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The circumspection with which we are reproached has so far been useful to us; we should adhere to it still, and not underrate our opponents. τὸ βραδὺ καὶ μέλλον: see on c. 36. 3.—μέμφονται: see c. 69. § 4; 70. § 2. ἡμῶν: possessive gen. with ὅ, which they find fault with in us. Kühn. 417, note 9; Kr. Spr. 47, 10, 2. —σπεύδοντές τε γὰρ...νεμόμεθα : we have here two reasons, united as complements by τε καί, why the Lacedaemonians need not be ashamed of τὸ βραδύ: (1) because the opposite behaviour (σπεύδοντες) is sure to lead to entanglements of which the issue cannot be seen; (2) because they owe to it their uninterrupted (διὰ παντός) freedom and renown. To this is added in § 2 the new remark, that this despised slowness is at bottom nothing else than considerate discretion (σωφροσύνη), which shows itself (1) in the absence of elation at success and of despair at failure; (2) in the fact that neither praise nor blame moves them to act in a way that their judgment does not approve. καὶ δύναται κτἑ.: Cl. explains δύνασθαι here ‘to have the same meaning,’ valere, whether in words or facts, comparing c. 141. 6; iii.46.10; iv.95.2; vi.36.9; 40. 16. But in all these there is no εἶναι; and vii.58.13, where εἶναι occurs, is now bracketed by Cl. himself and St. It is probable that in connexion with μάλιστα, ‘approximately’ (c. 13. 11), it means it may turn out to be: “the policy which they condemn may well be the truest good sense and discretion.” J.—ἔμφρων: truly rational; in Thuc. only here; mostly poetic; cf. Aesch. Prom. 848; Soph. Aj. 306; Pind. Ol. IX. 80.— 6. δἰ αὐτό: i.e. διὰ τὸ βραχὺ καὶ μέλλον; for the four following manifestations of σωφροσύνη all imply full consideration. ἧσσον ἑτέρων: = ἥκιστα. Cf. vi.9.6. So μᾶλλον ἑτέρων or ἑτέρου = μάλιστα. Cf. c. 85. 5. 138. 10; ii.15.1; 60. 24; iv.3.17; vi.16.1; vii.29.29. For ἕτεροι includes all others.—τῶν ἐξοτρυνόντων: depends on ἡδονῇ; i.e. by weakly allowing ourselves to be misled by the pleasure of hearing ourselves praised. Cf. ii.37.12; iii.38.31; 40. 7. παρὰ τὸ δοκοῦν ἡμῖν: against our own judgment. Cf. iii.38.11. καὶ ἤν τις αρα: and if any one should actually, etc., referring to c. 69 and c. 71. § 3; and because of this distinct reference we have the empiric aor. ἀνεπείσθημεν, which includes all similar cases. See on c. 69. 31.—ξὺν κατηγορίᾳ: cf. c. 69. 34. οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἀχθεσθέντες: opp. to ἡδονῇ; i.e. we are just as little influenced by anger at their reproaches. ἀναπείθειν is stronger than the simple verb, implying an almost violent conversion from previous policy. Cf. c. 126. 12; ii.14.1; iii.70.23; viii.52.2. τε καί: not correlative, but τε is inferential, and so. πολεμικοί and εὔβουλοι imply the just-mentioned qualities in action. These are referred to τὸ εὔκοσμον (like ἔμφρων, a word specially chosen for this specific behaviour), i.e. σωφροσύνη, which is based on deliberateness.—τὸ μέν: answers to πολεμικοί. The filiation is traced in reverse order: from σωφροσύνη comes αἰδώς, and from αἰδώς comes εὐψυχία, which is the basis of τὸ πολεμικόν. σωφροσύνη is identified with τὸ εὔκοσμον, and αἰσχύνη (properly the shame which follows a wrong action) only in this place with αἰδώς (properly the shame which prevents a wrong action). For εὐψυχία, cf. c. 121. 16; ii.87.19; vi.72.22; and τὸ εὔψυχον, ii.39.7; iv.126.38; Aesch. Pers. 326; Eur. Med. 403; Plat. Legg. 795 d; Tim. 25 b. εὔβουλοι: implies consideration and reasonable decision. This is traced to its source in σωφροσύνη by the partic. παιδευόμενοι with its triple result: (a) ἀμαθέστερον . . . ὑπεροψίας; (b) σωφρονέστερον . . . ἀνηκουστεῖν; (c) καὶ μὴ . . . νομίζειν δὲ κτἑ. It is σωφροσύνη which fosters the habit of subordination even in severe trials, and of vigorous action rather than of idle talk.— ἀμαθέστερον...ὑπεροψίας : for the order, see on c. 32. 8; = ἢ ὥστε ὑπερορᾶν τοὺς νόμους. This is the theoretical side: “not so highly trained that we fancy ourselves wiser than the law.” Cf. Eur. Or. 417. Arist. Rhet. i.15.12, τὸ τῶν νόμων σοφώτερον ζητεῖν εἶναι, τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ὃ ἐν τοῖς ἐπαινουμένοις νόμοις ἀπαγορεύεται. In ἀμαθέστερον is an ironical admission of the charge of ἀμαθία in c. 68. 4. ξὺν χαλεπότητι: belongs to παιδευόμενοι repeated, in strict discipline.—σωφρονέστερον...ἀνηκουστεῖν : this is the practical side; “not so presumptuous as to refuse obedience to the law.” For const., see H. 954; Kr. Spr. 49, 4. Cf. viii.46.34. καὶ μὴ...ἐπεξιέναι, νομίζειν δὲ κτἑ.: and so trained “that we do not, through over-sagac ity in unprofitable accomplishments, disparage in clever speeches our enemy's resources, and then when it comes to action make our advance with no corresponding vigour, but are convinced, etc.” See Grote's analysis of this speech, V. c. 48, p. 351. τὰ ἀχρεῖα, chiefly of rhetorical artifices. ξυνετοὶ ὄντες, subord. to μεμφόμενοι, expressing the means. Cf. c. 31. 5; 67. 6; 75. 11. ἐπεξιέναι, abs., used with ἔργῳ also in c. 120. 28; v.9.41. τὰς διανοίας: pl. as c. 144. 5; iii.82.22; vi.11.23; Lys. XXIV 16: designs, projects, the results of διάνοια, c. 138. 2; vi.15.15. παραπλησίους: only here of two terminations; sc. ταῖς ἡμετέραις, therefore not to be disparaged. —καὶ τὰς...διαιρετάς : referring to c. 69. 25, βούλεσθε . . . καταστῆναι. We have learned “that the chances which may occur do not admit of distinct definition by argument,” i.e. before they occur. With this is naturally connected what follows, § 4, “let us always assume prudent counsels on the part of our enemies, and prepare ourselves actively to meet them, not building our hopes on their mistakes; for this would be to make definite assumptions about accidental circumstances.” See App. ὡς πρὸς εὖ...ἐναντίους : Kr. Spr. 68, 8, states the rule: when a prep. phrase (a) is attended by an illustration (b) with ὡς, ὥσπερ, the prep. is used with both (a) and (b) when (b) follows (as in c. 85. 9), but only with (b) when (b) stands first, as here, iv.41.6, and vi.50.20. For other instances of a prep. not repeated, cf. c. 21. 5; 28. 6; 69. 32; 91. 20. παρασκευαζώμεθα: the subjv., which the best Mss. have, suitably follows up the declaration of Spartan principles with an exhortation (but Arn., Kr., Sh. read the indic. on account of ἀεί). The same connexion of thought is shown also by the repeated δεῖ. προνοουμένων : usually mid. in Attic; but act., iii.38.28; 58. 11. πολύ τε διαφέρειν κτἑ.: here the marked difference of national traits, insisted on by the Corinthians in c. 69, is denied. ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαιοτάτοις: in the severest school. J. The words ταύτας . . . μελέτας of c. 85. 1 show that this expression refers to the peculiar Spartan training, especially to its suppression of the individual will; (cf. 14) “the man who is trained under the strictest discipline,” so that no choice is left to his own will. Cf. ii.64.9, φέρειν χρὴ τὰ δαιμόνια ἀναγκαίως: i.e. with submission to the inevitable. Cf. c. 70, 71. See App.
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