by Jacob D. Cox, Major-General, U. S. V.
The campaign of the spring of 1862 was an interesting one in its details, but as it became subordinate to that against
Jackson in the
Shenandoah and was never completed as
Fremont had planned, a very brief sketch of it must suffice.
On the 29th of March
Fremont assumed command of the “Mountain Department,” including
West Virginia,
eastern Kentucky, and
East Tennessee as far as
Knoxville.
There was a little too much sentiment and too little practical war in the construction of a department out of five hundred miles of mountain ranges, and the appointment of the “path-finder” to command it was consistent with the romantic character of the whole.
The mountains formed an admirable barrier at which comparatively small bodies of troops could cover and protect the
Ohio Valley behind them, but extensive military operations across and beyond
the Alleghanies from west or east were impracticable, because a wilderness a hundred miles wide, crossed by few and most difficult roads, rendered it impossible to supply troops from depots on either side.
The country was so wild that not even forage for mules could be found in it, and the teams could hardly haul their own provender for the double trip.
Quick “raids” were therefore all that ever proved feasible.
Fremont had formed a plan of campaign which consisted in starting with
Blenker's division (which had been taken from the Army of the Potomac and given to him) from
Romney in the valley of the south branch of the
Potomac, ascending this valley toward the south, picking up
Schenck's and
Milroy's brigades in turn, the latter joining the column at
Monterey, on the great watershed, by way of the
Cheat Mountain Pass.
From
Monterey Fremont intended to move upon
Staunton and thence, following the south-western trend of the valleys, to the
New River near
Christiansburg.
Here he would come into communication with me, whose task it would have been to advance from
Gauley Bridge on two lines, the principal one by Fayette and Raleigh Court House over Flat-top Mountain to
Princeton and the Narrows of
New River, and a subordinate one on the turnpike to
Lewisburg.
The plan looked to continuing the march to the south-west with the whole column till
Knoxville should be reached, the last additions to the force to be from the troops in the
Big Sandy Valley of
eastern Kentucky.
The plan would probably have failed, first, from the impossibility of supplying the army on the route, as it would have been without any reliable or safe base; and second, because the railroads east of the mountains ran on routes specially well adapted to enable the enemy quickly to concentrate any needed force at
Staunton, at
Lynchburg, at
Christiansburg, or at
Wytheville to over-power the column.
The Union army would be committed to a whole season of marching in the mountains, while the
Confederates could concentrate the needed force and quickly return it to
Richmond when its work was done, making but a brief episode in a larger campaign.
But the plan was not
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destined to be thoroughly tried.
Stonewall Jackson, after his defeat by
Kimball at
Kernstown, March 23d, had retired to the
Upper Shenandoah Valley with his division, numbering about 10,000 men;
Ewell was waiting to cooperate with him, with his division, at the gaps of the
Blue Ridge on the east, and
General Edward Johnson was near
Staunton with a similar force facing
Milroy.
In April
General Banks, commanding the
National forces in the Shenandoah Valley, had ascended it as far as
Harrisonburg, and
Jackson observed him from Swift Run Gap in the
Blue Ridge, on the road from
Harrisonburg to
Gordonsville.
Milroy also pushed eastward from
Cheat Mountain summit, in which high regions winter still lingered, and had made his way through snows and rains to
McDowell, ten miles east of
Monterey, at the crossing of Bull Pasture River, where he threatened
Staunton.
But
Banks was thought to be in too exposed a position, and was directed by the War Department to fall back to
Strasburg, and on the 5th of May had gone as far as
New Market.
Blenker's division had not yet reached
Fremont, who was waiting for it at
Petersburg.
Jackson saw his opportunity and determined to join
General Johnson by a rapid march to
Staunton, to overwhelm
Milroy first and then return to his own operations in the
Shenandoah.
2 Moving with great celerity, he attacked
Milroy at
McDowell
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on the 8th, and the latter calling upon
Fremont for help,
Schenck was sent forward to support him, who reached
McDowell, having marched 34 miles in 24 hours.
Jackson had not fully concentrated his forces, and the
Union generals held their ground and delivered a sharp combat,
3 in which their casualties of all kinds numbered 256, while the
Confederate loss was 498,
General Johnson being among the wounded.
Schenck as senior assumed the command, and on the 9th began his retreat to
Franklin, abandoning the
Cheat Mountain road.
Franklin was reached on the 11th, but
Jackson approached cautiously and did not reach there till the 12th, when, finding that
Fremont had concentrated his forces, he did not attack, but returned to
McDowell, whence he took the direct road to
Harrisonburg, and marched to attack
Banks at
Strasburg,
Ewell meeting and joining him in this movement.
Fremont resumed preparations for his original campaign, but
Banks's defeat deranged all plans, and those of the Mountain Department were abandoned.
A month passed in efforts to destroy
Jackson by concentration of
McDowell's,
Banks's, and
Fremont's troops; but it was too late to remedy the ill effects of the division of commands at the beginning of the campaign.
On the 26th of June
Pope was assigned to command all the troops in
northern Virginia,
Fremont was relieved by his own request, and the Mountain Department ceased to exist.
The operations on the
Kanawha line had kept pace with those in the north during the month of April.
Leaving a brigade to garrison the
Lower Kanawha Valley, I sent forward another under
Colonel Crook on the
Lewisburg Turnpike, whilst I moved in person with the two remaining (
Scammon's and
Moor's) on the
Princeton route.
The brigades numbered about two thousand men each.
Wagons were so few that tents were discarded, and the men bivouacked without shelter.
On the 7th of May my advanced guard occupied Giles Court House (Parisburg) and the Narrows of
New River, and on the 16th the rest of the two brigades on this line were at the
East liver,
Crook's brigade occupying
Lewisburg.
We were thus prepared to join
Fremont's column when it should approach
Christiansburg.
Instead of this we got news of
Jackson's movements and of
Schenck's and
Milroy's retreat, and
Fremont was obliged to telegraph that his plans were suspended, and that I must look out for myself.
The enemy had made strong efforts to concentrate a sufficient force to protect the railway, and the brigades of
Generals Humphrey Marshall,
Heth, and
Williams were assigned to this duty, under the command of
Marshall as senior.
My own orders required me to converge toward
Crook's line of movement as I advanced, and from Flat-top Mountain my line of supplies was exposed to a hostile movement on the right flank.
On the 16th of May
Marshall, leaving
Heth to hold the passes of
New River, marched by the
Wytheville road on
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Princeton, driving out my small detachment there after a stubborn resistance.
In the night I marched
Moor's brigade back from
East River and drove
Marshall out in turn.
I recalled
Scammon's brigade also on the 17th, and offered battle in front of the town.
Marshall took strong position on the hills south of the place, but did not attack, nor did
Heth, who followed
Scammon part of the way from the Narrows.
Princeton could easily have been turned by roads on the west, and I determined while awaiting the resumption of the general plan of campaign to retire to Flat-top Mountain, a very strong position, directing
Crook on the other side of
New River to halt at
Lewisburg, where we could support each other.
On May 23d
Heth with his brigade tried to dislodge
Crook, but was beaten, with the loss of 38 killed and many wounded, of whom 66 fell into our hands.
Crook also captured 4 cannon and 300 stand of small-arms.
Crook's loss was 13 killed, 53 wounded, and 7 missing.
When
General Pope assumed command he directed a defensive policy to be pursued in
West Virginia, and made arrangements to transfer part of my command to his army in the field.
About the middle of August I took two brigades by way of the
Kanawha and
Ohio Rivers to
Parkersburg, and thence by rail to
Washington.
Gauley Bridge was made the advanced post in the
Kanawha Valley, and no important movement was again made on that line.
It is an interesting fact, that, so confident was
General Halleck that
Pope would be joined by
McClellan's army in time to keep
Lee in the neighborhood of
Richmond, my original orders were to march through the mountains by way of
Staunton, and join
Pope at
Charlottesville.
I had several detachments out pursuing guerrillas and scattered bands of Confederate troops operating in my rear toward the
Kentucky line, and this necessarily caused a few days' delay in beginning the directed movement.
I took advantage of the interval to lay before
General Pope, by telegraph, the proof that the march ordered meant fifteen days of uninterrupted mountain travel, most of it through a wilderness destitute of supplies, and with the enemy upon the flank.
Besides this, there was the very serious question whether the Army of Virginia would be at
Charlottesville when I should approach that place.
On the other hand, my calculation was that we could reach
Washington in ten days or less by the way we came.
On this evidence
Pope, with
Halleck's assent, gave permission to move as suggested.
The march from Flat-top Mountain to the head of navigation on the
Kanawha, ninety miles, was made in three days, and the Kanawha Division reached
Washington within the time appointed.
One train-load of two regiments joined
Pope at Warrenton Junction when the railroad was cut at
Manassas Junction by
Stonewall Jackson.
Two other regiments got as far as Bull Run bridge and had a lively affair with the enemy.
Afterward I was ordered into the forts on
Upton's and
Munson's hills to cover the front of
Washington toward
Centreville.
Here, with
McClellan in person, we listened to the cannonade of the
Second Bull Run, and through our lines Pope and McDowell retired within the defenses of Washington.
It has often been a subject of interested speculation to inquire what would have been the fate of the Kanawha Division, had it been approaching
Charlottesville at this time, in accordance with
Halleck's original order .
