No. 123. reports of Bvt. Maj. Gen. Jefferson C. Davis, U. S. Army, commanding Second Division, of operations May 1-August 22.
Hdqrs. Second Division, Fourteenth Army Corps, Near Atlanta, Ga., September--, 1864.Captain: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by this division during the campaign of the united armies, under the command of Major-General Sherman, against the enemy's forces in Georgia, from the Ist day of May to the 22d day of August, at which time I assumed command of the Fourteenth Army Corps: After the return of this division from the campaign in East Tennessee in December, 1863, it went into camp at McAfee's Church, near Rossville, Ga. Comfortable quarters were soon built by the troops, and the remainder of the winter was well occupied in drilling, outfitting, and preparing the command for active operations in the spring. Several expeditions and reconnaissances were made by the division or parts of it during the winter and spring, special reports of which have already been made. On the 1st of May, at which time orders were received for the commencement of active operations, the division consisted of three brigades and two field batteries, organized and commanded as follows, viz: First Brigade, commanded by Brig. Gen. J. D. Morgan, consisting of the Tenth Illinois Veteran Volunteer Infantry, Col. John Tillson; Sixteenth Illinois Veteran Volunteer Infantry, Col. Robert F. Smith; Sixtieth Illinois Veteran Volunteer Infantry, Col. William B. Anderson; Tenth Michigan Veteran Volunteer Infantry, Col. Charles M. Lum; Fourteenth Michigan Veteran Volunteer Infantry, Col. Henry R. Mizner. Second Brigade, commanded by Col. J. G. Mitchell, consisting of the Thirty-fourth Illinois Veteran Volunteer Infantry, Lieut. Col. Oscar Van Tassell; Seventy-eighth Illinois Volunteer Infantry, Col. Carter Van Vleck; Ninety-eighth Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Col. John S. Pearce; One hundred and eighth Ohio Volunteer Infantry, [Lieut. Col. Joseph Good]; One hundred and twenty-first Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Col. H. B. Banning; Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry, [Capt. L. S. Bell]. Third Brigade, commanded by Col. Daniel McCook, consisting of the Twenty-second Indiana Veteran Volunteer Infantry, Lieut. Col. William M. Wiles; Eighty-fifth Illinois Volunteer Infantry, Col. C. J. Dilworth; One hundred and twenty-fifth Illinois Volunteer Infantry, Col. O. F. Harmon; Eighty-sixth Illinois Volunteer Infantry, Lieut. Col. A. L. Fahnestock; Fifty-second Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Lieut. Col. C. W. Clancy; One hundred and tenth Illinois Volunteer Infantry, Lieut. Col. E. H. Topping. Artillery, commanded by Capt. C. M. Barnett; Fifth Wisconsin Battery, commanded by Capt. George Q. Gardner (veteran); Battery I, Second Illinois Artillery, commanded by Lieutenant Coe (veteran). The Tenth Michigan and Fourteenth Michigan Regiments at the commencement of the campaign were on veteran furlough, and rejoined the division respectively at Resaca and near Acworth. The Third Ohio Regiment had been detailed by department commander for permanent garrison duty at Chattanooga, Tenn., where it served until the expiration of its term of enlistment. The One hundred and tenth Illinois Regiment was stationed at Nashville, Tenn., for  the purpose of bringing forward transportation when obtained. Transportation overtook the division on the 26th of May. The regiment for some time after was kept with the train as guard, &c. It reported to its brigade for duty on the 20th day of July. On the morning of the 2d of May, in compliance with orders, Morgan's and Mitchell's brigades and the batteries marched to Ringgold, Ga., and went into camp on the East Chickamauga Creek. On the morning of the 3d McCook's brigade marched from Lee and Gordon's Mills, and joined the division at Ringgold. On the morning of the 5th the division passed through the gap at Ringgold, and went into bivouac near the stone church, at the forks of the Dalton and Cleveland roads. The enemy's pickets were encountered by Morgan's skirmishers in small force. On the morning of the 7th the advance of the army was assigned to my division, and at daylight McCook's brigade, followed by the rest of my command, moved on the direct road to Tunnel Hill. The enemy's cavalry was soon encountered and some sharp skirmishing kept up until the head of the column reached Smith's house, within cannon range of the enemy's position at Tunnel Hill. At this point the enemy opened his artillery, but being familiar with the ground, I soon made disposition of my troops and placed a few guns in position, and ordered them to return the fire, which was promptly executed. In accordance with the general plan for the advance upon that place, Major-General Howard's corps moved from Cherokee Springs, from the direction of Cleveland, and formed a junction with my command at this point. General Howard sent a force to operate on the north end of Tunnel Hill, while a strong line of skirmishers from Me-Cook's brigade, gallantly commanded by Major Holmes, Fiftysecond Ohio Infantry, attacked the enemy's position below the town near where the road leading to Dalton crosses the hill. These movements, assisted by the action of the batteries, caused the enemy to withdraw from his position and retreat toward Buzzard Roost. In compliance with orders, I moved my entire division beyond the town and took position on the right of the Dalton road, and sent a regiment from Morgan's brigade to take possession of a high round hill immediately in my front, known to us as Signal Hill. This duty was well performed by the Tenth Illinois Regiment, commanded by Colonel Tillson. McCook's brigade had the advance during the day, and most of the fighting required to be done in driving in the enemy's pickets and skirmishers was gallantly performed by his troops, superintended by himself. The division remained in this position until the forenoon of the 9th, when an advance into the gap of Buzzard Roost was determined upon. Mitchell's brigade was ordered to advance along the left of the road and drive in the enemy's pickets, occupying a little group of round-shaped hills in front of the enemy's works, which obstructed the gap. This duty was performed by a line of skirmishers, supported by his whole, brigade. The ground thus gained was held, and my entire division took position in the gap. During the succeeding three days my troops were kept more or less under fire: The enemy, after persistent and sometimes heavy skirmishing, was driven into his works in the gorge and upon the top of Rocky Face. The operations of these three days were mostly executed and the fighting done by General Morgan's brigade. Much of the fighting consisted in heavy skirmishing, and on several occasions, when attempts were made to feel of the enemy's works, it became almost a general engagement in severity. Captain Barnett,  my chief of artillery, with much difficulty succeeded in getting a part of his artillery in position, and operated very successfully with it against the enemy's batteries and works. The privations and hardships my troops were compelled to undergo during these few days' operations, and their constant exposure to the fire of the enemy's artillery, as well as his skirmishline and sharpshooters, and the consequent heavy loss in killed and wounded, gave the highest proof of their discipline and courage, and the zeal with which they were entering upon the long and arduous campaign before them. On the 12th my command was relieved from its position in the gap by troops from the Fourth Corps, and, following the other divisions of the corps, marched at sunrise for Snake Creek Gap, which place it reached at dark. During the night it passed through the gap and bivouacked early on the 13th near the field-works thrown up by General McPherson's command in the vicinity of Resaca. In compliance with instructions, after a few hours rest, the division took a position in line on the left of the corps in the general advance upon the enemy's position near Resaca. During the night of the 13th the division occupied a position a little in reserve of the left of the corps and connected pickets with Major-General Schofield's right. On the 14th, conforming to the movement of troops on the right and the general plan of advance, the division moved forward from one position to another until the enemy's main lines were reached. The troops on several parts of our lines had become warmly engaged with the enemy during the forenoon, and his main line of battle in front of our right was well developed. In the afternoon, in compliance with orders, I sent Mitchell's brigade to the support of a part of our lines, composed of Brigadier-General Judah's command, of the Twenty-third Corps, and Brigadier-General Turchin's brigade, of the Fourteenth Corps, which were reported as being hard pressed by the enemy. This brigade moved promptly and gallantly into position. Relieving these troops, they entered immediately into the fight. The conduct of this brigade was highly creditable to both officers and men. Colonel Mitchell's conduct was conspicuous on this occasion for personal gallantry. My batteries were exceedingly well posted on a high ridge overlooking the enemy's works and were well manned all day. Their conduct was very conspicuous on this occasion. The effect of their projectiles was unusually severe upon the enemy's lines, driving him several times from his rifle-pits. During the night, in obedience to orders, I moved the entire division, except the batteries, to the right, and relieved the division of General Butterfield, of the Twentieth Corps, and the brigade of General Carlin, of the Fourteenth Corps, from their position in the front line. The troops worked assiduously all night, strengthening and completing the works previously commenced by General Butterfield's troops. The 15th my skirmish line was sharply engaged all day, but no general movement of my troops was made. Early on the morning of the 16th instant it was ascertained that the enemy had abandoned his position and was crossing the river. I received orders to march with as little delay as possible with my command down the west bank of the Oostenaula River to the mouth of the Armuchee Creek, with a view to co-operating with the cavalry forces in that vicinity. It was supposed that a bridge existed across the river at this point, over which the forces operating on this flank of the army could cross and cut the railroad between Kingston and Rome, and rejoin the main column in its pursuit of the retreating enemy. The division made a rapid march of  fifteen miles and encamped at dark a few miles from the Armuchee. During the night the cavalry forces, under the command of Brigadier-General Garrard, passed through my camp en route for Lay's Ferry, near Resaca. General Garrard reported his inability to find any bridge across the Oostenaula above Rome, and his determination to return and cross the river with the main column near Resaca. This condition of affairs placed me in an embarrassing position as to how to act under the circumstances. Believing, however, that the main object of the expedition could best be obtained by pushing on to Rome with my command, and try to secure the bridge and capture that place, I immediately sent a communication to Major-General Thomas of my determination, and early on the morning of the 17th resumed the march in that direction. About noon the first of the enemy's pickets were found at Farmer's Bridge over the Armuchee. This place is eight miles from Rome. Here I determined to park the trains and allow the troops time to rest and get dinner. About 2 p. m. the column, except two regiments left behind to guard the trains, resumed the march. Mitchell's brigade had the advance and pushed rapidly forward, driving in the enemy's cavalry until within cannon range of the enemy's works on De Soto Hill on the west side of the Oostenaula River. Colonel Mitchell reported the enemy in strong force in his front, and his advanced guard, Thirtyfourth Illinois Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Van Tassell, sharply engaged with his skirmishers. I immediately made disposition of my troops for the purpose of driving in the enemy's outposts, so as to reconnoiter his works. This was scarcely commenced before he opened with a battery of artillery upon the advance troops, and at the same time a brigade of infantry advanced from the works to attack us. I immediately ordered Col. Daniel McCook to move his brigade as rapidly as possible to the front and take position on a commanding ridge to the left of the Resaca and Rome road, still held by our skirmishers. McCook moved promptly into position and deployed his troops so as to be able to give or receive an attack at any time. By this time the enemy was observed advancing, apparently with a view of taking possession of a ridge directly in front of the one just taken by McCook's brigade, and extending some distance to his right. This ridge offered a better and more extended line of battle, and I ordered McCook to advance and take possession of it. The movement was promptly executed, just in time to meet the enemy in about equal force ascending the opposite slope to the attack. Both parties opened fire with great determination, and the enemy at this time indicated a disposition to give a general battle outside of his works. From the best information I could get I was well satisfied his forces did not exceed mine in numbers. The gallant manner in which McCook's brigade went into battle and sustained it, notwithstanding a march of eighteen miles since morning, determined me to accept the issue, and Mitchell's brigade was promptly deployed on the right of the road in supporting distance of McCook. The batteries were put in position and opened fire for a few rounds. Morgan's brigade was massed in reserve during the attack on McCook's brigade, but a report received at this time that the enemy was moving in heavy force to my right, together with the demonstrations his skirmishers were making in that direction, determined me to move Morgan to that flank, with orders to push out skirmishers to the Alabama road. The emergency as well as the approach of night required great promptness in the execution of the movement. The emergency was fully met, and  by dark Morgan had driven in the enemy's skirmishers and formed his entire brigade on the Alabama road close up to the enemy's works. McCook and Mitchell reported the enemy repulsed on their fronts, and I ordered a strong skirmish line to be thrown out, with instructions to force those of the enemy back into his works, behind which his main forces had taken refuge. This was handsomely done, and our main lines established upon the most advantageous ground that could be selected. My lines as now established completely invested the enemy's works on the west bank of the river, my left being so near the Oostenaula and my right so near the Coosa, as to prevent my flank from being turned from either direction. My loss in killed and wounded did not exceed 150 men. Lieutenant-Colonel Wiles and Major Shea, of the Twenty-second Indiana Regiment, were both seriously wounded. Notwithstanding the long march of eighteen miles and the fatigue of the field maneuvers and fighting during the day, the troops stacked their arms and went vigorously to work building breastworks, and by morning the entire line was well fortified. The dense fog which prevailed in the morning prevented any movement, under the circumstances, until 9 a. m., at which time it began to rise, and I ordered the works to be vigorously attacked in front of each brigade with a strong line of skirmishers. This was done and the works soon taken possession of, having been abandoned during the night, except by a skirmish line, which fled rapidly across the river, burning the bridges behind them. His rear guard was pursued so closely by our skirmishers that their attempts to destroy the pontoons across the river were only partially successful. A few troops advanced into the works on De Soto Hill were sufficient to draw the enemy's artillery fire from the two formidable field-works, one situated on the east bank of the Oostenaula and the other on the south bank of the Coosa. The works were situated on two high hills, and completely commanded all approaches to them from the. opposite side of the river, as well as the works just abandoned by the enemy and now held by us. In order to test the full strength of the enemy, I ordered Barnett's and Gardner's batteries to be put into position on De Soto Hill and to open fire. This was done, and after half an hour's practice the superiority of our batteries was gratifyingly manifested by an almost complete silence of the enemy's guns. While these movements were being made, the skirmish line had gradually closed to the river-bank, and was sharply engaged with the enemy on the opposite side. The city was now completely at our mercy. This fact, considered in connection with the best information I could obtain, convinced me that the enemy intended to evacuate the city, and was only prolonging his resistance in order to remove, as much as possible, his public stores. To complete the capture of the city it was necessary to throw troops across the Oostenaula. A point some distance above the enemy's works, near McCook's left during the engagement of the previous evening, was selected, and his brigade designated to execute the movement. The hazardous enterprise of effecting the first crossing was gallantly accomplished by the Eighty-fifth Illinois Regiment, commanded by Colonel Dilworth, on rafts built of rails and logs hastily collected on the bank. This regiment was crossed in an astonishingly short space of time, and soon began to drive in the enemy's pickets in the direction of the city. The enemy, finding himself unexpectedly attacked from a direction which soon must result in his capture, retreated in the most precipitate manner over the Etowah River,  destroying the bridge behind him. Dilworth advanced his skirmishers down the Oostenaula, driving in those of the enemy, until his line reached the city and extended to the Etowah, thus covering the railroad and all approaches to the city between the forks of the two rivers. This enabled us to reach the crossings over the Oostenaula, and secure what yet remained undestroyed of the bridges. The main bridges were entirely destroyed, but the pontoons were secured and repaired, and a bridge made in a few hours sufficient to cross the whole of McCook's brigade. On taking possession of the city considerable public stores were found, notwithstanding the efforts of the enemy to destroy and remove them. These stores consisted of quartermaster, commissary, and medical supplies, and were issued to the troops of my command, except one large train of cars, loaded mostly with salt, and sent to Kingston. A large amount of private property was found in the city, abandoned by the owners. This consisted mostly of cotton. All such stores were placed under guard, and in this condition were turned over to my successor, Colonel Bane, commanding brigade, of Sixteenth Corps, Army of thL Tennessee. Three field pieces, five 32-pounder garrison guns, and two 8-inch howitzers were abandoned, and fell into our hands. The large iron-works and machine-shops of Noble & Co., upon which the enemy relied for a large part of his ordnance supplies and repairs, were captured in good condition. It was the intention of the enemy to destroy these shops and stores, but so sudden was the attack of Dilworth's skirmishers that he precipitately fled, and they fell into our possession. The city was occupied by McCook's brigade until the advance was resumed. Morgan's and Mitchell's brigades went into camp on the west bank of the Oostenaula, occupying the works. The enemy's pickets continued to hold the south bank of the Coosa for several days, and kept up at intervals a vicious skirmish firing into the city, killing and wounding soldiers and citizens indiscriminately, until the 22d, when, in compliance with instructions, Morgan crossed a part of his brigade in pontoon boats, which had been sent me from the main column by order of Major-General Thomas, and took possession of the opposite bank of the river. The pontoon bridge was soon laid, and the whole of Morgan's brigade moved across and occupied the works, driving the enemy from that entire front. On the 23d Mitchell's brigade and the batteries moved across the two rivers and bivouacked, preparatory to commencing the advance the next morning. The 24th the entire division moved from Rome to Euharlee Creek, where it struck General McPherson's column, and went into camp. The following morning it resumed the march to Van Wert, where it again came in contact with General McPherson's troops. At this point I ascertained that a road running over the Allatoona Mountain, between the one occupied by McPherson's command and the Fourteenth Army Corps, could be found. I determined to move upon it. The road proved passable, and by a rapid march I was enabled to encamp my whole command at night within three miles of Dallas and in close support of the main column. On reporting the arrival of my command, on the morning of the 26th, I received orders from General Thomas to make a reconnaissance in the direction of Dallas, with a view of finding out the enemy's position on that flank and to open, if possible, communication with General McPherson's command. Taking the Burnt Hickory road and passing over Bishop's Bridge, across Pumpkin Vine Creek, two miles from Dallas, the advance of Morgan's brigade drove in the enemy's pickets and  pushed into the town. The whole division followed and formed line of battle on the East Marietta road. The head of General Mc-Pherson's column arrived at this time and went into position, his lines running across the Villa Rica road. Skirmishers ordered out soon found Hardee's corps intrenched in a strong position, covering the Marietta and Villa Rica roads, his right resting on the west end of Ellisberry Mountain. During the night the troops erected temporary breast-works, and early on the morning of the 27th I ordered McCook's brigade to advance about a mile into a gorge in the mountain, through which a road passes connecting the two roads leading from Dallas to Marietta. A regiment deployed as skirmishers, after some hard fighting, discovered a brigade of the enemy's infantry strongly posted in this defile. McCook's whole brigade was during the day posted and intrenched so as to completely control this pass. A regiment from Mitchell's brigade was sent to open communication with the right of General Hooker's corps, then operating near the northeast end of Ellisberry Mountain. This communication was preserved by a line of sentinels from my command during the remainder of our operations on this flank. During the day the Twenty-second Indiana Regiment, after considerable fighting, reached the enemy's lines on top of the mountain and held its position until night; but, while attempting to withdraw, the enemy sallied out in pursuit in considerable force. The One hundred and twenty-fifth Illinois Regiment was at this time moving out to take position as a picket, and very opportunely arrived at the point of the conflict. A general melee ensued, in which a number were killed and wounded on both sides. The night was intensely dark and, where friend could not be distinguished from foe, the conflict became exceedingly exciting. It resulted, however, favorably to us. The position was held and a number of prisoners fell into our hands. On the morning of the 28th, in order to render the position between my left and General Hooker's right more secure, I selected a strong position about midway between the two points, the distance being three miles, and ordered Mitchell to intrench his brigade there and to cut roads to his rear connecting with the main command near Good [New] Hope Church. This work was well executed by Colonel Mitchell and command, and much facilitated the subsequent movements of our troops in that direction. As now posted my command remained without change of position until early on the morning of the 1st of June, when, in concert with the Army of the Tennessee, I withdrew and joined the corps, then occupying a position near the left of the whole army, in the vicinity of Good [New] Hope Church. Relieving a part of the Army of the Ohio, Hovey's command, it took position in the front line during the night, where it remained engaged in constant skirmishing with the enemy until the 4th, when it withdrew and took a commanding position on Stoneman's Hill, filling, with two brigades, a gap between General Hooker's command, on the right, and the Fourteenth Army Corps, on the left. During the night of the 5th the enemy evacuated his works, and early on the morning of the 6th, taking the right of the corps in the pursuit, the division went into camp in the afternoon on Proctor's Creek, covering the road leading from Acworth to Big Shanty, two miles from the former place, where it remained in comparative quiet until the 17th. when it moved in concert with the other divisions of the corps to a position in front of Pine Mountain and formed on the right of Baird's division, connecting with the left of the Fourth Corps in the afternoon.  During the 18th and 19th the division changed position several times in the general advance of our lines to the enemy's position near Kenesaw Mountain, and the skirmishing was frequently very sharp, particularly between a part of Morgan's brigade, which was ordered to drive in the enemy's skirmishers and to feel of his position on top of the mountain. This duty was gallantly done by the Sixtieth Illinois Regiment, commanded by Colonel Anderson. This demonstration, and the appearance of the troops at the base of the mountain while going into position, drew forth a heavy fire from the enemy's batteries on the summit and showed conclusively that he was there in force and strongly posted. The batteries of the division came into action, and during the remainder of the day contested the ground with good success. The troops were intrenched and field-works thrown up for the batteries during the night. The troops remained in this position with but little change until the night of the 25th, during which time sharp skirmishing frequently engaged the infantry, and fierce artillery contests sprang up between the contending batteries. In these encounters our batteries invariably manifested their superiority and discipline over that of the enemy. My command, except the batteries, was relieved by a division of the Sixteenth Corps, of the Army of the Tennessee, and moved during the night to the rear of our lines and bivouacked during the 26th in rear of General Stanley's division, of the Fourth Corps, preparatory to storming the enemy's works at some point near that place on the following morning. Being informed by Major-General Thomas of the distinguished duty for which my division had been designated, in company with Generals Stanley, Brannan, and Baird, I made a thorough reconnaissance of the enemy's works and selected the point of attack. The point selected was immediately in front of General Whitaker's brigade, of Stanley's division, of the Fourth Corps. The enemy's works here conforming to a projecting point in the ridge, upon which his works were built, presented a salient angle, and, in the absence of abatis, fallen timber, and other obstructions which generally confront their works, this point seemed the most assailable. Early on the morning of the 27th the brigade commanders accompanied me to the ground and familiarized themselves with it. McCook's and Mitchell's brigades had been designated for this conspicuous duty, and at 8 o'clock were massed in an open field in rear of our breast-works (now occupied by Morgan's brigade as a reserve), some 600 yards from the point to be carried. No place nearer the enemy's line could the troops be massed without receiving the enemy's fire, both of infantry and artillery. The ground to be passed over was exceedingly rocky and rough, and a considerable part of it covered with forest trees, interspersed with undergrowth. The signal was given a little before 9 o'clock, and the troops, following the example of their admired leaders, bounded over our own works, in the face of the enemy's fire, and rushed gallantly for the enemy, meeting and disregarding with great coolness the heavy fire, both of artillery and infantry, to which they were subjected, until the enemy's works were reached. Here, owing to exhaustion, produced by the too rapid execution of the movement, the exceedingly rough ground, and the excessive heat, the troops failed to leap and carry the works to which their noble daring and impetuous valor had carried them. McCook had fallen, dangerously wounded, and Harmon, next in rank, had assumed command, but fell immediately. Dilworth, the next senior in rank, promptly took command of the brigade, and  with great personal gallantry held his command to the fierce contest now being fought so near the works that a number of both officers and men were killed and wounded at the trenches. Mitchell's brigade, moving in column parallel with McCook's, received and returned the fire with the same impetuosity and invincible determination, but failed, from the same cause, to carry the works. The position of the troops at this juncture was one of extreme solicitude, and presented a problem of some difficulty of solution. To retire, and thus receive the full effect of the enemy's unrestrained fire, now considerably diminished in severity by the effect of our own, was sure to incur an additional loss. A renewal of the assault in the present exhausted condition of the troops was exceedingly hazardous. Under the circumstances, after a thorough examination of the ground and the enemy's works, I reported to Major-General Thomas, and recommended that the position be held and the troops intrenched where they were. This he ordered to be done, and intrenching implements were immediately furnished the troops, and both brigades threw up works a few yards from and nearly parallel to those of the enemy. This was done under fire so severe that at times it might also be termed a general engagement. Works thrown up under such circumstances were of necessity of rude character, but sufficed to protect the men until night, during which the whole command intrenched itself in excellent works. During the succeeding six days the position was held, the troops sleeping on their arms at night. Details were kept engaged in throwing up new works whereever an advanced line could be established, until the morning of the 3d of July, when it was discovered that the enemy had abandoned the position. The assault failed in its immediate object, but the courage and discipline exhibited by the troops in the attack, the determined manner in which they clung to the works afterward, and the noble physical endurance displayed by them during the six days and nights, have never been exceeded in modern soldiery. Col. Daniel McCook, long the admired and gallant commander of his brigade, fell with a severe wound, of which he subsequently died at his home in Ohio. Colonel Harmon, of the One hundred and Twenty-fifth Illinois, succeeded him in command, but fell immediately afterward. He was a brave and skillful officer. The loss of these two noble leaders was at the time a great misfortune to the troops, and will ever be to the army and country a great loss. In the list of killed are the names of Lieut. Col. James M. Shane, Ninety-eighth Ohio Infantry; Maj. John Yager, One hundred and Twenty-first Ohio Infantry; Capt. M. B. Clason, One hundred and Twenty-first Ohio Infantry; Capt. W W. Fellows, One hundred and Twenty-fifth Illinois Infantry, acting brigade inspector; Capt. Charles H. Chatfield, Eighty-fifth Illinois Infantry; Lieut Patrick, One hundred and Twenty-first Ohio Infantry, and Captain Bowersock, One hundred and Thirteenth Ohio Infantry, whom I think it my duty to mention in this report. In the list of wounded are Lieut. Col. D. B. Warner, One hundred and Thirteenth Ohio Infantry; Capt. Henry O. Mansfield, Fifty-second Ohio Infantry; Captain Durant, One hundred and Thirteenth Ohio Infantry; Adjt. C. N. Andrus, Eiglty-fifth Illinois Volunteer Infantry; Lieut. Samuel T. Rogers, Eighty-sixth Illinois Infantry; Captain Vanantwerp, Eighty-sixth Illinois Infantry; Captain Howden, Seventy-eighth Illinois Infantry; Lieutenants Lippincott, Bentley. Baxter, Watson, and Dungan, of the One hundred and Thirteenth Ohio Infantry; and Lieutenants Thomas and Lindsey, of the Ninety.  eighth Ohio Infantry. These gallant officers fell in leading their men to the enemy's works, some of them at the ditches. On the morning of the 3d of July the division moved in pursuit of the enemy, again in retreat. Passing through Marietta and following the Twentieth Corps, went into bivouac at Nickajack Creek, in sight of the enemy's works at that place. July 4, opened with both batteries and pushed a heavy line of skirmishers across the creek and swamp. In the afternoon Morgan's whole brigade was crossed and skirmished heavily with the enemy, and succeeded in driving him into his main works. This brigade bivouacked during the night close to the abatis of the enemy's works. At daylight on the morning of the 5th Major Burnett, of the Tenth Michigan Infantry, commanding the skirmish line, reported through General Morgan that the enemy had retreated, and the pursuit was resumed. Passing through the enemy's works, the rear guard of the enemy was pressed by the Thirty-fourth Illinois Regiment to within a few hundred yards of his works on the Chattahoochee River. Here his skirmishers made a determined stand, and the Fourteenth Michigan, the One hundred and twentyfifth Illinois, and the Ninety-eighth Ohio Regiments were deployed, and after a severe skirmish drove the enemy from his rifle-pits into his main works, from which, after occasional skirmishing and considerable artillery fighting, he withdrew on the 9th of July. The enemy's works thus vacated were immediately occupied by a brigade and battery of my troops, until the general crossing of the river and advance upon Atlanta was resumed. The short respite of a few days here given to the troops was well spent in a general burnishing up of guns and accouterments, and outfitting of the men with clothing. On the morning of the 17th Morgan's and Mitchell's brigades and the batteries moved to the river at Pace's Ferry at daylight. After some delay on account of the pontoons not being laid, the command commenced to cross, and Morgan being in the advance found the enemy about one mile from the ferry, and after a sharp skirmish fight, in which a part of General Johnson's skirmishers took part, with his cavalry dismounted, drove them to and across Nancy's Creek. The troops here bivouacked for the night. On the morning of the 18th Dilworth's brigade joined the division, moving from its previous camp before daylight, and took the advance of the column. Little resistance was offered by the enemy to our advance during the day, and before night I was able to report my troops in camp on Peach Tree Creek, a short distance below Howell's Mill, picketing the bank from my front to its mouth. On the 19th, in compliance with verbal instructions from Major-General Thomas, I ordered Dilworth to move his brigade to the mouth of Green Bone Creek in search of a crossing said to exist there. A point over which troops could be passed was found; it was also found strongly picketed by the enemy. Dilworth was ordered to drive these away, and to effect a lodgment of his troops on the opposite bank, if possible. This, after a severe skirmish, was accomplished in the afternoon. The remainder of his brigade was ordered across, but had hardly formed on the opposite bank when a brigade of the enemy sallied out from their works to the support of their skirmishers, then driven back. Dilworth immediately pushed his lines forward in order to meet his foe on an advantageous ridge which lay in his front. The two forces here met in about equal numbers and at once brought on an engagement.  The fighting was very sharp on both sides, but soon resulted in a signal repulse of the enemy. The loss was heavy on both sides, considering the numbers engaged and the short time the fight lasted. This day's work was exceedingly creditable to both Colonel Dilworth and command. Mitchell's brigade was ordered to the support of Dilworth. It moved with great promptness, and succeeded in crossing in time to assist in the closing of this gallant little fight and repulse of the enemy. Baird's division crossed and took position on my left during the night. Morgan's brigade, with Banning's regiment, the One hundred and twenty-first Ohio, of Mitchell's brigade, and the batteries were held as reserved forces on the north bank of the creek. Heavy details were required from these to picket the creek to its mouth, and some severe fighting was done at different points, when attempts were made by us to cross the stream. On the 20th I changed the position of my batteries. Gardner crossed the creek and was placed in the main line of Dilworth's works, and after a few rounds of excellent firing, drove the enemy from his rifle-pits in front. The rest of my troops remained in nearly the same position, and skirmished sharply all day. On the morning of the 12st it was reported that the enemy had fallen back, and I ordered a reconnaissance to be made. General Baird did the same in his front, but it was soon discovered that he had only withdrawn his picket-line closer to his main works. The enemy retreated during the night. On the morning of the 22d, keeping to the right of Baird's division, I moved my whole command to the west side of the Marietta road, and took position on the Turner's Ferry road, connecting with General Baird's right. This position was a strong one, and, being for the time the extreme right of the whole army, I ordered it to be well fortified. My batteries bore upon the city from these works with great ease. My command remained in this position without change until the 28th, when I received orders to make movement in the direction of Turner's Ferry and East Point, and from thence toward Howard's right. At this time my health, which had not been good for some days, required me to turn over the active and immediate command of the troops to General Morgan. The movement was promptly commenced by General Morgan, but, before being completed, the enemy attacked General Howard's command on the right in heavy force, and, in compliance with instructions from Major-General Sherman, I sent a staff officer to order Morgan to Howard's support. Morgan, who, when the messenger reached him, was several miles off, turned his column at once in the direction of the fighting. Every effort was made by General Morgan to reach the position, but he was unable to do so until the enemy had been repulsed. The troops went into bivouac long after night, much fatigued from the long march and excessive heat. On the 29th the division took position on the right of the Army of the Tennessee, and intrenched itself, where it remained with little change until the 4th, when, in accordance with orders, it moved across Utoy Creek and took position on the right and rear of Baird's division. This was accomplished after some heavy skirmishing, in which the enemy's artillery took part. On the 5th the division took ground to the right and front, the left brigade connecting with Baird's right flank, where it remained much exposed to the enemy's shell until the 7th, when, in compliance with instructions, it moved forward; wheeling on the left, formed a new line close to the enemy's works. In the execution of this movement there was some fighting, and a number of prisoners  were taken. On the 8th four regiments from the First and Second Brigades were sent to the right of the Twenty-third Corps, which was making some demonstrations against the enemy, and acted as a reserve to that command during the day; at night they returned to camp. On the morning of the 20th, in compliance with instructions from corps headquarters, I ordered General Morgan to make, with his own and Dilworth's brigades, a reconnaissance in the direction of Red Oak, and, if possible, to reach the railroad at that point. Two brigades of Baird's division and one from Carlin's reported to me on the Campbellton road, to be used, if necessary, in support of this movement. General Morgan pushed the reconnaissance with vigor, and reached the railroad, as desired. After destroying a small portion of the track, and reporting to me his success, I ordered the troops to return to their respective camps. During the 21st and and 22d the location of the troops remained without change. On the 22d I turned over the command of the division to Brigadier-General Morgan, and, in compliance with Special Orders, No. 241, War Department, dated August 9, 1864, assumed command of the Fourteenth Army Corps, relieving Brig. Gen. R. W. Johnson. This ends my connection with the division as its immediate commander, but before closing this report, and taking leave of the troops, with whom I have so long been associated amid the scenes of active operations unparalleled in the history of war, I feel it my duty, as it is my greatest pleasure, to record a few words expressive of my high appreciation of the zeal, endurance, and courage exhibited by them throughout this long and bloody campaign — a campaign which required the highest skill in commanders to meet the varying exigencies and demanded from the ranks sacrifices which none but the soldiers of a brave and intelligent people struggling for the preservation of their Government could make. The lists of casualties will show how nobly the troops met the stern demands of the battle-field; but the patriotic zeal and devotion displayed by them in meeting the no less stern requirements of the bivouac, the march, and the trenches their immediate commanders and companions in arms can only know and record. These will long be remembered by all, and a grateful country will appreciate and reward such heroism and devotion in her cause. Among those officers whose rank and position brought them more immediately under my observation during the campaign, of whom I desire to make special mention, are Brig. Gen. James D. Morgan, commanding First Brigade, and next to me in rank in the division. To him I am under many obligations for his active and efficient cooperation at all times and under all circumstances. He has, in my judgment, earned promotion, and I earnestly recommend him to the consideration of the Government for it. Col. John G. Mitchell, commanding the Second Brigade of the division, has been recommended by me for promotion to the rank of brigadier-general in special recommendation for faithful services as brigade commander and distinguished conduct throughout the campaign. Col. C. J. Dilworth, of the Eighty-sixth Illinois Regiment, has commanded the Third Brigade since the assault on the enemy's works on the 27th of June; his efficiency as a commander and personal gallantry on that as well as other and more recent occasions has made it my duty to recommend him for promotion. The following regimental commanders are recommended for the appointment of brevet brigadier-generals for their abilities as commanders and distinguished conduct throughout the campaign: Col. H. B. Banning, One hundred  and twenty-first Ohio Regiment, and Col. William B. Anderson, Sixtieth Illinois Regiment. There are a number of other regimental commanders, whose rank is less than that of colonel, who have richly earned another grade. I hope their regiments will soon be filled by the necessary recruits, and thoy commissioned accordingly by the Governors of their respective States. Where so many subordinate officers have distinguished themselves it is impossible to discriminate. The artillery attached to this division consisted of Battery I, Second Illinois Artillery, and the Fifth Wisconsin Battery. The efficiency, discipline, and good conduct on the march and in battle of both officers and men was in the highest degree commendable. Capt. Charles M. Barnett, chief of artillery, proved himself a skillful and energetic officer by his excellent management of his batteries throughout the campaign. Captain Gardner and Lieutenant Coe, battery commanders, performed their duties ably and efficiently. Their batteries are among the best in the service. To my staff-consisting of Capt. T. W. Morrison, assistant adjutant-general; Maj. John H. Phillips, medical director; Thomas H. Daily, captain and aide-de-camp; Lieut. Thomas J. Carney, aidede-camp; Capt. James L. Orr, commissary of subsistence; Capt. J. E. Remington, assistant quartermaster; Capt. Leonidas A. Cole, commissary of musters; Capt. Charles M. Barnett, chief of artillery; Capt. Hamilton W. Hall, inspector; Capt. John F. Squier, provostmarshal; Lieut. John Paul Kuntze, topographical engineer; Lieut. George Scroggs, ordnance officer — I am again under obligations for their zealous assistance throughout the campaign. Their duties were often exceedingly arduous, and were always performed by them with skill and alacrity, whether on the field of battle or elsewhere. No list of casualties accompanies this report. This will be found in General Morgan's report, which closes with the termination of the campaign.
Jef. C. Davis, Brevet Major-General, Commanding.
Capt. A. C. McCLURG, Assistant Adjutant-General, Fourteenth Army Corps.
Hdqrs. Second Division, Fourteenth Army Corps, In the Field, June 28, 1864.Captain: The following is a corrected report of the casualties in this division as given by the brigade commanders in yesterday's operations:
Jef. C. Davis, Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.
Capt. A. C. McCLURG, Assistant Adjutant-General, Fourteenth Army Corps.