May 24, 1862. |
May 25. |
May 26. |
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had been promptly informed
from Washington of the reasons and the necessity of countermanding the order for McDowell to move on from Fredericksburg to join him, and he had as usual sent back a complaining remonstrance, and charges of a withholding of troops from him. Nevertheless he issued that order of great promise.
He had said to the Secretary of War, ten days before, “I will fight the enemy, whatever their force may be, with whatever force we may have;” and the Secretary could see no reasons for a change now in the General's resolution, for, so long as the Confederate force that kept McDowell back was withheld from Richmond, McClellan was comparatively as strong in power to fight his enemy as if McDowell was with him, and Jackson and Ewell were confronting that soldier on the Chickahominy instead of on the Shenandoah or Rappahannock.
The fact that McDowell could not then re-enforce him, imposed upon McClellan the obvious duty of acting with uncommon vigor before his enemy could be strengthened, for his was an offensive and not a defensive movement.
But McClellan seems not to have acted with the vigor that was expected, and the President evidently feared he would not, for, at about the time when the commander issued the order indicating a general advance, Mr. Lincoln, filled with just apprehensions for the safety of the capital, because of the movements in the Shenandoah Valley, telegraphed to him, saying--“I think the time is near when you must either attack Richmond, or give up the job and come to the defense of Washington.”
On the following day
he informed McClellan of the successful retreat of Banks, and asked him if he could not cut the railway between Richmond and Fredericksburg; and also what impression he had of the intrenched works for the defense of Richmond.
The General replied that he did not think the Richmond works formidable, and that he had cut the Virginia Central railway in three places.1 He also assured the President that he was “quietly closing in upon the enemy, preparatory to the last struggle,” but thought it necessary to secure his flanks against “the greatly superior forces” in front of him.
For several days afterward, operations on the flank of the great army made the sum of its action.
That army, fully prepared for an instant forward movement, and eager to perform it, not only lay passive, but was dangerously severed by the fickle Chickahominy,2 whose power for mischief, when fed by rains, the commander was constantly setting forth.
Instead of moving his whole force upon the works, which he did not consider formidable, he thought it best only to order a part of General Fitz-John Porter's corps (the Fifth) to Hanover Court-House, to secure his menaced right flank, and keep the way open for McDowell to join him. This detachment moved by way of Mecnanicsville, at three o'clock on the morning of the 27th, General W. H. Emory in the advance, with the Fifth and Sixth Regular Cavalry, and Benson's horse battery.
These were followed by General Morell's division, composed of the brigades of Generals Martindale, Butterfield,
1 This was done by cavalry under Stoneman.
2 “I have two corps [Keyes's and Heintzelman's] across the Chickahominy, within six miles of Richmond: the others on this side [left] at other crossings within same distance, and ready to cross when bridges are completed.” --McClellan's dispatch to the President, May 25, 1862.
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