James Adam, The Republic of Plato

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περὶ -- λέγων . περί can hardly be for ὑπέρ, nor dare we write ὑπέρ for περί (as Badham suggests). The words mean simply ‘qui de hoc argumento verba facit,’ ‘the exponent of such a theory.’ Cf. 362 D ἱκανῶς εἰρῆσθαι περὶτοῦλόγου. Muretus seems to have desiderated πατήρ for περί: cf. expressions like Phaedr. 275 E (λόγος) τοῦ πατρὸς ἀεὶ δεῖται βοηθοῦ. On the strength of this Herwerden would read ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου, rejecting λέγων (“posteaquam ex πήρ factum est περί, corrector addidit λέγων”). The ‘father of the theory’ would mean Thrasymachus: see on ὦ παῖδες in 368 A. It is just possible that πατήρ was read by Ficinus (“ut sermonis huius perhibent auctores”), and if so, the variant may have some ancient authority now lost; but Herwerden's proposal is too drastic, and the text is probably sound.

ἀθλιώτατος. Apelt conjectures ἠλιθιώτατος, but cf. (with Hartman) I 344 A τοὺς δὲ—ἀδικῆσαι οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοντας ἀθλιωτάτους.

360D - 362C In the third place, the life of the unjust man (according to our theory) is far better than that of the just. Let us suppose that each is the perfect embodiment of his character—the one a consummate artist in iniquity, able to coerce where needful, and so apt at concealment that he enjoys the highest reputation for justice, while guilty of the worst acts of injustice; the other wishful not to be esteemed, but to be, good, and labouring until he dies under the imputation of the worst injustice, although he remains just. Only by means of this supposition can we make sure that the just man has not been attracted by the rewards of justice, but by justice itself. What will be the result? The just will be wholly miserable and unsuccessful, the unjust wholly prosperous and happy, doing good to their friends and evil to their foes; nay more, the unjust will be dearer to the gods than the just, because they have wherewith to win their favour.

τὴν δὲ κρίσιν κτλ. αὐτήν opposes the third division of Glauco's speech to the other two (see 358 C), and marks it as the most important. A kindred use of αὐτός recurs at 370 E ἀλλὰ μήν,—κατοικίσαι γε αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν —ἀδύνατον. I formerly read αὖ τὴν for αὐτήν, but the MS reading is quite de fensible. It should be noticed that κρίσιν is at first a kind of pendent accusative, afterwards “resumed as a cognate accusative with κρῖναι” (J. and C.). Tucker strangely makes κρίσιν=‘choice.’ The word means of course (our) ‘judgment’ concerning etc. Cf. 361 D ἵν᾽ ἀμφότεροι —κρίνωνται and εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἐκκαθαίρεις.