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Without establishing more surely the identity of justice and holiness, Socrates now seeks to prove the identity of temperance and wisdom, and begins to discuss the relation between temperance and justice.

The proof that temperance and wisdom are the same is briefly as follows: ἀφροσύνη is the opposite of σοφία, and also of σωφροσύνη: but a thing can have but one opposite: therefore σοφία and σωφροσύνη are identical. It is admitted at once that ἀφροσύνη and σοφία are opposites: the proof that ἀφροσύνη is ἐναντίον σωφροσύνῃ is of some length and (as well as the assertion that a thing can have but one opposite) assumes the identity of the contrary and contradictory. The usual sense of ἀφροσύνη (intellectual folly) and the meaning natural from its derivation (as the opposite of σωφροσύνη) are also—as is natural to one who holds that vice is ignorance—identified, and the whole argument is unnecessarily spun out.

1. ἀφροσύνην τι καλεῖς. See above on 330C

3. πότερον δὲ ὅταν. Here begins the proof that σωφροσύνη is ἐναντίον ἀφροσύνῃ. (1) τὸ ὀρθῶς and ὠφελίμως πράττειν is σωφρονεῖν, and σωφροσύνη is that by which one σωφρονεῖ; (2) τὸ μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττειν is ἀφρόνως πράττειν and οὐ σωφρονεῖν: from which it is inferred that ἀφρόνως πράττειν is the opposite of σωφρόνως πράττειν, or (as is worked out at inordinate length) that ἀφροσύνη is the opposite of σωφροσύνη. In equating μὴ ὀρθῶς with ἀφρόνως πράττειν in (2) Socrates again confounds contradictory and contrary: see on 331A

5. τοὐναντίον. So Stallbaum, after Heindorf's τοὐναντίον πράττειν: the MSS. have εἰ τοὐναντίον ἔπραττον, which is faulty both because it in no way corresponds to the answer σωφρονεῖν and because εἰ with the imperfect is here unsuitable. In τοὐναντίον it will be observed that Socrates already allows no middle position between σωφρονεῖν and its opposite: see above on l. 3.

17. φέρε δή. From here to l. 24 Socrates tries to prove that a thing can have but one ἐναντίον. This is true only if we confine ἐναντίον to the meaning of ‘contradictorily opposite’ throughout, e.g. if we are always content merely to assert that the ἐναντίον of καλόν is μὴ καλόν: as soon as we say that its ἐναντίον is αἰσχρόν we have given to the thing two opposites (one of them multiform)—since μὴ καλόν is not αἰσχρόν but may be anything in the whole world except καλόν. This part of the argument is therefore also vitiated by neglecting the difference between contrary and contradictory terms.

24. ἀναλογισώμεθα: of reckoning up and reflecting as in Rep. I. 330E X. 618C.

30-1. u(po\ swfrosu/nhs—u(po\ a)frosu/nhs. This has not been admitted in so many words, but with σωφροσύνῃ and ἀφροσύνῃ for ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης and ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης: 332B l. II: cf. C, l. 16.

37. ἔμπροσθεν: 332A

41. τό does not belong to ἕν but to the clause ἓν ἑνὶ μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι: cf. τὸ εἰ βούλει τοῦτο in 331C ἐκεῖνον refers to ch. XVIII.

46. οὐ πάνυ μουσικῶςσυναρμόττουσιν. ‘In his lenem agnosco Sophistae irrisionem, qui supra §43’ (326Bπάντα τὸν βίον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εὐρυθμίας τε καὶ εὐαρμοστίας δεῖσθαι dixisset’, Heindorf.

49. πλείω δὲ μή. B reads πλείοσιν, Τ πλείοσι: πλείω is a suggestion of Heindorf's, adopted by most editors. The nominatives ἓν μόνον in l. 48 and σοφία and σωφροσύνη in 50 are strongly in favour of πλείω. If πλείοσιν is retained, it must be regarded as a blemish in Plato's style.

56. τἀ λοιπά. If δικαιοσύνη = ὁσιότης and σωφροσύνη = σοφία it remains to identify either δικαιοσύνη or ὁσιότης with either σωφροσύνη or σοφία in order to prove the identity of these four virtues. Socrates begins to prove that δικαιοσύνη = σωφροσύνη.

57. ὅτι ἀδικεῖ: ὅτι (cf. below, 333D and Parm. 155E) is equivalent to κατὰ τοῦτο : cf. Rep. I. 340D ἐπεὶ αὐτίκα ἰατρὸν καλεῖς σὺ τὸν ἐξαμαπτάνοντα ρεπὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας κατ᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐξαμαρτάνει; τι the relative and ὅτι the conjunction shade into one another here. There is much to be said for Cron's view that the words should be written alike: see on Apology, Appendix II, p. 123.

59. πολλοί γέ φασιν. In Rep. I. 348B ff., Thrasymachus asserts that ἀδικία is εὐβουλία, ἀρετή, καλόν and ἰσχυρόν: compare also Polus in Gorg. 469B ff. Notice that Protagoras' own opinion —that ἀδικία is not compatible with σωφροσύνη—makes for the identification of δικαιοσύνη and σωφροσύνη.

62. τὸν τῶν πολλῶν: on account of the τῶν here, Heindorf wished to insert οἱ before πολλοί in l. 59, but such a view could hardly be said to be held by the majority: cf. Rep. I. 348E εἰ γὰρ λυσιτελεῖν μὲν τὴν ἀδικίαν ἐτίθεσο, κακίαν μέντοι αἰσχπὸν αὐτὸ ὡμολόγεις εἶναι ὥσρεπ ἄλλοι τινές, εἴχομεν ἄν τι λέγειν κατὰ τὰ νομιζόμενα λέγοντες κτλ. As Sauppe points out, the article τῶν refers only to the above-mentioned πολλοί. With the situation cf. Rep. VII. 527E ff. σκόπει οὖν αὐτόθεν πρὸς ποτέρους διαλέγει: οὐ ρπὸς οὐδετέπους ἀλλὰ σαυτοῦ ἕνεκα τὸ μέγιστον ροιεῖ τοὺς λόγους, φθονοῖς μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἄλλω̣ εἴ τίς τι δύναιτο ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν ὄνασθαι;

63. εἴτ᾽ οὖνεἴτε: see on Apol. 34E.

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hide References (14 total)
  • Commentary references from this page (14):
    • Plato, Republic, 340d
    • Plato, Republic, 348b
    • Plato, Republic, 348e
    • Plato, Republic, 527e
    • Plato, Apology, 34e
    • Plato, Gorgias, 469b
    • Plato, Protagoras, 326b
    • Plato, Protagoras, 330c
    • Plato, Protagoras, 330e
    • Plato, Protagoras, 331a
    • Plato, Protagoras, 331c
    • Plato, Protagoras, 332a
    • Plato, Protagoras, 332b
    • Plato, Protagoras, 333d
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