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Chapter 45: battle of Winchester.
At light on the morning of the 19th, our cavalry pickets, at the crossing of the
Opequon on the
Berryville road, were driven in, and information having been sent me of that fact, I immediately ordered all the troops at
Stephenson's depot to be in readiness to move, directions being given for
Gordon, who had arrived from
Bunker Hill, to move at once, but by some mistake on the part of my staff officer, the latter order was not delivered to
General Breckenridge or
Gordon.
I rode at once to
Ramseur's position, and found his troops in line across the
Berryville road skirmishing with the enemy.
Before reaching this point, I had ascertained that
Gordon was not moving and sent back for him, and now discovering that the enemy's advance was a real one and in heavy force, I sent orders for
Breckenridge and
Rodes to move up as rapidly as possible.
The position occupied by
Ramseur was about one mile and a half out from
Winchester, on an elevated plateau between
Abraham's Creek and Red Bud Run.
Abraham's Creek crosses the
Valley Pike one mile south of
Winchester, and then crosses the
Front Royal road about the same distance southeast of the town, and running eastwardly, on the southern side of the
Berryville road, crosses that road a short distance before it empties into the
Opequon.
Red Bud Run crosses the
Martinsburg road about a mile and a half north of
Winchester and runs eastwardly, on the northern side of the
Berryville road, to the
Opequon.
Ramseur was therefore in the obtuse angle formed by the
Martinsburg and Front Royal roads. In front of and to the right of him, for some distance, the country was open.
Abraham's Creek runs through a deep valley, and beyond it, on the right, is high open ground, at the intersection of the
Front Royal and
Millwood roads.
To
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Ramseur's left the country sloped off to the
Red Bud, and there were some patches of woods which afforded cover for troops.
To the north of the
Red Bud, the country is very open, affording facilities for any kind of troops.
Towards the
Opequon, on the front, the
Berryville road runs through a ravine with hills and woods on each side, which enabled the enemy to move his troops under cover, and mask them out of range of artillery.
Nelson's artillery was posted on
Ramseur's line, covering the approaches as far as practicable, and
Lomax with
Jackson's cavalry and part of
Johnson's was on the right, watching the valley of
Abraham's Creek, and the
Front Royal road beyond, while
Fitz. Lee was on the left, across the
Red Bud, with his cavalry and a battery of horse artillery; and a detachment of
Johnson's cavalry watched the interval between
Ramseur's left and the
Red Bud. These troops held the enemy's main force in check until
Gordon's and
Rodes' divisions arrived from
Stephenson's depot.
Gordon's division arrived first, a little after ten o'clock A. M., and was placed under cover in a rear of a piece of woods behind the interval between
Ramseur's line and the
Red Bud, the detachment of
Johnson's cavalry having been removed to the right.
Knowing that it would not do for us to await the shock of the enemy's attack,
Gordon was directed to examine the ground on the left, with a view to attacking a force of the enemy which had taken position in a piece of wood in front of him, and while he was so engaged,
Rodes arrived with three of his brigades, and was directed to form on
Gordon's right in rear of another piece of woods.
While this movement was executed, we discovered very heavy columns of the enemy, which had been massed under cover between the
Red Bud and the
Berryville road, moving to attack
Ramseur on his left flank, while another force pressed him in front.
It was a moment of imminent and thrilling danger, as it was impossible for
Ramseur's division,
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which numbered only about 1,700 muskets, to withstand the immense force advancing against it.
The only chance for us was to hurl
Rodes and
Gordon upon the flank of the advancing columns, and they were ordered forward at once to the attack.
They advanced in most gallant style through the woods into the open ground, and attacked with great vigor, while
Nelson's battery on the right, and
Braxton's on the left, opened a destructive fire.
But
Evans' brigade of
Gordon's division, which was on the extreme left of our infantry, received a check from a column of the enemy, and was forced back through the woods from behind which it had advanced, the enemy following to the very rear of the woods, and to within musket range of seven pieces of
Braxton's artillery which were without support.
This caused a pause in our advance and the position was most critical, for it was apparent that unless this force was driven back the day was lost.
Braxton's guns, in which now was our only hope, resolutely stood their ground, and under the personal superintendence of
Lieutenant Colonel Braxton and
Colonel T. H. Carter, my then
Chief of Artillery, opened with canister on the enemy.
This fire was so rapid and well directed that the enemy staggered, halted, and commenced falling back, leaving a battle flag on the ground, whose bearer was cut down by a canister shot.
Just then,
Battle's brigade of
Rodes' division, which had arrived and been formed in line for the purpose of advancing to the support of the rest of the division, moved forward and swept through the woods, driving the enemy before it, while
Evans' brigade was rallied and brought back to the charge.
Our advance, which had been suspended for a moment, was resumed, and the enemy's attacking columns were thrown into great confusion and driven from the field.
This attacking force of the enemy proved to be the 6th and 19th corps, and it was a grand sight to see this immense body hurled back in utter disorder before my two divisions, numbering a very little over 5,000 muskets.
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Ramseur's division had received the shock of the enemy's attack, and been forced back a little, but soon recovered itself.
Lomax, on the right, had held the enemy's cavalry in check, and, with a part of his force, had made a gallant charge against a body of infantry, when
Ramseur's line was being forced back, thus aiding the latter in recovering from the momentary disorder.
Fitz. Lee on the left, from across the
Red Bud, had poured a galling fire into the enemy's columns with his sharpshooters and horse artillery, while
Nelson's and
Braxton's battalions had performed wonders.
This affair occurred about 11 A. M., and a splendid victory had been gained.
The ground in front was strewn with the enemy's dead and wounded, and some prisoners had been taken.
But on our side,
Major General Rodes had been killed, in the very moment of triumph, while conducting the attack of his division with great gallantry and skill, and this was a heavy blow to me.
Brigadier General Godwin of
Ramseur's division had been killed, and
Brigadier General York of
Gordon's division had lost an arm. Other brave men and officers had fallen, and we could illy bear the loss of any of them.
Had I then had a fresh body of troops to push our victory, the day would have been ours, but in this action, in the early part of the day, I had present only about 7,000 muskets, about 2,000 cavalry and two battalions of artillery with about 30 guns; and they had all been engaged.
Wharton's division and
King's artillery had not arrived, and
Imboden's cavalry under
Colonel Smith, and
McCausland's under
Colonel Ferguson, were watching the enemy's cavalry on the right, on the
Martinsburg road and the
Opequon.
The enemy had a fresh corps which had not been engaged, and there remained his heavy force of cavalry.
Our lines were now formed across from
Abraham's Creek to Red Bud and were very attenuated.
The enemy was still to be seen in front in formidable force, and away to our right, across
Abraham's Creek, at the junction of the
Front Royal and
Millwood roads,
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he had massed a division of cavalry with some artillery, overlapping us at least a mile, while the country was open between this force and the
Valley Pike and Cedar Creek Pike back of the latter; which roads furnished my only means of retreat in the event of disaster.
My line did not reach the
Front Royal road on the right or the
Martinsburg road on the left.
When the order was sent for the troops to move from
Stephenson's depot,
General Breckenridge had moved to the front, with
Wharton's division and
King's artillery, to meet a cavalry force, which had driven our pickets from the
Opequon on the
Charlestown road, and that division had become heavily engaged with the enemy, and sustained and repulsed several determined charges of his cavalry, while his own flanks were in great danger from the enemy's main force on the right, and a column of his cavalry moving up the
Martinsburg road on the left.
After much difficulty, and some hard fighting,
General Breckenridge succeeded in extricating his force, and moving up the
Martinsburg road to join me, but he did not reach the field until about two o'clock in the afternoon.
In the meantime there had been heavy skirmishing along the line, and the reports from the front were that the enemy was massing for another attack, but it was impossible to tell where it would fall.
As the danger from the enemy's cavalry on the right was very great and
Lomax's force very weak,
Wickham's brigade of
Fitz. Lee's cavalry had been sent from the left to
Lomax's assistance.
When
Wharton's division arrived,
Patton's brigade of that division was left to aid
Fitz. Lee in guarding the
Martinsburg road, against the force of cavalry which was advancing on that road watched by
Lomax's two small brigades; and the rest of the division in the centre, in order to be moved to any point that might be attacked.
Late in the afternoon two divisions of the enemy's cavalry drove in the small force which had been watching it on the
Martinsburg road, and
Crook's corps,
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which had not been engaged, advanced at the same time on that flank, on the north side of Red Bud, and, before this overwhelming force,
Patton's brigade of infantry and
Payne's brigade of cavalry under
Fitz. Lee were forced back.
A considerable force of the enemy's cavalry then swept along the
Martinsburg road to the very skirts of
Winchester, thus getting in the rear of our left flank.
Wharton's two other brigades were moved in double quick time to the left and rear, and making a gallant charge on the enemy's cavalry, with the aid of
King's artillery, and some of
Braxton's guns which were turned to the rear, succeeded in driving it back.
The division was then thrown into line by
General Breckenridge, in rear of our left and at right angles with the
Martinsburg road, and another charge of the enemy's cavalry was handsomely repulsed.
But many of the men on our front line, hearing the fire in the rear, and thinking they were flanked and about to be cut off, commenced falling back, thus producing great confusion.
At the same time
Crook advanced against our left, and
Gordon threw
Evans' brigade into line to meet him, but the disorder in the front line became so great that, after an obstinate resistance, that brigade was compelled to retire also.
The whole front line had now given way, but a large portion of the men were rallied and formed behind an indifferent line of breastworks, which had been made just outside of
Winchester during the first year of the war, and, with the aid of the artillery which was brought back to this position, the progress of the enemy's infantry was arrested.
Wharton's division maintained its organization on the left, and
Ramseur fell back in good order on the right.
Wickham's brigade of cavalry had been brought from the right, and was in position on
Fort Hill just outside of
Winchester on the west.
Just after the advance of the enemy's infantry was checked by our artillery, it was reported to me that the enemy had got around our right flank, and as I knew this was practicable
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and was expecting such a movement from the cavalry on the
Front Royal road, I gave the order to retire, but instantly discovering that the supposed force of the enemy was
Ramseur's division, which had merely moved back to keep in line with the other troops, I gave the order for the latter to return to the works before they had moved twenty paces.
This order was obeyed by
Wharton's division, but not so well by the others.
The enemy's cavalry force, however, was too large for us, and having the advantage of open ground, it again succeeded in getting around our left, producing great confusion, for which there was no remedy.
Nothing now was left for us but to retire through
Winchester, and
Ramseur's division, which maintained its organization, was moved on the east of the town to the south side of it, and put in position, forming a basis for a new line, while the other troops moved back through the town.
Wickham's brigade, with some pieces of horse artillery on
Fort Hill, covered this movement and checked the pursuit of the enemy's cavalry.
When the new line was formed, the enemy's advance was checked until nightfall, and we then retired to
Newtown without serious molestation.
Lomax had held the enemy's cavalry on the
Front Royal road in check, and a feeble attempt at pursuit was repulsed by
Ramseur near
Kernstown.
As soon as our reverse began, orders had been sent for the removal of the trains, stores and sick and wounded in the hospitals to
Fisher's Hill over the
Cedar Creek Pike and the
Back Road.
This was done with safety, and all the wounded, except such as were not in a condition to be moved, and those which had not been brought from the field, were carried to the rear.
This battle, beginning with the skirmishing in
Ramseur's front, had lasted from daylight till dark, and, at the close of it, we had been forced back two miles, after having repulsed the enemy's first attack with great slaughter to him and subsequently contested every inch of ground with unsurpassed obstinacy.
We deserved
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the victory, and would have had it, but for the enemy's immense superiority in cavalry, which alone gave it to him.
Three pieces of
King's artillery, from which the horses were shot, and which, therefore, could not be brought off, were lost, but the enemy claimed five, and if he captured that number, two were lost by the cavalry and not reported to me. My loss in killed, wounded and prisoners was severe for the size of my force, but it was only a fraction of that claimed by the enemy.
Owing to its obedience to orders in returning to the works, the heaviest loss of prisoners was in
Wharton's division.
Colonel G. W. Patton, commanding a brigade, was mortally wounded and fell into the hands of the enemy;
Major General Fitz. Lee was also severely wounded.
In the death of
Major General Rodes, I had to regret the loss, not only of a most accomplished, skilful and gallant officer, upon whom I placed great reliance, but also of a personal friend, whose counsels had been of great service to me in the trying circumstances with which I had found myself surrounded.
He fell at his post, doing a soldier's and patriot's duty to his country, and his memory will long be cherished by his comrades.
General Godwin and
Colonel Patton were both most gallant and efficient officers, and their loss was deeply felt, as was that of all the brave officers and men who fell in this battle.
The enemy's loss in killed and wounded was very heavy, and some prisoners fell into our hands.
A skilful and energetic commander of the enemy's forces would have crushed
Ramseur before any assistance could have reached him, and thus ensured the destruction of my whole force; and later in the day, when the battle had turned against us, with the immense superiority in cavalry which
Sheridan had, and the advantage of the open country, would have destroyed my whole force and captured everything I had. As it was, considering the immense disparity in numbers and equipment, the enemy had very little to boast of. I had lost a few pieces of
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artillery and some very valuable officers and men, but the main part of my force and all my trains had been saved, and the enemy's loss in killed and wounded was far greater than mine.
When I look back to this battle, I can but attribute my escape from utter annihilation to the incapacity of my opponent.
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