have been expected of it under the circumstances in which it was placed.
I will now return to my own position.
Just as I was returning from observing Sedgwick
's column I encountered, at Hazel Run
, one of General McLaws
' staff officers, Major Costin
, coming down under an escort of cavalry, and he informed me that General McLaws
had moved down the Plank
road to meet the enemy, and that General Lee
wished him and myself to attack Sedgwick
in conjunction and endeavor to overwhelm him, and there was a note or message from General McLaws
requesting information as to my position and that of the enemy, and asking what place I proposed, for attacking the enemy.
I think there was a note received later from General Lee
communicating his wishes in regard to the proposed attack, similar to information brought by Major Costinat
any rate the information of his views and wishes was brought by Lieutenant Pitzer
on his return.
It was about an hour before sunset when Major Costin
reached me, and that part of my division on the right was more than three miles from the position at Cox
's, so that it was impossible to accomplish anything that night.
I immediately sent a note to General McLaws
informing him that I would concentrate all my force that night and move against the enemy very early next morning, drive him from Lee
's and Marye's Hills, and extend my left while advancing so as to connect with his (McLaws
') right, and continue to move against the enemy above, after his connection with Fredericksburg
was severed; and I asked General McLaws
' co-operation in this plan.
During the night, I received a note from him assenting to my plan and containing General Lee
's approval of it also.
As soon as the first communication had been received from General McLaws
, my troops from the right were ordered up, but it was after night before they were all concentrated.
' artillery was brought up before