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ff. 21 εἶεν δὴ κτλ. After the political follows the psychological argument: see 577 C note δὲ ἰδέ. My correction of δεῖ δέ (the reading of the best MSS: see cr. n.) has been generally accepted. The reading δὲ δεῖ is intrinsically unsatisfactory, and can only be an attempt to ‘emend’ δεῖ δέ. See Cl. Rev. XI p. 349. δέξεται κτλ.: ‘it will admit also of another demonstration.’ The subject is simply ‘our thesis,’ as stated just before in the conclusion of the first argument (580 C). Cf. (with Stallbaum) V 453 D οὐ γὰρ εὐκόλῳ ἔοικεν and Phaed. 69 E τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς ἀπιστίαν παρέχει (unjustly bracketed by Schanz), where the subject similarly ‘latet in antegressis.’ Idiomatic expressions like δηλώσει (VI 497 C note), δείξει etc. belong to a somewhat different category. It is impossible to extract any satisfactory sense out of the passage if (with Schneider alone of all the editors) we retain τὸ λογιστικόν (see cr. n.) or λογιστικόν, the latter of which occurs before δέξεται in many MSS. The Oxford editors, with much probability, suggest that λογιστικόν is the relic of some such gloss on τριχῇ as we actually find in Par. K, viz. λογιστικον. ἐπιθυμητικὸν θυμικον (sic). ἡδοναὶ κτλ. Hitherto in the Republic the words Pleasure and Desire have, with few exceptions (e.g. I 328 D, VI 485 D, VIII 554 E al.), had an evil, or at least unmoral, connotation. The view now put forward, viz. that each ‘part’ of soul has its own pleasures and desires differing in point of virtue and vice (cf. VI 505 C) like the ‘parts’ to which they belong, is related not only to the theory of the Philebus but also to the Aristotelian analysis of pleasure in Eth. Nic. X cc. 3—5. ἰδία. Paris A has ἰδίᾳ—see cr. n.— “multo minus concinne” (Schneider). Cf. ἰδίῳ αὐτοῦ infra E. ἀρχαὶ κτλ. Any one of the three may hold rule in the soul. The reference in ἦν is to IV 436 A ff.
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