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No. 4. report of Brig. Gen. William F. Barry, U. S. Army, Chief of artillery.

Hdqrs., Mil. Div. Of the Mississippi, Atlanta, Ga., September 10, 1864.
General: I have the honor to make the following report of the artillery of the active armies of the Military Division of the Mississippi [120] for the campaign in Northern Georgia during the summer of 1864, which resulted in the capture of Atlanta:

On the 20th of March, 1864, the date of my appointment as chief of artillery of your army, the field artillery of the four separate armies, which at that time composed your command, consisted of 16,250 men (effective), 530 guns, 4,300 horses, and 987 mules. The proportion of artillery to the aggregate infantry and cavalry force was about three guns to 1,000 men. The guns were of varied patterns, twelve different calibers being at that time in actual use. The severity of the campaigns of the previous autumn and winter had also reduced the number of draft animals much below what was necessary.

Believing that the character of the country and of your proposed operations, as well as the veteran condition of your troops, would justify a material reduction in the number of guns, and convinced that efficiency and facility of service and supply demanded a reduction of the number of calibers, I submitted both questions to your consideration. You approved of my recommendation that the proportion of artillery to the other two arms should not exceed two guns per 1,000 men, and that the number of calibers should be reduced to four. Immediate measures were taken to carry out these views. Horses and mules in sufficient numbers were provided and distributed ; the proportion of artillery was reduced to rather less than two guns per 1,000 men, and all the odd or unnecessary calibers were eliminated by being either turned into arsenals or placed in the depots or other fortified posts in our rear, where they were used as guns of position.

Written instructions and printed general orders were prepared and issued, the latter in such numbers that every officer and sergeant was supplied with a copy, and by the 1st of May, when the campaign commenced, the field artillery of your armies, in equipment, outfit, and general supply and condition, was well provided, and in all respects ready for the rough and active service to which it was subsequently subjected.

To Brigadier-General Brannan, Colonel Taylor, and Brigadier-General Tillson (the latter succeeded about the commencement of the campaign by Lieutenant-Colonel Schofield), the respective chiefs of artillery of the Armies of the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Ohio, much credit is due for the intelligence, energy, and zeal displayed in perfecting the preparatory arrangements and in the work of reorganizing and refitting their field batteries generally. Brigadier-General Brannan had nearly completed his share of the labor when I entered upon my duties.

The entire artillery force that took the field with the active portion of your forces in Northern Georgia, on the 5th of May, 1864, was as follows:

Army of the Cumberland24843,1201302,380
Army of the Tennessee19602,215961,758
Army of the Ohio2379028530

These batteries were efficiently horsed and well supplied with caissons, battery wagons, and traveling forges, and rarely had at any [121] time on hand a less amount of ammunition than 400 rounds per gun. Great credit is due to Capt. T. G. Baylor, the chief ordnance officer of the military division, for the promptness and energy with which he kept well at the front, even under the occasionally adverse circumstances of interrupted communications and unexpectedly large expenditures, an abundant supply of serviceable ammunition and ordnance stores.

A reserve artillery force was organized for each of the three armies. This consisted of twelve batteries for the Army of the Cumberland, four batteries for the Army of the Tennessee, and two batteries for the Army of the Ohio.

As it was not your wish that the reserve artillery should either accompany or follow the field movements of your active forces, I directed the reserve batteries of the Armies of the Cumberland and Tennessee to be posted at Nashville, and those of the Army of the Ohio at Chattanooga. Instructions were given that all of these batteries should be kept always ready to take the field at a moment's notice. Drafts of officers, enlisted men, guns, horses, and in several instances entire batteries, were from time to time made upon this reserve, and the means of effectively making good the losses in the field of the active batteries were thus always at hand, and were promptly brought to the front.

For special reasons no horse artillery was organized, but suitable mounted batteries, equipped as lightly as possible, were selected for service with the cavalry, and were assigned to, and served through the campaign with, the divisions of Stoneman, Kilpatrick, Garrard, and McCook. The cavalry commanders, and the army chiefs of artillery give these batteries, in their several reports, a high reputation for endurance and dash, praise which entitles them to the more credit since their organization and equipment was not altogether favorable to distinction with the cavalry arm.

No siege train, specially organized as such, was deemed requisite, either with the active armies or with the reserve artillery, the field batteries of 20-pounder Parrotts being considered sufficiently heavy for such work as the operations of the campaign would be likely to render necessary. The result fully justified this expectation, with the single exception of some special service during the operations before Atlanta, for which eight 4 1/2-inch rifled siege guns were brought by rail from Chattanooga, and returned thither in the same manner when their mission was accomplished.

The 10 and 20 pounder Parrotts and the 3-inch wrought-iron guns have fully maintained their reputations for endurance and for the superior accuracy and range expected from rifled guns. The light i 2-pounder has more than ever proved itself to be the gun for the line of battle, where facility of service and effectiveness of solid 31hot, spherical case, and canister is most required. Circumstances enabled the endurance of the 4 1/2-inch rifled siege guns to be more severely tested than ever before in the face of the enemy. Four of them were found to stand, without any apparent deterioration except an enlargement of the vent, more than 1,000 discharges each fired continuously at an average of twenty minutes interval, and at an elevation varying from eight to ten degrees. In accuracy, range, and certainty of flight and explosion, this gun, when served with Schenkl projectiles (especially his percussion-shell) really leaves nothing to be desired. [122]

The amount of ammunition furnished both field and siege guns was always abundant, and it was generally supplied in serviceable condition and of the best description. Experience teaches that Parrott ammunition is the most suitable for Parrott guns, and Schenkl and Hotchkiss for the 3-inch and 41-inch, and also that the Schenkl case-shot, with combination fuse, and the Hotchkiss fuse-shell, are at present the most effective projectiles of their class for rifled guns.

The nature of military operations in a country like ours is peculiar, and often without precedent; elsewhere. It is generally unfa vorable to the full development and legitimate use of artillery. This is eminently the case in the West, where large tracts of uncleared land and dense forest materially circumscribe its field of usefulness and often force it into positions of hazard and risk. The services of the artillery throughout the whole campaign have been conspicuous. The western life of officers and men, favorable to self-reliance, coolness, endurance, and marksmanship, seems to adapt them peculiarly for this special arm. Their three years experience in the field adds important elements to their efficiency and has combined to render the artillery of your command unusually reliable and effective. At Rocky Face Ridge, Resaca, Kenesaw, and amid the varied and bloody operations before Atlanta, it sustained its appropriate share of the work most creditably. Its practice at Rocky Face Ridge and Kenesaw Mountain, where at unusual elevation it was called upon to silence or dislodge the enemy, was extraordinary. Abundant proof of this was obtained from personal inspection of the enemy's works after we gained possession of them, which proof is fully confirmed by the concurrent acknowledgment of the enemy.

The peculiar nature of the campaign and the gallantry of the artillery officers are alike illustrated by the fact that three division chiefs of artillery were killed, and the chief of artillery of the Army of the Tennessee seriously wounded by the rifles of rebel sharpshooters while they were engaged in the duty of selecting suitable positions for their batteries.

Posted as many batteries frequently and necessarily were in unusually exposed positions, and not unfrequently upon the actual skirmish line, the guns were always served with steadiness and effect, and in no instance, except in the battle of July 22 and the cavalry raids of Stoneman and McCook, on which occasions there were special exculpatory reasons, were guns abandoned or the enemy suffered to make captures. A manifest improvement was observable throughout in the use and selection of projectiles and in the judicious expenditure of ammunition.

The separate reports of battery commanders and of the division, corps, and army chiefs of artillery, which are laid before you, give the more minute details of the service of the artillery as well as the names of individuals who rendered themselves conspicuous for courage and conduct.

I beg respectfully to indorse the recommendations for the reward of individuals and to add thereto the names of Brigadier-General Brannan, Lieutenant-Colonel Schofield, and Captain Hickenlooper, the officers who have throughout the campaign performed the duties of chiefs of artillery of the three armies with fidelity, energy, and efficiency that entitle them to official commendation.

The officers of my staff, Captain Marshall, assistant adjutant-general; Captain Merritt and Lieutenant Verplanck, aides-de-camp, were always active and zealous, and carried my orders, frequently [123] under sharp fire, with coolness and intelligence. I respectfully present them for such reward as you may deem proper.

A tabular statement of guns lost and captured, of ammunition expended, and of casualties, is appended to this report.

I am, general, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

William F. Barry, Brigadier-General, Chief of Artillery. Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman
, Comdg. Military Division of the Mississippi.


Officers.Men.Total.Guns lost.Guns captured from enemy.
Army of the Cumberland56037208182742461
Army of the Tennessee4323113674250121
Army of the Ohio13617477521

Ammunition expended.

3-inch10-pounder Parrott.12-pounder (light).20-pounder Parrott.12pounder Howitzer. 4-inch gun. Total
Army of the Cumberland35,32114,78629,6435,059201036888,378
Army of the Tennessee17,3854,18214,0958,9515431,8531,15848,167
Army of the Ohio2,7421,7094,3200008,778

William F. Barry, Brigadier-General, Chief of Artillery.


Hdqrs. Military Division of the Mississippi, Atlanta, Ga., September 17, 1864.
I have examined the foregoing interesting report of General Barry, and confirm it in all respects. The large captures of artillery credited the Army of the Cumberland, if unexplained, might lead to misunderstanding. That army captured in fair battle 13 guns, viz, 4 by Hooker at Resaca, 8 by Davis at Jonesborough, and 1 by Kilpatrick. Of the remainder, 34 were found in Resaca, Rome, and Atlanta, and were the equal fruits of all the armies, but the Army of the Cumberland, having the center, first occupied these places, and got charge of the captures, whereas the other two armies on the flanks were always moved around, so as to operate on the flanks of the retreating enemy, but they are, of course, equally entitled to the credit of capturing the fortified places in which these guns were found.

W. T. Sherman, Major-General, Commanding.

1 Of these, 4 at Resaca and 20 at Atlanta were abandoned by the enemy to the whole army, though they were taken possession of by the Army of the Cumberland.

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