CHAPTER XXXV
Here Socrates, taking a fresh start, endeavours to make Protagoras assent to the doctrine that pleasure is good. Protagoras
desires to have the question examined. He allows that wherever
knowledge is present, it must rule, but this is inconsistent with
the view that one can know the better and do the worse. It is
agreed to examine this popular view, in case the inquiry should
throw light on the relation between courage and the rest of
virtue. On the ethical doctrine of this and the following chapters
see Introduction, p. xxvi.
3.
εὖ ζῆν εἰ ἀνιώμενος—ζῴη. There is the usual ambiguity
in
εὖ ζῆν: see on
344Eabove.
5.
οὐκ εὖ ἄν σοι δοκεῖ. The MSS. have
δοκοῖ, which all the
editors (except Heindorf) retain. The meaning required is:
‘would he not, think you, have lived well?’ (to which Protagoras replies
ἔμοιγε sc.
δοκεῖ),
not ‘would you not think he has
lived well?’ and
δοκεῖ is as necessary here as in
ἆρ᾽ οὖν δοκεῖ
σοι ἄνθρωπος ἂν εὖ ζῆν εἰ—ζῴη above. The idiom is attested by
abundant examples, e.g.
Ar. Plut. 380 καὶ μὴν φίλως γ᾽ ἄν μοι
δοκεῖς, νὴ τοὺς θεούς, τρεῖς μνᾶς ἀναλώσας λογίσασθαι δώδεκα,
Wasps, 1404-5
εἰ νὴ Δί᾽ ἀντὶ τῆς κακῆς γλώττης ποθὲν πυροὺς
πρίαιο σωφρονεῖν ἄν μοι δοκεῖς: in Plato it is extremely frequent,
e.g.
Rep. 1.
335Bπάνυ μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἄν μοι δοκεῖ καλῶς λέγεσθαι,
Alc. I, 105C
εἰ αὖ σοι εἴποι—οὐκ ἂν αὖ μοι δοκεῖς ἐθέλειν,
Gorg.
514E, cf.
Euthyd. 294B,
306B Gorg. 522A, and below
357A The
corruption is natural: it occurs also in the MSS. of
Ar. Wasps,
loc. cit.
10.
ἐγὼ γὰρ λέγω: i.e. ‘I mean’ not ‘I say’: cf. below, l. 23
in E. Socrates puts his question in a different form inviting an
affirmative answer. After the
ἡδέα following Heindorf would
insert
τὰ ἡδέα, but the subject is easily supplied.
11.
μὴ εἴ τι—ἄλλο. So B and the first hand in T. The clause
εἴ τι—ἄλλο defines negatively the meaning of
κατὰ τοῦτο, as
καθ᾽
ὃ ἡδέα ἐστίν defined it positively.
μή deprecates or forbids the
possible misunderstanding: its use in the idiomatic
μὴ ὅτι is
the same in kind: see above on
319D To read
εἰ μή τι (with the
second hand in T) would be to beg the whole question—
that
step is not reached till
353D
18.
ἔστι μὲν ἃ κτλ. See on
ἀνθρώποις μὲν—ὠφέλιμα in
334A
26.
ἐὰν μὲν πρὸς λόγον κτλ. πρὸς λόγον does not (except
per accidens) mean ‘relevant’ but is equivalent to
εὔλογον:
compare the phrases
μετὰ λόγου, κατὰ λόγον; and, for the use of
πρός, πρὸς ὀργήν, πρὸς βίαν and the like. So in
343D 344A Here
the meaning is further explained by the clause
καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ—
ἀγαθόν. τὸ σκέμμα is quite different from
σκέψις: it is not the
inquiry itself, but the
proposition to be inquired into, viz. that
Pleasure is good: if this proposition is reasonable, says Protagoras, we shall accept it, if not, we shall dispute it. The sentiment does not deserve the scorn which Heindorf pours upon it,
if only we catch the force of
πρὸς λόγον, σκέμμα and
ἀμφισβητήσομεν.
31.
δίκαιος—σύ. Plato very frequently omits the copula
ἐστίν; εἶ and
ἐσμέν more rarely,
εἶναι often,
ἦν rarely, parts of
the conjunctive and optative very rarely. Schanz,
Novae
Commentationes Platonicae, 31-5.
κατάρχεις: a lofty word (here used with a touch of irony)
with religious associations: the middle is used of beginning a
sacrifice. Cf.
Symp. 177E ἀλλὰ τύχῃ ἀγαθῆ̣ καταρχέτω Φαῖδρος
καὶ ἐγκωμιαζέτω τὸν Ἔρωτα and
ibid. 176A.
34.
ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τι. It is not of course implied that
ὑγίεια is
an
ἔργον σώματος, i.e. something
ὃ σῶμα ἐργάζεται. Examples of
σώματος ἔργα would be different kinds of bodily labour.
ἢ πρὸς
ὑγίειαν κτλ. is equivalent to
πῶς ἔχει ἢ πρὸς ὑγίειαν κτλ.: cf. below
352Bπῶς ἔχεις πρὸς ἐπιστήμην;
35.
τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ τὰς χεῖρας ἄκρας: the rest being
covered by clothes.
χείρ is not hand here (otherwise
χεῖρας
ἄκρας would be the tips of the fingers), but the arm, as in
Homer's
φίλας περὶ χεῖρε βαλόντε (
Od. XI. 211).
37.
ἐπισκέψωμαι. The word is apt here, as it is often used
of a medical inspection: cf.
Phaedo, 117E ἐπεσκόπει τοὺς πόδας
καὶ τὰ σκέλη. With the whole passage cf.
Theaet. 162A ἆρα κἂν
εἰς Λακεδαίμονα ἐλθὼν—πρὸς τὰς παλαίστρας ἀξιοῖς ἂν ἄλλους θεώμενος γυμνούς, ἐνίους φαύλους, αὐτὸς μὴ ἀντεπιδεικνύναι τὸ εἶδος παραποδυόμενος;
39.
θεασάμενος: with the usual asyndeton; see on
330A
42.
καὶ τοῦτο: καί refers to
351CD.
45.
ἡγεμονικόν: this word was afterwards selected by the
Stoics to denote
τὸ κυριώτατον τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐν ᾧ αἱ φαντασίαι καὶ αἱ
ὁρμαὶ γίνονται (Diog. Laert. VII. 159).
46.
ὡς περὶ τοιούτου αὐτοῦ ὄντος: see on
337E
51.
περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ὥσπερ περί: see the reference in
the last note. Aristotle alludes to this passage in
Eth. Nic. VII. 2.
1145
b. 23
δεινὸν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἐνούσης, ὡς ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἄλλο
τι κρατεῖν καὶ περιέλκειν αὐτὴν ὥσπερ ἀνδράποδον.
54.
ἐάνπερ γιγνώσκῃ—μὴ ἂν κρατηθῆναι: a frequent
theme in Plato, e.g.
Meno, 77B ff.,
Gorg. 466D ff., two passages
which contain much in common with the discussion in this and
the next chapter.
56.
ἢ ἃ ἂν ἡ: the reading of Stephanus; B has
ἢ ἃ ἡ, T
ἢ ἂν ἡ.
59.
αἰσχρὸν—μὴ οὐχί. Goodwin,
M.T. p. 327, § 817. As a
σοφιστής himself Protagoras must exalt
σοφία.
62.
καλῶς γε σὺ λέγων: sc.
φῂς τοῦτο, to be supplied from
φάναι.
64.
γιγνώσκοντας τὰ βέλτιστα οὐκ ἐθέλειν πράττειν:
‘video meliora proboque: deteriora sequor.’
73.
ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡττᾶσθαι is virtually within inverted
commas. With
καὶ οὐ the sentence which started as a relative
clause becomes independent: see note on
313A
80.
τί δέ—ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι τοῦτο λέγουσιν; Cf.
Crito, 44C
ἀλλὰ τί ἡμῖν, ὦ μακάριε Κρίτων, οὕτω τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλει;
and 44D
ποιοῦσι δὲ τοῦτο ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι (sc.
ποιοῦντες).
