1861. |
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As the Army of the Potomac rapidly increased in numbers and equipment in Virginia in front of Washington, it required more space than the narrow strip between the river and the advance posts of the Confederates, and early in September it was determined to acquire that space by pushing back the intruders.
Already there had been several little skirmishes between the pickets and the outposts of the confronting contestants.
On the 5th of August, a detachment of the Twenty-eighth New York, under Captain Brush, mostly firemen, attacked a squad of Confederate cavalry in Virginia, opposite the Point of Rocks, killing and wounding eight men, and capturing nine prisoners and twenty horses; and on the, 12th a detachment of the Tenth New York, under Captain Kennedy, crossed the Potomac from Sandy Hook, and attacked and routed some Virginia cavalry at Lovettsville.
On the 12th of September,
reconnoissance was made toward Lewinsville, four or five miles from Camp Advance, at the Chain Bridge, by about two thousand men, under the command of General William F. Smith,1 in charge of a brigade at that post.
They had accomplished a topographical survey, for which purpose they were chiefly sent, and were returning, when they were attacked by a body of Virginians,2 under the command of Colonel J. E. B. Stuart, afterward the famous general leader of cavalry in the Confederate army.
Stuart opened heavily with his cannon, which at first disconcerted the National troops.
The latter were kept steady until Griffin's Battery was placed in position, when its guns soon silenced those of the Virginians, and scattered their cavalry.
Then the National troops, having accomplished their object, returned to their post near the Chain Bridge “in perfect order and excellent spirits,” with a loss of two killed and ten wounded.3
1 These troops consisted of the Seventy-ninth (Highlanders) New York Militia; battalions of Vermont and Indiana Volunteers, and of the First United States Chasseurs; a Cavalry company, and Griffin's West Point Battery.
2 These were the Thirteenth Virginia Volunteers, Rosser's Battery of the Washington Artillery, and a detachment of cavalry.
3 Reports of Lieutenant-Colonel Shaler and Adjutant Ireland, and dispatch of General McClellan, all dated September 11th, 1861. General McClellan joined the column at the close of the affair. Colonel Stuart (Confederate) gave a glowing account of the confusion into which the Nationals were thrown by his first attack, and gave the affair the aspect of a great victory for himself. He reported “fearful havoc in the ranks of the enemy.” “Our loss,” he said, “was not a scratch to man or horse.” --Stuart's Report, Sept. 11, 1861.
Stuart appears to have been accused of rashness on this occasion, in exposing his cannon to the danger of capture. In an autograph letter before me, dated at Munson's Hill, September 14th, and addressed to General Longstreet, he repels the accusation, and declares that at no time was a piece of his cannon “in a position that it could not have safely retreated from before an army of 10,000 advancing at the double-quick.” Longstreet sent Stuart's letter to General Johnson, with an endorsement, testifying to the judicious disposition of the cannon in the engagement.
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