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μήτοι has been doubted, and is not, apparently, elsewhere so used in Plato (Kugler de part. τοί etc. p. 11), though often in Tragedy. Here too it strikes, I think, a lofty note ‘Wherefore let not any’ etc. θορυβήσῃ is also highly dramatic. All this parade is affected because it is a deduction from one of his own favourite commonplaces which Socrates is about to parry: see next note. πάντες γὰρ κτλ. γὰρ ἄρα—a rare combination—occurs also in Prot. 315 D, Symp. 205 B (according to Ven. T, but the Bodleian reads γάρ), Laws 698 D. ἄρα indicates that the objector is quoting another man's view (II 358 C note), and the doctrine that all men desire the good was in point of fact a commonplace in the Platonic school. See for example Gorg. 468 A, Men. 77 C ff., Symp. 204 E and Rep. III 413 A, VI 505 D. Here, as always, Socrates would of course concede that all men desire the good; but we need the λογιστικόν in each act of desire to specify what the good really is (437 D note). Moreover, according to our present theory, the desire of good drink is the product of two desires, viz. (1) thirst or the desire of drink, and (2) the desire of good. That (2) is in a certain sense universal, does not alter the fact that the two desires are logically distinct. See on τοῦ δὲ—προσγιγνόμενα 437 E.
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