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“Kansas and her Constitution.-The vexed question is settled.
The problem is solved.
The dead point of danger is passed.
All serious trouble to Kansas affairs is over and gone.
” --
And a column, nearly, of the same sort.
Then, when you come to look into the Lecompton Constitution, you find the same doctrine incorporated in it which was put forth editorially in the Union What is it?
Article 7, Section 1. The right of property is before and higher than any Constitutional sanction; and the right of the owner of a slave to such slave and its increase is the same and as inviolable as the right of the owner of any property whatever.
Then in the schedule is a provision that the Constitution may be amended after 1864 by a two-thirds vote.
“ But no alteration shall be made to affect the right of property in the ownership of slaves.
”
It will be seen by these clauses in the Lecompton Constitution, that they are identical in spirit with the authoritative article in the Washington Union of the day previous to its indorsement of this Constitution.
I pass over some portions of the speech, and I hope that any one who feels interested in this matter will read the entire section of the speech, and see whether I do the
Judge injustice.. He proceeds :
When I saw that article in the Union of the 17th of November, followed by the glorification of the Lecompton Constitution on the 18th of November, and this clause in the Constitution asserting the doctrine that a State has no right to prohibit slavery within its limits, I saw that there was a fatal blow being struck at the sovereignty of the States of this Union.
I stop the quotation there, again requesting that it may all be read.
I have read all of the portion I desire to comment upon.
What is this charge that the
Judge thinks I must have a very corrupt heart to make?
It was a purpose on the part of certain high functionaries to make it impossible for the people of one State to prohibit the people of any other State from entering it with their “property,” so called, and making it a slave State.
In other words, it was a charge implying a design to make the institution of slavery national.
And now I ask your attention to what
Judge Douglas has himself done here.
I know he made that part of the speech as a reason why he had refused to vote for a certain man for public printer, but when we get at it, the charge itself is the very one I made against him, that he thinks I am so corrupt for uttering.
Now, whom does he make that charge against?
Does he make it against that newspaper editor merely?
No ; he says it is identical in spirit with the
Lecompton Constitution, and so the framers of that Constitution are brought in with the editor of the newspaper in that “fatal blow being struck.”
He did not call it a “conspiracy.”
In his language it is a “fatal blow being struck.”
And if the words carry the meaning better when changed from a “conspiracy” into a “fatal blow being struck,” I will change
my expression and call it “fatal blow being struck.”
We see the charge made not merely against the editor of the
Union, but all the framers of the
Lecompton Constitution ; and not only so, but the article was an authoritative article.
By whose authority?
Is there any question but he means it was by the authority of the
President and his Cabinet — the Administration?
Is there any sort, of question but he means to make that charge?
Then there are the editors of the
Union, the framers of the
Lecompton Constitution, the
President of the
United States and his Cabinet, and all the supporters of the
Lecompton Constitution, in Congress and out of Congress, who are all involved in this “fatal blow being struck.”
I commend to
Judge Douglas's consideration the question of
how corrupt a man s heart must be to make such a charge!
Now, my friends, I have but one branch of the subject, in the little time I have left, to which to call your attention, and as I shall come to a close at the end of that branch, it is probable that I shall not occupy quite all the time allotted to me. Although on these questions I would like to talk twice as long as I have, I could not
