The army of the Cumberland at Chattanooga.
by Joseph S. Fullerton, Brevet Brig.-Gen., U. S. V., Assistant Adj.-Gen., 4TH Army Corps.
After it became apparent that Bragg
would not assault Rosecrans
, it was thought that he might cross the river above, threaten our lines of communication with the rear, and thus repeat, on the north side, the manoeuvre of Roseerans
advised such a movement, but Bragg
preferred to adopt the plan of starving us out.
On September 24th a brigade that had held the point of Lookout Mountain
Bragg at once took possession, and sent Longstreet
's corps over into Lookout Valley
He also extended his pickets down the south bank of the river, nearly to Bridgeport
, our base of supplies.
This cut us off from the river and the roads on its north and south banks, and left us but one open road to the rear.
Over this, for a time, we might haul supplies; but we were in a state of semi-siege.
The trees within our lines were soon cut down for use in the fortifications, or for fuel.
There had been but little rain since early in July.
The earth was parched and blistered.
Leaves had dried up on the trees, and all the grass had withered and turned gray.
The moving of men and animals stirred up blinding clouds of dust which every breeze sent whirling through the camps.
With the first week in October came the rains, and it was a question whether the deep and sticky mud was not more objectionable than the dust.
Our whole army was obliged to depend for every ration and every pound of forage on the mules that hauled the army wagons over the sixty miles of horrible road from Bridgeport
Some of the hills along this route were so steep that a heavy wagon was almost a load going up, and, now that the rains were falling, that part of it in the little valleys had become so soft and was so cut up that a lightly loaded wagon would sink up to the axles.
In the third week of the occupation of Chattanooga
, no one, from commanding general down, any longer expected or even thought of an attack.
, summit, side, and base, was furrowed with rifle-pits and studded with batteries.
The little valley of Chattanooga
was dammed up with earth-works; and Lookout Mountain
, now a mighty fortress, lifted to the low hanging clouds its threatening head crowned with siege-guns.
The two lines of pickets were not more than three hundred yards apart; but, by common consent, there was no picket firing.
On a still night, standing on the picket line, one could hear the old negro song “Dixie,” adopted by the Confederates
as their national music; while from our line came, in swelling response, “Hail Columbia” and “The star-spangled banner.”
With a glass Bragg
's headquarters on Missionary Ridge
, even the movement of his officers and orderlies, could be seen; while from the ridge or Lookout Mountain
our whole camp was clearly in view.
By daylight our troops could be counted, our reveille heard, our roll-call noted, our scanty meals of half rations seen — the last without envy.
And we were not only heard and seen, but the enemy's signal-flag on Lookout talked, over our heads, with the signal-flag on Missionary Ridge
The fall rains were beginning, and hauling was becoming each day more difficult.
Ten thousand dead mules walled the sides of the road from Bridgeport
the men were on less than half rations.
Guards stood at the troughs of artillery horses to keep the soldiers from taking the scant supply of corn allowed these starving animals.
Many horses died of starvation, and most of those that survived grew too weak for use in pulling the lightest guns.
Men followed the wagons as they came over the river, picking up the grains of. corn and bits of crackers that fell to the ground.
Yet there was no murmur of discontent.
Ever since Longstreet
got into Lookout Valley
had been making preparation to drive him out. A small stern-wheel steamboat was built at Bridgeport
; a captured ferry-boat, reconstructed, was made an available transport; and material for boats and pontoons, or either, with stringers and flooring for bridges, was prepared at Chattanooga
as rapidly as possible, at an improvised saw-mill.
But the plan finally adopted was conceived and worked out by General William
, Chief Engineer
of the Army of the Cumberland.
On the 20th of October, after having been fully matured, it was submitted, and was warmly approved by Thomas
, who had then succeeded Rosecrans
, and who at once gave orders to General Smith
, General Hooker
, and others to carry it into execution with all possible expedition.
the evening of the 23d. General Smith
's plan was explained to him, and he heartily approved it and directed its execution.
Everything necessary for the movement being in readiness, it was commenced with the greatest possible haste and secrecy on the night of the 26th.
After midnight, fourteen hundred picked men from Hazen
's and Turchin
's brigades, under command of Brigadier-General Hazen
, quietly marched to the river-bank at Chattanooga
; the rest of the troops of these two brigades, with three batteries of artillery under Major John Mendenhall
, crossed the river and marched over Moccasin Point
to a place near Brown's Ferry, where, under cover of the woods, they awaited the arrival of General Hazen
The success of this expedition depended on surprising the enemy at Brown's Ferry.
It was known that he had there 1000 infantry, 3 pieces of artillery, and a squadron of cavalry, while Longstreet
's corps was not far off. At 3 o'clock in the morning, 52 pontoons, filled with Hazen
's 1400 men, and under the direction of Colonel T. R. Stanley
, 18th Ohio Infantry, noiselessly started down the river on the nine-mile course to Brown's Ferry.
There was a full moon, but the light was dimmed by floating clouds and by a fog rising from the water.
Oars were used till the first picket fire of the enemy was approached; then the boats were steered close to the right bank and allowed to float with the current.
On top of Lookout a signal torch was seen flashing against the sky, but not a gun had yet been fired,--not an alarm given.
Brown's Ferry was reached at break of dawn.
Suddenly the oars were put into use, and before the enemy could make out the sounds the boats were rowed to the left bank.
The pickets on guard greeted them with a volley of musketry, and then fell back on their reserves.
The fourteen hundred men quickly and in perfect order occupied the crest of the hill and began to throw up light breastworks.
But they had not proceeded far in this work when the enemy appeared and made a fruitless effort to drive them from the hill.
In the meantime the boats were bringing over the river the rest of the two brigades that had marched to the north ferry landing.
When the transfer had been accomplished, the boats were used in the construction of a pontoon-bridge, which was finished by 3 o'clock in the afternoon, and over which Mendenhall
's artillery crossed.
At daylight on the morning of October 28th General Hooker
crossed the river at Bridgeport
with the Eleventh and Geary
's division of the Twelfth Corps, and moved along the direct road to Brown's Ferry by the base of Raccoon Mountain
He brushed away the, enemy's pickets and light bodies of skirmishers, and moved cautiously, as he knew Longstreet
was in Lookout Valley
and might at any moment appear to oppose his advance.
At 5 o'clock in the afternoon the head of his column reached a point about one mile from the ferry, up Lookout Valley
; and here his command went into camp, excepting Geary
's division, which was left three miles in the rear, in a position covering the ferry.
A short distance from the ferry, up the little valley of Lookout, was Longstreet
, with his troops.
's object, he did not even wait the light of day to repeat his old tactics.
The night of the 28th was clear and the air crisp.
The moon shone bright from before midnight till morning.
's troops were sleeping soundly after their hard march of nearly twenty-five miles, when Longstreet
's men came crowding down the valley.
An hour past midnight a terrific onslaught was made on Geary
It was assaulted on three sides.
Artillery in the valley and on Lookout opened a severe fire.
Our men, who slept in line of battle, sprang to their feet at the first shot of a sentinel.
The contest lasted for three hours, till Longstreet
's line was broken and his men driven from the field.
It was Longstreet
's intention to crush Geary
; then, with his whole force, to attack General Howard
's Eleventh Corps, nearly three miles away.
In order to hold Howard
where he was, and to prevent him from lending assistance to Geary
, he had sent a smaller column to move round his camp, and, almost in its rear, to occupy a steep hill nearly two hundred feet high.
ordered Colonel Orland Smith
, with his brigade, to carry the hill.
In gallant response a magnificent charge was m ade up the steep side, and the enemy was driven from the barricades on top at the point of the bayonet.
, routed at every point, retreated up the valley, leaving it at daybreak.
Four hundred and twenty of our men, and many more of the enemy, were killed and wounded.
thus gained Lookout Valley
; the siege of Chattanooga
was raised; the “cracker line” was opened!
The credit of this result is chiefly due to General W. F. Smith
, Chief Engineer
of the Army of the Cumberland, who conceived the plan of operations, and under whose directions it was mostly carried out. The raising of the siege of Chattanooga
, by opening up the river and the road on its south bank, was determined upon by the commanding officers
of the Army of the Cumberland soon after the occupation, though the plan of operations was adopted later, but before General Grant
came to Chattanooga
On November 15th General Sherman
in advance of his troops.
's plan, in brief, now was to turn Bragg
He selected his old army — the Army of the Tennessee, under Sherman
— to open the battle, to make the grand attack, and to carry Missionary Ridge
as far as Tunnel Hill
The Army of the Cumberland was simply to get into position and cooperate.
No battle-field in our war, probably none in history, where large armies were engaged, was so spectacular or so well fitted for a display of soldierly courage and daring as the amphitheater of Chattanooga
Late on the night of November 22d a sentinel who had deserted from the enemy was
brought to General Sheridan
, and informed him that Bragg
's baggage was being reduced and that he was about to fall back.
On account of these indications and reports, General Grant
decided not to wait longer for General Sherman
's troops to come up, but to find out whether Bragg
was in fact withdrawing, and, if so, to attack him at once.
Therefore, at 11 o'clock on the morning of the 23d, he directed General Thomas
to “drive in the enemy's pickets,” and feel his lines for the purpose of finding out whether he still held in force.
was about to change his plans.
He was compelled to depart from his original purpose, and was obliged to call on troops of the Army of the Cumberland to make the first offensive movement.
ordered General Granger
, commanding the Fourth Corps, to throw one division forward in the direction of Orchard Knob
, with a second division in support, to discover if the enemy still remained near his old camp.
is a rough, steep hill, one hundred feet high, covered with a growth of small timber, rising abruptly from the Chattanooga Valley
, and lying about half-way between our outer pits and the breastworks of logs and stones.
At its western base, and extending for a mile beyond, both north and south of the hill, were other rifle-pits, hid in part by a heavy belt of timber that extended about a quarter of a mile from the foot of the hill into the plain.
Between this belt of timber and our lines were open fields, in which there was not a tree, fence, or other obstruction, save the bed of the East Tennessee Railroad.
On the plain were hundreds of little mounds, thrown up by our own and the enemy's pickets, giving it the appearance of an overgrown prairie-dog village.
At noon General Grant
, Assistant Secretary of War Dana
, General Thomas
, Generals Hooker
, and other distinguished officers stood on the parapet of Fort Wood
facing Orchard Knob
, waiting to see this initial movement,--the overture to the battle of Chattanooga
At half-past 12, Wood
's division, supported by Sheridan
, marched out on the plain in front of the fort.
It was an inspiriting sight.
Flags were flying; the quick, earnest steps of thousands beat equal time.
The sharp commands of hundreds of company officers, the sound of the drums, the ringing notes of the bugle, companies wheeling and countermarching and regiments getting into line, the bright sun lighting up ten thousand polished bayonets till they glistened and flashed like a flying shower of electric sparks,--all looked like preparations for a peaceful pageant, rather than for the bloody work of death.
Groups of officers on Missionary Ridge
looked down through their glasses, and the enemy's pickets, but a few hundred yards away, came out of their pits and stood idly looking on, unconcernedly viewing what they supposed to be preparations for a grand review.
But at half-past 1 o'clock the advance was sounded.
's division, moving with the steadiness of a machine, started forward.
Not a straggler or laggard was on the field, and, what was probably hardly ever before seen, drummers were marching with their companies, beating the charge.
Now the enemy realized, for the first time, that it was not a review.
His pickets fell back to their reserves.
The reserves were quickly driven back to the main line.
Firing opened from the enemy's advanced rifle-pits, followed by a tremendous roll of musketry and roar of artillery.
Men were seen on the ground, dotting the field over which the line of battle had passed.
Ambulances came hurrying back with the first of the wounded.
Columns of puffy smoke arose from the Orchard
A cheer, faint to those on the parapet of Fort Wood
, indicated that the boys in blue were carrying the breastworks on the Knob
A sharp, short struggle, and the hill was ours.
About 4 o'clock in the afternoon of November 23d, when it became certain that Osterhaus
, cut off by the breaking of the pontoon-bridge at Brown's Ferry, would be attached to Hooker
's command, General Thomas
to make a demonstration against Lookout Mountain
the next morning, and, if the demonstration showed it could be carried, to proceed to take it. Later in the day, orders to the same effect came to General Hooker
from General Grant
The success at Orchard Knob
, and the breaking of the bridge, caused this radical change to be made in Grant
Yet he still held to the chief feature, which was to turn Bragg
The morning of November 24th opened with a cold, drizzling rain.
Thick clouds of mist were settling on Lookout Mountain
At daybreak Geary
's division, and Whitaker
's brigade of Cruft
's division, marched up to Wauhatchie, the nearest point at which Lookout Creek
, swelled by recent rains, could be forded, and at 8 o'clock they crossed.
The heavy clouds of mist reaching down the mountain-side hid the movement from the enemy, who was expecting and was well prepared to resist a crossing at the Chattanooga
As soon as this movement was discovered, the enemy withdrew his troops from the summit of the mountain, changed front, and formed a new line to meet our advance, his left resting at the palisade, and his right at the heavy works in the valley, where the road crossed the creek.
Having crossed at Wauhatchie, Whitaker
's brigade, being in the advance, drove back the enemy's pickets, and quickly ascended the mountain till it reached the foot of the palisade.
Here, firmly attaching its right, the brigade faced left in front, with its left joined to Geary
now moved along the side of the mountain, and through the valley, thus covering the crossing of the rest of Hooker
In the meantime Grose
's brigade was engaging the enemy at the lower road crossing, and Wood
's brigade of Osterhaus
's division was building a bridge rather more than half a mile farther up the creek.
, moving down the valley, reached this point at 11 o'clock, just after the bridge was finished, and as Osterhaus
's division and Grose
's brigade were crossing.
's command, now united in the enemy's field, was ready to advance and sweep around the mountain.
His line, hanging at the base of the palisades like a great pendulum, reached down the side of the mountain to the valley, where the force
that had just crossed the creek was attached as its weight.
Now, as, at the command of Hooker
, it swung forward in its upward movement, the artillery of the Army of the Cumberland, on Moccasin Point
, opened fire, throwing a stream of shot and shell into the enemy's rifle-pits at the foot of the mountain, and into the works thickly planted on the “White House
At the same time the guns planted by Hooker
on the west side of the creek opened on the works which covered the enemy's right.
Then followed a gallant assault by Osterhaus
After fighting for nearly two hours, step by step up the steep mountain-side, over-and through deep gullies and ravines, over great rocks and fallen trees, the earth-works on the plateau were assaulted and carried, and the enemy was driven out and forced to fall back.
He did so slowly and reluctantly, taking advantage of the rough ground to continue the fight.
It was now 2 o'clock. A halt all along the line was ordered by General Hooker
, as the clouds had grown so thick that further advance was impracticable, and as his ammunition was almost exhausted and more could not well be brought up the mountain.
But all the enemy's works had been taken.
had carried the mountain on the east side, had opened communication with Chattanooga
, and he commanded the enemy's line of defensive works in Chattanooga Valley
At 2 o'clock Hooker
reported to General Thomas
and informed him that he was out of ammunition.
Thomas at once sent Carlin
's brigade from the valley, each soldier taking with him all the small ammunition he could carry.
At 5 o'clock Carlin
was on the mountain, and Hooker
's skirmishers were quickly supplied with the means of carrying on their work.
In the morning it had not been known in Chattanooga
, in Sherman
's army, or in Bragg
's camp, that a battle was to be fought.
Indeed, it was not definitely known even to General Grant
; for Hooker
was only ordered to make a demonstration, and, if this showed a good chance for success, then to make an attack.
Soon after breakfast, Sherman
's men at the other end of the line, intent on the north end of Missionary Ridge
, and Thomas
's men in the center, fretting to be let loose from their intrenchments, were startled by the sound of
artillery and musketry firing in Lookout Valley
Surprise possessed the thousands who turned their anxious eyes toward the mountain.
The hours slowly wore away; the roar of battle increased, as it came rolling around the point of the mountain, and the anxiety grew.
A battle was being fought just before and above them.
They could hear, but could not see how it was going.
Finally, the wind, tossing about the clouds and mist, made a rift that for a few minutes opened a view of White House plateau.
The enemy was seen to be in flight, and Hooker
's men were in pursuit!
Then went up a mighty cheer from the thirty thousand in the valley that was heard above the battle by their comrades on the mountain.
As the sun went down the clouds rolled away, and the night came on clear and cool.
A grand sight was old Lookout that night.
Not two miles apart were the parallel camp-fires of the two armies, extending from the summit of the mountain to its base, looking like streams of burning lava, while in between, the flashes from the skirmishers' muskets glowed like giant fire-flies.
The next morning there was silence in Hooker
Before daylight eight adventurous, active volunteers from the 8th Kentucky Infantry scaled the palisades and ran up the Stars and Stripes.
The enemy had stolen away in the night.
Although General Grant
had twice changed his original plan, first in the movement from the center, then in the reconnoissance and resulting attack on Lookout Mountain
, he still adhered to his purpose of turning Bragg
's right, and made no change in the instructions given to General Sherman
, except as to the time of attack.
Every necessary preparation for crossing Sherman
's troops had been made secretly, under direction of General W. F. Smith
; 116 pontoons had been placed in North Chickamauga Creek
, and in ravines near its mouth, and many wagon-loads of “balks” (stringers) and chess (flooring) had been hid near by. Before dark on the evening of November 23d General Sherman
had his troops well massed and hid behind the hills on the north side of the river opposite the end of Missionary Ridge
After dark General Barnett
, Chief of Artillery
of the Army of the Cumberland, planted fifty-six guns on the low foot-hills on the north bank of the river, to cover Sherman
's crossing and to protect the pontoonbridge when laid.
Everything now being in readiness for the movement, at midnight General Giles A. Smith
's brigade entered the pontoons, floated out of North Chickamauga Creek
, and was rowed to the south bank of the river.
Landing quietly, he surprised and captured the enemy's pickets, and secured a firm foothold.
The pontoons were sent across the river, and with these and the small steamboat brought up from Chattanooga General Morgan L. Smith
's and General John E. Smith
's divisions were ferried over the river.
As soon as these troops had been landed, work was commenced on the pontoon-bridge, which was skillfully laid under the supervision of General W. F. Smith
The bridge was 1350 feet in length, and was completed by 11 o'clock in the morning, when General Ewing
's division and Sherman
's artillery crossed.
At 1 o'clock, just as Hooker
was rounding the front of Lookout Mountain
, the roar of his battle stirring the blood of the veterans of the Army of the Tennessee, Gener al Sherman
gave the command, “Forward!”
At 3:30 General Sherman
took the hill which was supposed to be the north end of the ridge, and soon afterward took another hill a little in advance, both separated by a deep depression from the heavily fortified Tunnel Hill
, on which Bragg
's right flank rested and which was Sherman
's objective point.
None of the men of the Army of the Cumberland, who for nine weeks were buried in the trenches at Chattanooga
, can ever forget the glorious night of the 24th of November.
As the sun went down, the clouds rolled up the mountain, and the mist was blown out of the valley.
Night came on clear, with the stars lighting up the heavens.
But there followed a sight to cheer their hearts and thrill their souls.
Away off to their right, and reaching skyward, Lookout Mountain
was ablaze with the fires of Hooker
's men, while off to their left, and reaching far above the valley, the north end of Missionary Ridge
was aflame with the lights of Sherman
The great iron crescent that had, with threatening aspect, so long hung over them, was disappearing.
The only thought that dampened their enthusiasm was that the enemy was being destroyed on the flanks, while they were tied down in the center, without a part in the victories.
But late that night General Grant
, thinking that General Sherman
had carried Tunnel Hill
, and acting in that belief, gave orders for the next day's battle.
was directed to attack the enemy at early dawn, Thomas
to cooperate with him, and Hooker
, to be ready to advance into Chattanooga Valley
, to hold the road that zigzagged from the valley to the summit.
Early the next morning, when General Grant
learned that the ridge had not been carried as far as Tunnel Hill
, and that Lookout Mountain
had been evacuated by the enemy, he suspended his orders, except those to Sherman
, and directed Hooker
to come down from the mountain, to carry the pass at Rossville
, and then operate on Bragg
's left and rear.
's army was now concentrated on Missionary Ridge
, and in the valley at the east foot.
's and Stevenson
's divisions had been withdrawn from Lookout Mountain
on the night of the 24th, and, marching all night, were seen at dawn the next morning moving along the summit of Missionary Ridge
, on the way to reenforce Bragg
For sev eral hours after daylight the flowing of this steady stream of troops continued.
Early in the morning of the 25th General Grant
and General Thomas
established their headquarters on Orchard Knob
, a point from which the best view of the movements of the whole army could be had. At sunrise General Sherman
commenced his attack, but after repeated assaults and severe fighting, it appearing to be impossible for General Sherman
to take the enemy's works, operations ceased early in the afternoon.
was detained three hours at Chattanooga Creek
, while a bridge that the
retreating enemy had burned was being rebuilt.
As soon as he had taken Rossville
, he moved against the south end of Missionary Ridge
The ridge was quickly carried, and, sweeping north-ward, Hooker
soon came upon Stewart
's division, posted on the summit, and behind the earth-works which the Army of the Cumberland had thrown up the day after Chickamauga
's division assaulted and carried the works, thus having the good fortune of retaking the works they themselves had constructed.
It was by this time nearly sundown.
reached the south end of the ridge too late in the day to relieve the pressure on Sherman
, who was at the north end six miles off. Bragg
's right had not been turned.
Success had not followed Sherman
The battle as planned had not been won.
Late on this memorable afternoon there was an accident — an accident like the charge at Balaklava
; though, unlike this theme for poetry, it called for greater daring, and was attended by complete success, and yielded most important results, for it led to the complete shattering of the enemy's army, and drove him from the field.
On Orchard Knob, and opposite the center of Missionary Ridge
, were four divisions of the Army of the Cumberland.
On the left was Baird
's division; then Wood
's and Sheridan
's divisions occupying the lines which, two days before, they had taken in their magnificent advance; on the right was R. W. Johnson
's division,--all under the personal command of Thomas
It was past 3 o'clock. General Sherman
had ceased operations.
's advance had not yet been felt.
The day was dying, and Bragg
still held the ridge.
If any movement to dislodge him was to be made that day it must be made at once.
At half-past 3 o'clock an attack was ordered by General Grant
He had changed his plan of battle.
At once orders were issued that at the firing, in rapid succession, of six guns on Orchard Knob
's whole line should instantaneously move forward, Sheridan
's and Wood
's divisions in the center, Sheridan
to be supported on the right by Johnson
, and Wood
on the left by Baird
This demonstration was to be made to relieve the pressure on Sherman
The only order given was to move forward and take the rifle-pits at the foot of the ridge.
's division the order was, “As soon as the signal is given, the whole line will advance, and you will take what is before you.”
Between Orchard Knob and Missionary Ridge
was a valley, partly covered with a small growth of timber.
It was wooded in front of the right of Baird
's and of the whole of Wood
In front of Sheridan
's and Johnson
's it had been
almost entirely cleared.
At the foot of the ridge were heavy rifle-pits, which could be seen from Orchard Knob
, and extending in front of them, for four and five hundred yards, the ground was covered with felled trees.
There was a good plain for both direct and enfilading fire from the rifle-pits, and the approaches were commanded by the enemy's artillery.
At this point the ridge is five or six hundred feet high.
Its side, scored with gullies and showing but little timber, had a rough and bare appearance.
Half-way up was another line of rifle-pits, and the summit was furrowed with additional lines and dotted over with epaulements, in which were placed fifty pieces of artillery.
Directly in front of Orchard Knob
, and on the summit of the ridge, in a small house, was Bragg
At twenty minutes before four the signal-guns were fired.
Suddenly twenty thousand men rushed forward, moving in line of battle by brigades, with a double line of skirmishers in front, and closely followed by the reserves in mass.
The big siege-guns in the Chattanooga
forts roared above the light artillery and musketry in the valley.
The enemy's rifle-pits were ablaze, and the whole ridge in our front had broken out like another Aetna
Not many minutes afterward our men were seen working through the felled trees and other obstructions.
Though exposed to such a terrific fire, they neither fell back nor halted.
By a bold and desperate push they broke through the works in several places and opened flank: and reverse fires.
The enemy was thrown into confusion, and took precipitate flight up the ridge.
Many prisoners and a large number of small-arms were captured.
The order of the commanding general
had now been fully and most successfully carried out. But it did not go far enough to satisfy these brave men, who thought the time had come to finish the battle of Chickamauga
There was a halt of but a few minutes, to take breath and to re-form lines; then, with a sudden impulse, and without orders, all started up the ridge.
Officers, catching their spirit, first followed, then led. There was no thought of supports or of protecting flanks, though the enemy's line could be seen, stretching on either side.2
As soon as this movement was seen from Orchard Knob
quickly turned to Thomas
, who stood by his side, and I heard him say angrily: “Thomas
, who ordered those men up the ridge?”
replied, in his usual slow, quiet manner: “I don't know; I did not.”
Then, addressing General Gordon Granger
, he said, “Did you order them up, Granger
“No,” said Granger
; “they started up without orders.
When those fellows get started all hell can't stop them.”
said something to the effect that somebody would suffer if it did not turn out well, and then, turning, stoically watched the ridge.
He gave no further orders.
As soon as Granger
had replied to Thomas
, he turned to me, his chief-of-staff, and said: “Ride at once to Wood
, and then to Sheridan
, and ask them if they ordered their men up the ridge, and tell them, if they can take it, to push ahead.”
As I was mounting, Granger
added: “It is hot over there, and you may not get through.
I shall send Captain Avery
, and other officers after both of you.”
As fast as my horse could carry me, I rode first to General Wood
, and delivered the message.
“I didn't order them up,” said Wood
; “they started up on their own account, and they are going up, too!
, if we are supported, we will take and hold the ridge!”
As soon as I reached General Wood
, Captain Avery
got to General Sheridan
, and delivered his message.
“I didn't order them up,” said Sheridan
; “but we are going to take the ridge!”
He then asked Avery
for his flask and waved it at a group of Confederate officers, standing just in front of Bragg
's headquarters, with the salutation, “Here's at you!”
At once two guns — the “Lady Breckinridge
” and the “Lady Buckner
”--in front of Bragg
's headquarters were fired at Sheridan
and the group of officers about him. One shell struck so near as to throw dirt over Sheridan
said the general, “that is ungenerous; I shall take those guns for that!”
received the message taken by Captain
, he had sent a staff-officer to Granger
, to inquire whether “the order given to take the rifle-pits meant the rifle-pits at the base, or those on the top of the ridge.”
told this officer that “the order given was to take those at the base.”
Conceiving this to be an order to fall back, the officer, on his way to Sheridan
, gave it to General Wagner
, commanding the Second Brigade of the division, which was then nearly half-way up the ridge.
ordered his brigade back to the rifle-pits at the base, but it only remained there till Sheridan
, seeing the mistake, ordered it forward.
It again advanced under a terrific fire.
The men, fighting and climbing up the steep hill, sought the roads, ravines, and less rugged parts.
The ground was so broken that it was impossible to keep a regular line of battle.
At times their movements were in shape like the flight of migratory birds — sometimes in line, sometimes in mass, mostly in V-shaped groups, with the points toward the enemy.
At these points regimental flags were flying, sometimes drooping as the bearers were shot, but never reaching the ground, for other brave hands were there to seize them.
Sixty flags were advancing up the hill.
was hurrying large bodies of men from his right to the center.
They could be seen hastening along the ridge.
's division was being withdrawn from Sherman
were at the center, urging their men to stand firm and drive back the advancing enemy, now so near the summit — indeed, so near that the guns, which could not be sufficiently depressed to reach them, became useless.
Artillerymen were lighting the
fuses of shells, and bowling them by hundreds down the hill.
The critical moment arrived when the summit was just within reach.
At six different points, and almost simultaneously, Sheridan
's and Wood
's divisions broke over the crest,--Sheridan
's first, near Bragg
's headquarters; and in a few minutes Sheridan
was beside the guns that had been fired at him, and claiming them as captures of his division.
's division took the works on Wood
's left almost immediately afterward; and then Johnson
came up on Sheridan
The enemy's guns were turned upon those who still remained in the works, and soon all were in flight down the eastern slope.
got on the ridge just in time to change front and oppose a large body of the enemy moving down from Bragg
's right to attack our left.
After a sharp engagement, that lasted till dark, he drove the enemy back beyond a high point on the north, which he at once occupied.3
The sun had not yet gone down, Missionary Ridge
was ours, and Bragg
's army was broken and in flight!
Dead and wounded comrades lay thickly strewn on the ground: but thicker yet were the dead and wounded men in gray.
Then followed the wildest confusion, as the victors gave vent to their joy. Some madly shouted; some wept from very excess of joy; some grotesquely danced out their delight,--even our wounded forgot their pain, to join in the general hurrah.
did not long stop to receive praise and congratulations.
With two brigades he started down the Mission Mills
road, and found, strongly posted on a second hill, the enemy's rear.
They made a stout resistance, but by a sudden flank movement he drove them from the heights and captured two guns and many prisoners.
The day was succeeded by a clear moonlight night.
At 7 o'clock General Granger
sent word to General Thomas
that by a bold dash at Chickamauga Crossing he might cut off a large number of the enemy now supposed to be leaving Sherman
's front, and that he proposed to move in that direction.
It was midnight before guides could be found, and then General Sheridan
again put his tired and well-worn men in motion.
He reached the creek just as the rear-guard of the enemy was crossing, and pressed it so closely that it burned the pontoon-bridge before all its troops were over.
captured several hundred prisoners, a large number of quartermasters' wagons, together with caissons, artillery, ammunition, and many small-arms.
In this battle Sheridan
's and Wood
's divisions — the two center assaulting divisions — took 31 pieces of artillery, several thousand small-arms, and 3800 prisoners. In that one hour of assault they lost 2337 men in killed and wounded,--over twenty per cent. of their whole force!
On the northern end of the ridge General Sherman
lost in his two days fighting 1697 in killed and wounded.
Of these, 1268 were in his own three divisions.
During the night the last of Bragg
's army was withdrawn from Missionary Ridge
, and Chattanooga
from that time remained in undisputed possession of the Union
made a brief report on the Chattanooga campaign
on November 30th, 1863, and on the 2d of December was relieved of command.
Of the battle of Missionary Ridge
, the report says:
About 11 A. M. the enemy's forces were being moved in heavy masses from Lookout and beyond to our front, while those in front extended to our right.
They formed their lines with great deliberation just beyond the range of our guns and in plain view of our position.
Though greatly outnumbered, such was the strength of our position that no doubt was entertained of our ability to hold it, and every disposition was made for that purpose.
During this time they [the enemy] had made several attempts on our extreme right, and had been handsomely repulsed with very heavy loss by Major-General Cleburne's command, under the immediate directions of Lieutenant-General Hardee. . . . About 8:30 P. M. the immense force in the front of our left and center advanced in three lines, preceded by heavy skirmishers.
Our batteries opened with fine effect, and much confusion was produced before they reached musket-range.
In a short time the roar of musketry became very heavy, and it was soon apparent the enemy had been repulsed in my immediate front.
While riding along the crest congratulating the troops, intelligence reached me that our line was broken on my right, and the enemy had crowned the ridge.
Assistance was promptly dispatched to that point under Brigadier-General Bate, who had so successfully maintained the ground in my front, and I proceeded to the rear of the broken line to rally our retiring troops and return them to the crest to drive the enemy back.
General Bate found the disaster so great that his small force could not repair it. About this time I learned that our extreme left had also given way, and that my position was almost surrounded.
Bate was immediately directed to form a second line in the rear, where, by the efforts of my staff, a nucleus of stragglers had been formed upon which to rally.
Lieutenant-General Hardee, leaving Major-General Cleburne in command on the extreme right, moved toward the left when he heard the heavy firing in that direction.
He reached the right of Anderson's division just in time to find it had nearly all fallen back, commencing on its left, where the enemy had first crowned the ridge.
By a prompt and judicious movement, he threw a portion of Cheatham's division directly across the ridge facing the enemy, who was now moving a strong force immediately on his left flank.
By a decided stand here the enemy was entirely checked, and that portion of our force to the right remained intact.
All to the left, however, except a portion of Bate's division, was entirely routed and in rapid flight. . . . A panic which I had never before witnessed seemed to have seized upon officers and men, and each seemed to be struggling for his personal safety, regardless of his duty or his character.
In this distressing and alarming state of affairs General Bate was ordered to hold his position covering the road for the retreat of Breckinridge's command, and orders were immediately sent to Generals Hardee and Breckinridge to retire their forces upon the depot at Chickamauga. . . . No satisfactory excuse can possibly be given for the shameful conduct of our troops on the left in allowing their line to be penetrated.
The position was one which ought to have been held by a line of skirmishers against any assaulting column, and wherever resistance was made the enemy fled in disorder after suffering heavy loss.
Those who reached the ridge did so in a condition of exhaustion from the great physical exertion in climbing which rendered them powerless, and the slightest effort would have destroyed them.
Having secured much of our artillery, they soon availed themselves of our panic, and turning our guns upon us enfiladed the lines, both right and left, rendering them entirely untenable.
Had all parts of the line been maintained with equal gallantry and persistence, no enemy could ever have dislodged us, and but one possible reason presents itself to my mind in explanation of this bad conduct in veteran troops who never before failed in any duty assigned them, however difficult and hazardous: They had for two days confronted the enemy, marshaling his immense forces in plain view, and exhibiting to their sight such a superiority in numbers as may have intimidated weak-minded and untried soldiers.
But our veterans had so often encountered similar hosts when the strength of position was against us, and with perfect success, that not a doubt crossed my mind.