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παραφερομένου. Casaubon's conjecture περιφερομένου is neat, but inappropriate, the reference being to the successive courses at a feast, which were not usually carried round among the Greeks. In Athen. IV 33 the carrying round of viands is mentioned as an Egyptian custom: τρίτη δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἰδέα δείπνων αἰγυπτιακή, τραπεζῶν μὲν οὐ παρατιθεμένων, πινάκων δὲ περιφερομένων. ἐγώ μοι δοκῶ κτλ. Lys. 222 E δέομαι οὖν ὥσπερ οἱ σοφοὶ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις, τὰ εἰρημένα ἅπαντα ἀναπεμπάσασθαι. The tone of the concluding summary recalls the usual finish of the earlier and professedly negative Socratic dialogues, like the Charmides (175 B—176 A). The only section of the dialogue which Socrates passes over in silence is the refutation of the statement that Injustice is strong (350 D—352 C). The original question—the quid sit of Justice—is abandoned at 347 E: the quale sit occupies the rest of the dialogue, and Socrates enquires first whether Justice is vicious and ignorant, or wise and good (347 E— 350 C), next whether it is strong or weak (350 D—352 C), and lastly whether it is more or less advantageous than Injustice (352 D—354 A). To speculate on the quale sit of a thing before determining its quid sit is condemned by Plato in Men. 71 B ὃ δὲ μὴ οἶδα τί ἐστι, πῶς ἂν ὁποῖόν γε τι εἰδείην; cf. ibid. 86 D and 100 B. The words with which the first book concludes lead us to expect that in the remaining books the problem will be discussed in proper logical order—the essence first, and afterwards the quality, of Justice. The expectation is duly fulfilled; and Book I is therefore in the full sense of the term a προοίμιον to the whole work.
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