James Adam, The Republic of Plato

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ff. The δευτέρα πόλις of Books II—IV rested on a psychological basis and was the expression of a moral rather than of an intellectual ideal: see on II 370 A and IV 443 B. In harmony with this conception Plato formerly used the word φιλόσοφος primarily and for the most part in its ethical sense (II 376 B note). Now that he is about to leave psychology for metaphysics, and describe the kingship of Knowledge, it becomes necessary to analyse again the meaning of φιλόσοφος. Henceforward, throughout Books VI and VII, the φιλόσοφος is one whose consuming passion is the love of Truth, that is, of the Ideas. See 480 A and VI 486 E notes

ἐννοῶ: i.q. νῷ ἔχω, ‘remember,’ not ‘understand’ (as D. and V.). Cf. Euthyphr. 2 B, Polit. 296 A. The illus tration which follows is all the more appropriate because the φιλόσοφος is himself an ἐραστής, in love with Truth: cf. VI 490 B.

πάντες οἱ ἐν ὥρᾳ κτλ. So in Charm. 154 B (cited by J. and C.) Socrates, an ἀνὴρ ἐρωτικός (Symp. 177 D), confesses ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ λευκὴ στάθμη εἰμὶ πρὸς τοὺς καλούς: σχεδὸν γάρ τί μοι πάντες οἱ ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ καλοὶ φαίνονται.

ὁ μέν, ὅτι σιμὸς κτλ. The point is that the ἀνὴρ ἐρωτικός, loving πάντας τοὺς ἐν ὥρᾳ, finds beauty even where there is none. He ‘sees Helen's beauty in a brow of Egypt.’ The passage has often been imitated, and may have suggested the well-known satirical outburst of Lucretius (IV 1160—1170).

ἐπίχαρις: ‘pleasing,’ χάριν ἔχουσα πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν Arist. Pol. E 9. 1309^{b} 24. With τὸ γρυπὸν βασιλικόν cf. Phaedr. 253 D and Arist. Physiog. 6. 811^{a} 36 οἱ δὲ γρυπὴν ἔχοντες (τὴν ῥῖνα) καὶ τοῦ μετώπου διηρθρωμένην μεγαλόψυχοι: ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀετούς. Neither τὸ σιμόν nor τὸ γρυπόν are marks of beauty; the straight nose is the fairest (Arist. Pol. l.c.).