the 11th I held a consultation with Major Generals Breckenridge
, in which I stated to them the danger of remaining where we were, and the necessity of doing something immediately, as the probability was that the passes of the South Mountain
and the fords of the upper Potomac would soon be closed against us. After interchanging views with them, being very reluctant to abandon the project of capturing Washington
I determined to make an assault on the enemy's works at daylight next morning, unless some information should be received before that time showing its impracticability, and so informed those officers.
During the night a dispatch was received from Gen. Bradley Johnson
from near Baltimore
informing me that he had received information, from a reliable source, that two corps had arrived from General Grant
's army, and that his whole army was probably in motion.
This caused me to delay the attack until I could examine the works again, and as soon as it was light enough to see, I rode to the front and found the parapets lined with troops.
I had, therefore, reluctantly to give up all hopes of capturing Washington
, after I had arrived in sight of the dome of the Capitol
, and given the Federal
authorities a terrible fright.
In his report, Grant
says, in regard to the condition of things when I moved towards Washington
, “The garrisons of Baltimore
were at this time made up of heavy artillery regiments, hundred days men, and detachments from the invalid corps.”
And, in regard to the force of Wallace
, he says: “His force was not sufficient to ensure success, but he fought the enemy nevertheless, and although it resulted in a defeat to our arms, yet it detained the enemy and thereby served to enable General Wright
to reach Washington
with two divisions of the 6th corps, and the advance of the 19th corps before him.”
says in his report: “Here (at Washington
) they (we) were met by troops from the Army of the Potomac, consisting of the ”