- Expedition to Booneville
-- destroying supplies
-- Confederate stragglers
-- success of the expedition
-- a reconnaissance
-- the importance of bodily sustenance
-- the battle of Booneville
-- recommended for appointment as a Brigadier
The expedition referred to by General Halleck
in his parting conversation was composed of the Second Michigan and Second Iowa regiments of cavalry, formed into a brigade under command of Colonel Washington L. Elliott
, of the Second Iowa.
It was to start on the night of the 27th of May at 12 o'clock, and proceed by a circuitous route through Iuka, Miss.
, to Booneville
, a station on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, about twenty-two miles below Corinth
, and accomplish all it could in the way of destroying the enemy's supplies and cutting his railroad communications.
The weather in that climate was already warm, guides unobtainable, and both men and horses suffered much discomfort from the heat, and fatigue from the many delays growing out of the fact that we were in almost total ignorance of the roads leading to the point that we desired to reach.
In order that we might go light we carried only sugar, coffee, and salt, depending on the country for meat and bread.
Both these articles were scarce, but I think we got all there was, for our advent was so unexpected by the people of the region through which we passed that, supposing us to be Confederate cavalry, they often gave us all they had, the women and servants contributing most freely from their reserve stores.
Before reaching Booneville
I had the advance, but just as we arrived on the outskirts of the town the brigade was formed with the Second Iowa on my right, and the whole force moved forward, right in front, preceded by skirmishers.
Here we encountered the enemy, but forced him back with little resistance.
When we had gained possession of the station, Colonel Elliott
directed one to take the left wing of my
regiment, pass to the south, and destroy a bridge or culvert supposed to be at a little distance below the town on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad.
The right wing, or other half of the regiment, was to be held in reserve for my support if necessary.
I moved rapidly in the designated direction till I reached the railroad, and then rode down it for a mile and a half, but found neither bridge nor culvert.
I then learned that there was no bridge of any importance except the one at Baldwin
, nine miles farther down, but as I was aware, from information recently received, that it was defended by three regiments and a battery, I concluded that I could best accomplish the purpose for which I had been detached — crippling the road — by tearing up the track, bending the rails, and burning the cross-ties.
This was begun with alacrity at four different points, officers and men vieing with one another in the laborious work of destruction.
We had but few tools, and as the difficulties to overcome were serious, our progress was slow, until some genius conceived the idea that the track, rails and ties, might be lifted from its bed bodily, turned over, and subjected to a high heat; a convenient supply of dry fence-rails would furnish ample fuel to render the rails useless.
In this way a good deal of the track was effectively broken up, and communication by rail from Corinth
to the south entirely cut off. While we were still busy in wrecking the road, a dash was made at my right and rear by a squadron of Confederate cavalry.
This was handsomely met by the reserve under Captain Archibald P. Campbell
, of the Second Michigan, who, dismounting a portion of his command, received the enemy with such a volley from his Colt
's repeating rifles that the squadron broke and fled in all directions.
We were not molested further, and resumed our work, intending to extend the break toward Baldwin
, but receiving orders from Elliott
to return to Booneville
immediately, the men were recalled, and we started to rejoin the main command.
In returning to Booneville
, I found the railroad track above where I had struck it blocked by trains that we had thus cut off, and the woods and fields around the town covered with several thousand Confederate soldiers.
These were mostly convalescents and disheartened stragglers belonging to General Beauregard
's army, and from them we learned that Corinth
was being evacuated.
I spent some little time in an endeavor to get these demoralized men into an open field, with a view to some future disposition of them; but in the midst of the undertaking I received another order from Colonel Elliott
to join him at once.
The news of the evacuation had also reached Elliott
, and had disclosed a phase of the situation so different from that under which he had viewed it when we arrived at Booneville
, that he had grown anxious to withdraw, lest we should be suddenly pounced upon by an overwhelming force
from some one of the columns in retreat.
Under such circumstances my prisoners would prove a decided embarrassment, so I abandoned further attempts to get them together — not even paroling them, which I thought might have been done with but little risk.
In the meantime the captured cars had been fired, and as their complete destruction was assured by explosions from those containing ammunition, they needed no further attention, so I withdrew my men and hastened to join Elliott
, taking along some Confederate officers whom I had retained from among four or five hundred prisoners captured when making the original dash below the town.
The losses in my regiment, and, in fact, those of the entire command, were insignificant.
The results of the expedition were important; the railroad being broken so thoroughly as to cut off all rolling stock north of Booneville
, and to place at the service of General Halleck
's army the cars and locomotives of which the retreating Confederates were now so much in need.
In addition, we burned twenty-six cars containing ten thousand stand of small arms, three pieces of artillery, a great quantity of clothing, a heavy supply of ammunition, and the personal baggage of General Leonidas Polk
A large number of prisoners, mostly sick and convalescent, also fell into our hands; but as we could not carry them with us — such a hurried departure was an immediate necessity, by reason of our critical situation — the process of paroling them was not contempleted, and they doubtless passed back to active service in the Confederacy
, properly enough unrecognized as prisoners of war by their superiors.
In returning, the columns marched back by another indirect route to its old camp near Farmington
, where we learned that the whole army had moved into and beyond Corinth
, in pursuit of Beauregard
, on the 13th of May, the very day we had captured Booneville
Although we had marched about one hundred and eighty miles in four days, we were required to take part, of course, in the pursuit of the Confederate army.
So, resting but one night in our old camp, we were early in the saddle again on the morning of the 2nd of June.
Marching south through Corinth
, we passed on the 4th of June the scene of our late raid, viewing with much satisfaction, as we took the road toward Blackland
, the still smoldering embers of the burned trains.
On the 4th of June I was ordered to proceed with my regiment along the Blackland
road to determine the strength of the enemy in that direction, as it was thought possible we might capture, by a concerted movement which General John Pope
had suggested to General Halleck
, a portion of Beauregard
's rear guard.
Pushing the Confederate
scours rapidly in with a running fire for a mile or more, while we were approaching
a little stream, I hoped to gobble the main body of the enemy's pickets.
I therefore directed the sabre battalion of the regiments, followed by that portion of it armed with revolving rifles, to dash forward in column, cut off these videttes before they could cross the stream, and then gather them in. The pickets fled hastily, however, and a pell-mell pursuit carried us over the stream at their heels by a little bridge, with no thought of halting till we gained a hill on the other side, and suddenly found ourselves almost in the camp of a strong body of artillery and infantry.
being in advance, hurriedly dismounted his battalion for a further forward movement on foot, but it was readily seen that the enemy was present in such heavy force as almost to ensure our destruction, and I gave orders for a hasty withdrawal.
We withdrew without loss under cover of thick woods, aided much, however, by the consternation of the Confederates
, who had hardly recovered from their surprise at our sudden appearance in their camp before we had again placed the stream between them and us by recrossing the bridge.
The reconnaissance was a success in one way — that is, in finding out that the enemy was at the point supposed by General Pope
; but it also had a tendency to accelerate Beauregard
's retreat, for in a day or two his whole line fell back as far south as Guntown
, thus rendering abortive the plans for bagging a large portion of his army.
's evacuation of Corinth
and retreat southward were accomplished in the face of a largely superior force of Union troops, and he reached the point where he intended to halt for reorganization without other loss than that sustained in the destruction of the cars and supplies at Booneville
, and the capture of some stragglers and deserters that fell into our hands while we were pressing his rear from General Pope
The number of these was quite large, and indicated that the enemy was considerably demoralized.
Under such circumstances, an energetic and skillfully directed pursuit might not have made certain the enemy's destruction, but it would largely have aided in disintegrating his forces, and I never could quite understand why it was not ordered.
The desultory affairs between rear and advance guards seemed as a general thing to have no particular purpose in view beyond finding out where the enemy was, and when he was found, since no supporting columns were at hand and no one in supreme control was present to give directions, our skirmishing was of little avail and brought but small reward.
A short time subsequent to these occurrences, Colonel Elliott
was made a brigadier-general, and as General Pope
appointed him his ChiefofStaff, I, on the 11th of June, 1862, fell in command of the brigade by seniority.
For the rest of the month but little of moment occurred,
and we settled down into camp at Booneville
on the 26th of June, in a position which my brigade had been ordered to take up some twenty miles in advance of the main army for the purpose of covering its front.
Although but a few days had elapsed from the date of my appointment as colonel of the Second Michigan to that of my succeeding to the command of the brigade, I believe I can say with propriety that I had firmly established myself in the confidence of the officers and men of the regiment, and won their regard by thoughtful care.
I had striven unceasingly to have them well fed and well clothed, had personally looked after the selection of their camps, and had maintained such a discipline as to allay former irritation.
Men who march, scout, and fight, and suffer all the hardships that fall to the lot of soldiers in the field, in order to do vigorous work must have the best bodily sustenance, and every comfort that can be provided.
I knew from practical experience on the frontier that my efforts in this direction would not only be appreciated, but requited by personal affection and gratitude; and, further, that such exertions would bring the best results to me. Whenever my authority would permit I saved my command from needless sacrifices and unnecessary toil; therefore, when hard or daring work was to be done I expected the heartiest response, and always got it. Soldiers are averse to seeing their comrades killed without compensating results, and none realize more quickly than they the blundering that often takes place on the field of battle.
They want some tangible indemnity for the loss of life, and as victory is an offset the value of which is manifest, it not only makes them content to shed their blood, but also furnishes evidence of capacity in those who command them.
My regiment had lost very few men since coming under my command, but it seemed, in the eyes of all who belonged to it, that casualties to the enemy and some slight successes for us had repaid every sacrifice, and in consequence I had gained not only their confidence as soldiers, but also their esteem and love as men, and to a degree far beyond what I then realized.
As soon as the camp of my brigade was pitched at Booneville
, I began to scout in every direction, to obtain a knowledge of the enemy's whereabouts and learn the ground about me. My standing in drawing at the Military Academy had never been so high as to warrant the belief that I could ever prove myself an expert, but a few practical lessons in that line were impressed on me there, and I had retained enough to enable me to make rough maps that could be readily understood, and which would be suitable to replace the erroneous skeleton outlines of northern Mississippi
, with which at this time we were scantily furnished; so as soon as possible I compiled for the use of myself and my regimental
commanders an information map of the surrounding country.
This map exhibited such details as country roads, streams, farmhouses, fields, woods, and swamps, and such other topographical features as would be useful.
I must confess that my crude sketch did not evidence much artistic merit, but it was an improvement on what we already possessed in the way of details to guide the command, and this was what I most needed; for it was of the first importance that in our exposed condition we should be equipped with a thorough knowledge of the section in which we were operating, so as to be prepared to encounter an enemy already indicating recovery from the disorganizing effects of his recent retreat.
In the immediate vicinity of Booneville
the country was covered with heavy forests, with here and there clearings or intervening fields that had been devoted to the cultivation of cotton and corn.
The ground was of a low character, typical of northeastern Mississippi
, and abounded in small creeks that went almost totally dry even in short periods of drought, but became flooded with muddy water under the outpouring of rain peculiar to a semi-tropical climate.
In such a region there were many chances of our being surprised, especially by an enemy who knew the country well, and whose ranks were filled with local guides; and great precautions as well as the fullest information were necessary to prevent disaster.
I therefore endeavored to familiarize all with our surroundings, but scarcely had matters begun to shape themselves as I desired when our annihilation was attempted by a large force of Confederate cavalry.
On the morning of July 1, 1862, a cavalry command of between five and six thousand men, under the Confederate General James R. Chalmers
, advanced on two roads converging near Booneville
The head of the enemy's column on the Blackland
road came in contact with my pickets three miles and a half west of Booneville
These pickets, under Lieutenant Leonidas S. Scranton
, of the Second Michigan Cavalry, fell back slowly, taking advantage of every tree or other cover to fire from till they arrived at the point where the converging roads joined.
At this junction there was a strong position in the protecting timber, and here Scranton
made a firm stand, being reinforced presently by the few men he had out as pickets on the road to his left, a second company I had sent him from camp, and subsequently by three companies more, all now commanded by Captain Campbell
This force was dismounted and formed in line, and soon developed that the enemy was present in large numbers.
Up to this time Chalmers
had shown only the heads of his columns, and we had doubts as to his purpose, but now that our resistance forced him to deploy two regiments on the
Map: battle of Booneville, July 1st 1862.|
right and left of the road, it became apparent that he meant business, and that there was no time to lose in preparing to repel his attack.
Full information of the situation was immediately sent me, and I directed Campbell
to hold fast, if possible, till I could support him, but if compelled to retire he was authorized to do so slowly, taking advantage of every means that fell in his way to prolong the fighting.
Before this I had stationed one battalion of the Second Iowa in Booneville
, but Colonel Edward Hatch
, commanding that regiment, was now directed to leave one company for the protection of our camp a little to the north of the station, and take the balance of the Second Iowa, with the battalion in Booneville
except two sabre companies, and form the whole in rear of Captain Campbell
, to protect his flanks and support him by a charge should the enemy break his dismounted line.
While these preparations were being made, the Confederates
attempted to drive Campbell
from his position by a direct attack through an open field.
In this they failed, however, for our men, reserving their fire until the enemy came within about thirty yards, then opened on him with such a shower of bullets from our Colt
's rifles that it soon became too hot for him, and he was repulsed with considerable loss.
Foiled in this move, Chalmers
hesitated to attack again in front, but
began overlapping both flanks of Campbell
's line by force of numbers, compelling Campbell
to retire toward a strong position I had selected in his rear for a line on which to make our main resistance.
As soon as the enemy saw this withdrawing he again charged in front, but was again as gallantly repelled as in the first assault, although the encounter was for a short time so desperate as to have the character of a handto-hand conflict, several groups of friend and foe using on each other the butts of their guns.
At this juncture the timely arrival of Colonel Hatch
with the Second Iowa gave a breathing-spell to Campbell
, and made the Confederates
so chary of further direct attacks that he was enabled to retire; and at the same time I found opportunity to make disposition of the reinforcement to the best advantage possible, placing the Second Iowa on the left of the new line and strengthening Campbell
on its right with all the men available.
In view of his numbers, the enemy soon regained confidence in his ability to overcome us, and in a little while again began his flanking movements, his right passing around my left flank some distance, and approaching our camp and transportation, which I had forbidden to be moved out to the rear.
Fearing that he would envelop us and capture the camp and transportation, I determined to take the offensive.
Remembering a circuitous wood road that I had become familiar with while making the map heretofore mentioned, I concluded that the most effective plan would be to pass a small column around the enemy's left, by way of this road, and strike his rear by a mounted charge simultaneously with an advance of our main line on his front.
I knew that the attack in rear would be a most hazardous undertaking, but in the face of such odds as the enemy had the condition of affairs was most critical, and could be relieved only by a bold and radical change in our tactics; so I at once selected four sabre companies, two from the Second Michigan and two from the Second Iowa, and placing Captain Alger
, of the former regiment, in command of them, I informed him that I expected of them the quick and desperate work that is usually imposed on a forlorn hope.
To carry out the purpose now in view, I instructed Captain Alger
to follow the wood road as it led around the left of the enemy's advancing forces, to a point where it joined the Blackland
road, about three miles from Booneville
, and directed him, upon reaching the Blackland
road, to turn up it immediately, and charge the rear of the enemy's line.
Under no circumstances was he to deploy the battalion, but charge in column
right through whatever he came upon, and report to me in front of Booneville
, if at all possible for him to get there.
If he failed to break through the enemy's line, he was to go ahead as far as he
could, and then if any of his men were left, and he was able to retreat, he was to do so by the same route he had taken on his way out. To conduct him on this perilous service I sent along a thin, sallow, tawnyhaired Mississippian named Beene, whom I had employed as a guide and scout a few days before, on account of his intimate knowledge of the roads, from the public thoroughfares down to the insignificant bypaths of the neighboring swamps.
With such guidance I felt sure that the column would get to the desired point without delay, for there was no danger of its being lost or misled by taking any of the many by-roads which traversed the dense forests through which it would be obliged to pass.
I also informed Alger
that I should take the reserve and join the main line in front of Booneville
for the purpose of making an advance of my whole force, and that as a signal he must have his men cheer loudly when he struck the enemy's rear, in order that my attack might be simultaneous with his.
I gave him one hour to go around and come back through the enemy, and when he started I moved to the front with the balance of the reserve, to put everything I had into the fight.
This meant an inestimable advantage to the enemy in case of our defeat, but our own safety demanded the hazard.
All along our attenuated line the fighting was now sharp, and the enemy's firing indicated such numerical strength that fear of disaster to Alger
increased my anxiety terribly as the time set for his cheering arrived and no sound of it was heard.
Relying, however, on the fact that Beene's knowledge of the roads would prevent his being led astray, and confident of Alger
's determination to accomplish the purpose for which he set out, as soon as the hour was up I ordered my whole line forward.
Fortunately, just as this moment a locomotive and two cars loaded with grain for my horses ran into Booneville
I say fortunately, because it was well known throughout the command that in the morning, when I first discovered the large numbers of the enemy, I had called for assistance; and my troops, now thinking that reinforcements had arrived by rail from Rienzi
, where a division of infantry was encamped, and inspirated by this belief, advanced with renewed confidence and wild cheering.
Meantime I had the engineer of the locomotive blow his whistle loudly, so that the enemy might also learn that a train had come; and from the fact that in a few moments he began to give way before our small force, I thought that this strategem had some effect.
Soon his men broke, and ran in the utmost disorder over the country in every direction.
I found later, however, that his precipitous retreat was due to the pressure on his left from the Second Iowa, in concert with the front attack of the Second Michigan, and the demoralization wrought in his
rear by Alger
, who had almost entirely accomplished the purpose of his expedition, though he had failed to come through, or so near that I could hear the signal agreed upon before leaving Booneville
had reached and turned up the Blackland
road, the first thing he came across was the Confederate
headquarters; the officers and orderlies about which he captured and sent back some distance to a farm-house.
Continuing on a gallop, he soon struck the rear of the enemy's line, but was unable to get through; nor did he get near enough for me to hear his cheering; but as he had made the distance he was to travel in the time allotted, his attack and mine were almost coincident, and the enemy, stampeded by the charges in front and rear, fled toward Blackland
, with little or no attempt to capture Alger
's command, which might readily have been done.
's troopers soon rejoined me at Booneville
, minus many hats, having returned by their original route.
They had sustained little loss except a few men wounded and a few temporarily missing.
Among these was Alger
himself, who was dragged from his saddle by the limb of a tree that, in the excitement of the charge, he was unable to flank.
The missing had been dismounted in one way or another, and run over by the enemy in his flight; but they all turned up later, none the worse except for a few scratches and bruises.
My effective strength in this fight was 827 all told, and Alger
's command comprised ninety officers and men.1 Chalmers
's force was composed of six regiments and two battalions, and though I have been unable to find any returns from which to verify his actual numbers, yet, from the statements of prisoners and from information obtained from citizens along his line of march, it is safe to say that he had in the action not less than five thousand men. Our casualties were not many --forty-one in all. His loss in killed and wounded was considerable, his most severely wounded-forty men-falling into our hands, having been left at farm-houses in the vicinity of the battlefield.
The victory in the face of such odds was most gratifying, and as it justified my disinclination — in fact, refusal — to retire from Booneville
without fighting (for the purpose of saving my transportation, as directed by superior authority when I applied in the morning for reinforcements), it was to me particularly grateful.
It was also very valuable in view of the
fact that it increased the confidence between the officers and men of my brigade and me, and gave us for the balance of the month not only comparative rest, but entire immunity from the dangers of a renewed effort to gobble my isolated outpost.
In addition to all this, commendation from my immediate superiors was promptly tendered through oral and written congratulations; and their satisfaction at the result of the battle took definite form a few days later, in the following application for my promotion, when, by an expedition to Ripley, Miss.
, most valuable information as to the enemy's location and plans was captured: