effective strength may be put down at 24,000, which General A. P. Howe
, commanding one of the divisions, says he was informed, at headquarters of the corps, it was. The first corps must have numbered at least 16,000 and perhaps more, so that I must have been left confronting at least 40,000 men in these two corps, besides the stationary batteries on Stafford Heights
's division of the 2nd corps which was just above, near Falmouth
, and, according to Hooker
's statement, numbered over 6,000 for duty on the 30th.
My division by the last tri-monthly field return which was made on the 20th of April, and is now before me, had present for duty 548 officers and 7,331 enlisted men, making a total of 7,879.
It had increased none, and I could not have carried into action 7,500 in all, officers and men, and not more than 7,000 muskets, as in camp wheneverything was quiet, a number of men reported for duty, who were not actually able to take the field.
I had already lost about 150 men in the resistance which was made at the lower crossing.
's brigade did not probably exceed 1,500 men for duty, if it reached that number.
I had, therefore, not exceeding 9,000 infantry officers and men in all, being very little over 8,000 muskets; and in addition I had Anderson
's battalion with twelve guns; Graham
's four guns; Tunis
', Whitworths, and portions of Watson
's and Cutt
's battalions under General Pendleton
, not numbering probably thirty guns.
I think 45 guns must have covered all my artillery, and these were nothing to compare with the enemy's in weight of metal.
The foregoing constituted the means I had for occupying and holding a line of at least six miles in length, against the enemy's heavy force of infantry, and his far more numerous and heavier and better appointed artillery.
It was impossible to occupy the whole line, and the interval between Deep Run
and the foot of Lee's Hill
had to be left vacant, watched by skirmishers, protected only by a cross fire of artillery.
I could spare no infantry