comparison with that of our great Jackson in the same field, and for the following reasons: (lst) With about 12,000 (perhaps fewer) men you met and defeated Hunter at Lynchburg with an army of 20,000 men. You pursued him, driving him out of Virginia into Kanawha Valley, thus diverting him from the valley of Virginia. He had (I think) two brigades of cavalry,--you did not have over 1,500 cavalry. （2nd) You made a forced march down the valley, whipping another army of 12,000 men at Monocacy, after driving all the Federal forces out of the valley, marched to the very walls of Washington City, causing the withdrawal of a large force from the front of Lee, for the protection of the city. （3rd) You fell back into Virginia, when your force reduced by fighting and marching could not have exceeded 9,000 men. Sheridan was sent to meet you with 35,000 or 40,000 men. Up to this period your campaign was brilliantly successful. The disproportion was vastly greater between your forces and Sheridan's than between Jackson's and Shields' at Kernstown. If it had been possible to reinforce you at Winchester to the extent of 20,000, you would have driven Sheridan into the Potomac. （4th) Now observe. After Kernstown, Jackson fell back up the valley, was reinforced by Ewell; the latter was left to hold Banks in check. Jackson marched with his own force, 4,500 men, took command of Johnston's force of two brigades, 3,500 men, defeated Milroy, 7,000 men, returned centre with Ewell and with a force, now something over 20,000, expelled Banks (who commanded not over 7,000) from the valley. When threatened by Fremont from the west and Shields from the east-each with about 18,000 men-he retired, keeping them in check, and fought with equal numbers, the battle of Port Republic. Again. At Chancellorsville Jackson, by order of Lee, by a forced and daring march, attacked the right flank of the Federal Army, surprised and routed it. You, by a similar march, surprised and routed the advance forces of Sheridan at Cedar Creek. His remaining force would have been routed had not the troops halted to plunder the captured camp. Who was responsible for this? Those who commanded under you, whose business and duty it was to keep their troops well in hand, and pursue the routed army. I have thought much of your campaign in the valley when our military affairs were in extremis and think you did all that could have been done. I urge that you will write a full, consecutive history of that campaign, not leaving out of view the service rendered by your cavalry; they acted a most important part in saving Lynchburg until your arrival. You reached Lynchburg late in the afternoon; the day before
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