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ἐκεῖ αὖ: cf. a above.

σοφία: σοφία, μάθησις, ἐπιστήμη are here (ef. 349 b ff.) interchanged as synonymous expressions (ἀμαθεστάτους, μάθωσιν, ἐπιστήμονες), and to this refers the censure in Arist. Eth. N. iii. 11 δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐμπειρία περὶ ἕκαστα ἀνδρεία τις εἶναι: ὅθεν καὶ Σωκράτης ᾠήθη ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν. The true nature of ἐπιστήμη Plato leaves here unexamined; but Protagoras, in failing to take up this point in his contest with Socrates, is shown not to observe the lack of accuracy, but to be satisfied with the indefinite idea of insight. See Introd. p. 23.

Protagoras has maintained in 349 d that courage and knowledge are frequently dissociated. In opposition to this, Socrates has shown that, while people often confound daring with courage, only that daring which is accompanied by knowledge can correctly be called courage; from which it follows that courage and knowledge are inseparably connected. When now Plato makes Protagoras say that his statement that the courageous are also daring, has been unfairly turned about by Socrates, this is wholly aside from the point at which Socrates was aiming. By this objection, as well as by his irrelevant illustration, Protagoras shows that he has misunderstood the purpose of Socrates. For this reason Socrates does not follow him, but from another point takes up a new line of proof.

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    • Plato, Protagoras, 349b
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