐτοῖς κτλ.: for it was in their power to go and do better things than these.

οὐδένα σχολάζειν: no one had leisure, in the better sense of the word.

ἀσχολίας αὐτῷ οὔσης: as he had no leisure (for such things).

κακῶς τοῦτο πράττειν: acted badly in this respect.


ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων: “by the multitude.” See on τὰ τυχόντα i. 1. 14.

λαχόντας: sc. τὸ ἄρχειν.

τοὺς βιασαμένους: those who have won it by violence.


ὁμολογήσειε: opt. in past general cond. rel. clause, like συμφαῖεν in iii. 8. 9. So εἴ τις λέγοι in 12.

τὸν ναύκληρον: the shipowner, here distinguished from τῷ ἐπισταμένῳ, i.e. the captain.—καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας κτλ.: and so all others who have anything needing attention, if they think they know how to attend to it, (do so); otherwise, etc. The ellipsis after ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιμελεῖσθαι may be filled with ἐπιμελομένους, supplementary participle with ἐπεδείκνυεν, which governs also the participles πειθομένους and μεταπεμπομένους.


δήπου: opinor, credo.

ἁμαρτάνων: circumstantial participle of condition.


καί: even.

ὡς ἔτυχε ζημιοῦσθαι: “or gets off with a light punishment.”

ἂν μᾶλλον σῴζεσθαι: would be more secure.

... ἀπολέσθαι: or in this way, and speedily, would perish.


κράτιστον ἐπιτήδευμα: the best pursuit.

εὐπραξίαν: good conduct. The questioner of Socrates understands εὐπραξία and εὐ πράττειν in their usual sense of success and succeed, synonymous with εὐτυχία and εὐτυχεῖν (so used in 8); and naturally asks if Socrates considers this a pursuit.

τὸ ἐπιτυχεῖν: sc. τινά as subj., easily supplied from ζητοῦντα.

εὖ ποιεῖν: to do well.


θεοφιλεστάτους: most beloved by the gods. Distinguish this compound from φιλόθεος loving the gods.

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