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οὗτος . . . Ἀρχέλαος: the position emphasizes the name; ‘this man—Archelaus!’

πῶς οὐκ ἄδικος: sc. ἐστίν. This admission, coupled with the opinion that Archelaus is an enviable and happy man, which is very evident from the ironical narrative which follows, shows most plainly the utter opposition between Polus' view and the moral principle which Socrates champions.

γε: introduces the authority of indisputable facts. See on 460 e.

32 ff.

καὶ, καὶ, καί: is in sense almost equiv. to “and therefore.” The construction begun in the clause γε . . . ἀδελφοῦ is naturally varied in καὶ . . . Ἀλκέτου by being made personal.

εἰ ἐβούλετο, ἦν εὐδαίμων: is an unreal conditional sentence, with opposition to the present. The close proximity of the two clauses in the apodosis explains the omission of the second ἄν.

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    • Plato, Gorgias, 460e
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