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ἀλλὰ ἰδέαι κτλ. For ideas of σκευαστά cf. especially Crat. 389 A—390 A, a passage which forms an admirable commentary on this. The anecdote about Plato and Diogenes in D. L. VI 53 (Πλάτωνος περὶ ἰδεῶν διαλεγομένου, καὶ ὀνομάζοντος τραπεζότητα καὶ κυαθότητα κτλ.) is pointless unless Plato believed in εἴδη τῶν σκευαστῶν. οὐκοῦν -- κατὰ ταὐτά. Cf. Crat. 389 A ff. ποῖ βλέπων ὁ τέκτων τὴν κερκίδα ποιεῖ; ἆρ οὐ πρὸς τοιοῦτόν τι ὃ πέφυκε κερκίζειν; Πάνυ γε. Τί δέ; ἂν καταγῇ αὐτῷ ἡ κερκὶς ποιοῦντι, πότερον πάλιν ποιήσει ἄλλην πρὸς τὴν κατεαγυῖαν βλέπων, ἢ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος, πρὸς ὅπερ καὶ ἣν κατέαξεν ἐποίει; Πρὸς ἐκεῖνο, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκεῖνο δικαιότατ̓ ἂν αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι κερκὶς καλέσαιμεν; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. The Idea is conceived as a παράδειγμα: cf. VI 500 E—501 C and see on V 476 D. Borrowing the ontology of the Philebus, we might say that the carpenter has an ἄπειρον of wood, into which he introduces πέρας after the model of the Idea of Bed or αἰτία, thereby manufacturing a μικτόν or material bed (Schmitt die Verschiedenheit d. Ideenlehre in Pl. Rep. u. Phil. p. 25 note 68). We are not entitled (in view of 597 B and the phraseology of the present passage) to take ἰδέαν merely as the plan or form of bed in the mind of the carpenter: the Ideas of σκευαστά must be credited with the same attributes—transcendence, self-existence, etc.—as appertain to those of abstract qualities and φυτευτά (see on V 476 A), although the difficulties which such a view involves are undeniably greater in the one case than in the other. If we put ourselves in Plato's position—and Socrates is here speaking as one Platonist to another (εἰώθαμεν λέγειν）—it becomes correct to say that the carpenter is looking at the Idea rather than at his own νόημα, for the νόημα is nought apart from its object, the νοητόν (cf. V 476 E note), i.e. the selfexistent Idea of Bed, without which all the νοήματα in the world would be powerless to generate a bed because it is the αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι κλίνη, and no mere νόημα, which is the true and essential cause of all material κλῖναι. See also on 597 B.
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