[
283]
Chapter 24: Second attack on Vicksburg, etc.
Rear-Admiral Porter took command of the Mississippi Squadron in October, 1862.
Rear-Admiral Davis had ordered all the vessels except the
Benton and the
Carondelet up to
Cairo for repairs, for what with being rammed and shaken up by constant firing of the guns, they required a thorough overhauling.
There being at this moment no actual operations in progress,
Rear-Admiral Porter devoted his attention to putting the vessels in thorough order, changing their batteries to Dahlgren guns, and adding a number of small stern-wheel vessels, covered with light iron (called “tin-clads” ), to the squadron.
Up to this time the gun-boats had, strictly speaking, been under the control of the Army.
but now all this was changed, and the Mississippi Squadron, like all the other naval forces, was brought directly under the supervision of the
Secretary of the Navy.
The
Commander-in-Chief of the squadron had no longer to receive orders from
General Halleck or Army headquarters, but was left to manage his command to the best of his ability, and to co-operate with the Army whenever he could do so. This was a much better arrangement, as it allowed the naval
commander-in-chief to exercise his judgment, instead of being handicapped, as
Foote and
Davis were.
It may be remembered when
Donelson fell, and
Foote suggested to
Halleck the importance of pushing on with the gun-boats to
Nashville.
General Halleck forbade his doing so. The new arrangement left the commander of the squadron at liberty to undertake any expedition he thought proper, and he was not in the least hampered by any instructions from the Navy Department regarding his movements; so that when the Army was operating in the interior of
Tennessee, which seemed at that time the great battleground, the Navy could take advantage of the opportunity and make raids on the enemy along the
Mississippi and its tributaries, keeping down guerillas, and enabling army transports to go and come without hindrance.
In October, 1862, the guerillas were exceedingly troublesome all along the rivers, firing at every unarmed steamer which passed.
Large quantities of goods were shipped from
St. Louis to points along the river professedly Union, which ultimately reached the
Confederates.
All this was stopped, and the guerillas, when captured, were summarily dealt with, and the houses where they were harbored laid in ashes.
No commerce was allowed on the
Mississippi except with
Memphis, and the river looked almost as deserted as in the early days of its discovery, its silence being seldom disturbed except by gun-boats and army transports, and the sharp report of the howitzers as they sent the shrapnel shells into the dense woods or over the high banks
[
284]
where it might be supposed guerillas were lying in wait to fire on the transports.
This was slow work compared to the active warfare the iron-clads had been engaged in under
Foote and
Davis, but they were merely getting ready for the hard work before them and will be heard from ere long again.
Before
Admiral Porter left
Washington he was informed by the
President that
General McClernand had been ordered to raise an Army at
Springfield, Ill., to prosecute the
siege of Vicksburg.
The President expressed the hope that the
rear-admiral would co-operate heartily with
General McClernand in the operations to be carried on. But as
Vicksburg never would have been taken if it had depended on
General McClernand's raising an Army sufficient for the purpose, the admiral, immediately on his arrival at
Cairo, sent a message to
General Grant, at
Holly Springs, Miss., informing him of
McClernand's intention, that he,
Porter, had assumed command of the Mississippi Squadron, and was ready to cooperate with the Army on every occasion where the services of the Navy could be useful.
A few days afterwards
General Grant arrived at
Cairo and proposed an expedition against
Vicksburg, and asking the rearadmiral if he could furnish a sufficient force of gun-boats to accompany it.
Grant's plan was to embark
Sherman from
Memphis, where he then was, with thirty thousand soldiers, to be joined at
Helena, Arkansas, by ten thousand more.
Grant himself would march from
Holly Springs with some sixty thousand men upon
Granada.
General Pemberton would naturally march from
Vicksburg to stop
Grant at
Granada until reinforcements could be thrown into
Vicksburg from the south, and while
Pemberton was thus absent with the greater part of his Army
Sherman and
Porter could get possession of the defences of
Vicksburg.
General Grant having been informed that the gun-boats would be ready to move at short notice, and having sent orders to
Sherman to put his troops aboard the transports as soon as the gun-boats arrived in
Memphis, returned immediately to
Holly Springs to carry out his part of the programme.
This interview between
Grant and
Porter lasted just half an hour, and thus was started the expedition against
Vicksburg, which, after a long and arduous siege and a great expenditure of men and money, resulted in the capture of the strongest point of defence occupied by the enemy during the war.
The expedition from
Memphis got away early in December, 1862,
Commander Walke, in the
Carondelet, being sent ahead with the
Cairo,
Baron DeKalb, and
Pittsburg.
(iron-clads,) and the
Signal and
Marmora ( “tin-clads” ) to clear the
Yazoo River of torpedoes and cover the landing of
Sherman's Army when it should arrive.
This arduous and perilous service was well performed.
On the 11th of December,
Commander Walke dispatched the two “tin-clads” on a reconnoisance up the
Yazoo.
They ascended some twenty miles, when they were apprized of the presence of torpedoes by a great number of small boats along the channel of the river and an explosion near the
Signal.
Another torpedo was exploded from the
Marmora by firing into it with a musket as it appeared just below the surface.
The commanding
officers of these two vessels reported that with the assistance of two iron-clads to keep down the sharpshooters, they could clear the river of torpedoes, but not otherwise, as there were rifle-pits all along the left bank of the
Yazoo, and the enemy were supplied with light artillery.
At
Lieutenant-Commander Selfridge's request he was sent on this duty in the
Cairo, with the
Pittsburg,
Lieut.-Commanding
Hoel, and the ram
Queen of the West,
Colonel Charles Ellet, Jr., commanding.
These officers were cautioned to be particularly careful and run no risks.
On the 12th of December the vessels proceeded on the duty assigned them under a shower of bullets from the rifle-pits, which was only checked by the gun-boats dropping
[
285]
close into the left bank and enfilading the rifle-pits with shrapnel.
This cleared the enemy out, and the boats from the vessels were enabled to drag for the infernal machines and haul them to the shore.
where they were destroyed by firing volleys of musketry into them.
After this work had been prosecuted for some time
Lieut.-Comr. Selfridge proceeded ahead in the
Cairo to cover the
Marmora, which was thought to be sorely beset by the enemy's sharpshooters.
The
Cairo encountered a floating torpedo.
Two explosions in quick succession occurred, which seemed almost to lift the vessel out of the water.
Everything was done to keep the
Cairo afloat, but without avail, and she sank in twelve minutes after the explosion, in six fathoms of water, with nothing but the tops of her chimneys showing above the surface.
All the crew were saved.
No fault was imputed to the
commanding officer of the
Cairo.
It was an accident liable to occur to any gallant officer whose zeal carries him to the post of danger, and who is loath to let others do what he thinks he ought to do himself.
This was a bad day's work for a beginning, but the admiral looked upon it simply as an accident of war, and
Selfridge was immediately given command of the
Conestoga.
The loss of the
Cairo was the more regretted as she had lately been made “shot proof,” by covering her weakest points with
railroad iron.
It appeared on examination of the river banks that the torpedo wires were connected with galvanic batteries, and that the enemy was prepared with a system of torpedo defence that would require the utmost caution in ascending the
Yazoo and seizing a point at which to land an Army.
Rear-Admiral Porter arrived in the
Yazoo a day or two after the loss of the
Cairo, and the whole squadron was set to work to clear the river of torpedoes.
The gun-boats ascended to within range of the forts on Haines' Bluff and brought on an engagement with the enemy's batteries, during which the boats of the squadron pushed ahead, and succeeded in destroying numbers of torpedoes.
General Sherman moved his transports to a point on the river called
Chickasaw Bayou without the loss of a man from torpedoes or sharpshooters, his landing being covered in every direction by the gun-boats.
Sherman first made a feint on Haines' Bluff as if to attack the works and then landed at
Chickasaw Bayou.
Owing to the late heavy rains he found the roads to Vicksburg heights almost impassable, and when he attempted to advance with his Army he was headed off by innumerable bayous, which had to be bridged or corduroy roads built around them.
It was killing work.
Even at this time
Vicksburg had been fortified at every point, and its only approaches by land led through dense swamps or over boggy open ground, where heavy guns were placed, so as to mow down an advancing Army.
A general has seldom had so difficult a task assigned him, and there was little chance of
Sherman's succeeding unless
Pemberton had drawn off nearly all his forces to oppose
Grant's advance on
Granada, thus leaving
Vicksburg without a garrison; for even a small force could hold the place against a vastly superior attacking one.
There was only one point where the
Confederates had possibly left a loophole open for an enemy to get in; if they neglected that point it would be because they never supposed any one would attempt to penetrate swamps where men had to wade up to their middle in mud and water, and the passage of artillery was almost an impossibility.
At the time of which we are writing the rain had fallen in such torrents that the low lands in the vicinity of
Vicksburg were submerged, the water extending nearly to the base of the frowning hills covered with earthworks and rifle-pits, against which an Army would have made little impression.
There was, then, no other course but to attack the enemy's works by the road leading from
Chickasaw Bayou and attempt to reach the landing at the foot of the high hills overlooking river and plain, where nature had placed obstacles nearly as formidable as the enemy's guns at other places.
Sherman gained that point and established himself under the high hills it was necessary to assault before he could see the inside of
Vicksburg; but what was encountered in reaching that point no one but the brave
[
286]
officers and men of that Army will ever know.
An Army of thirty thousand men can accomplish a great deal when well directed but it cannot convert swamps into dry land.
But the enemy had not neglected the swamps around
Chickasaw Bayou or the approaches to
Vicksburg on that side.
On the contrary they seemed to have exercised their ingenuity to make that route impassable.
Acres of wood had been felled, the trees overlapping one another and forming a
chevaux de frise which extended through the swamp for several miles.
The difficulties seem great enough in the description, but this falls far short of the reality.
However
Sherman and his Army overcame everything and at last reached
terra firma.
In the meanwhile the Navy was doing what it could to help the Army, but its work was necessarily confined to the water, shelling the edges of the woods all around the peninsula where
Sherman and his Army were struggling, and keeping the enemy from bringing their artillery to bear.
Sherman was of course aware of the perilous character of his undertaking, and the probability of his being driven back, but he had one strong motive to induce him to extra exertions and that was his loyalty to
General Grant.
The latter had run considerable risk in leaving his base at
Holly Springs to draw
Pemberton from
Vicksburg.
Time was precious and
Sherman had to act with promptness, and he felt that it was due to his chief that he should leave nothing untried that would help
Grant to carry out his plans.
Those plans were well conceived but the best calculations in the world were liable to be upset in the face of such elements as prevailed at
Chickasaw Bayou, when
Sherman found himself in the swamp beneath the heights of
Vicksburg.
Grant had left
Holly Springs with a large Army at the time he had appointed, merely with the design of drawing
Pemberton from
Vicksburg and thus helping
Sherman in his attack on that place.
This was all
Grant proposed to do, although it was suggested that in case
Pemberton retreated before him,
Grant would follow him up.
Grant moved towards
Granada and everything looked well, but the
Confederate general,
Earl Van Dorn, dashed into
Holly Springs twenty-eight miles in the rear of the
Union Army, capturing the garrison and all their stores.
At the same time
General Forrest pushed his cavalry into
West Tennessee, cutting the railroad to
Columbus at several points between that place and
Jackson.
This completely cut
Grant off from his only line of communication with the
North and also from his several commands.
Due precautions had been taken to prevent this mishap by leaving a strong force behind at
Holly Springs, but the
commanding officer was not on the alert and his capture was a complete surprise.
In this raid of the
Confederates a million dollars' worth of stores were destroyed.
Under the circumstances it was impossible for
Grant to continue his march on
Granada, which
Pemberton perceiving, the latter returned to
Vicksburg in time to assist in
Sherman's repulse.
Had
Grant been satisfied that he could subsist his Army in the enemy's country, he would have doubtless pushed on to
Vicksburg at all hazards and the place would have fallen at that time, but such was not to be. “There's a divinity that shapes our ends, rough hew them as we may.”
Had
Vicksburg been taken at that moment, one of the best opportunities of displaying the strength and resources of the
North would have been lost.
Sherman made all his arrangements to attack the enemy's works on the 29th of December, 1862, and the assault took place early on that day. One division succeeded in occupying the batteries on the heights and hoped shortly to reach those commanding the city of
Vicksburg, but the division that was to follow the advance was behind time and the opportunity was lost.
A portion of
Pemberton's Army had returned from
Granada, just in time to overwhelm and drive back the small force that had gained the hills.
The latter were outnumbered four to one and were driven back.
The enemy did not follow, being satisfied with driving our troops from the heights and there was nothing left for
Sherman to do but to get his Army safely back to the transports.
Throughout these operations the Navy did everything that could be done to ensure the success of
General Sherman's movement.
As the soldiers pushed their way through the swamps the
Benton and two other iron-clads with the
Marmora and ram
Queen of the West, moved up to within easy range of Haines' Bluff.
The
Benton opened on the Confederate batteries and also shelled the road leading to
Vicksburg to prevent the enemy from sending reinforcements to
Vicksburg and also to make them believe that
Haines' Bluff was the intended point of attack.
Boats were sent towards the forts to drag for torpedoes with the intention if the latter could be removed to advance the gun-boats to close quarters.
When the small boats approached the enemy's works a rapid fire was opened on them, but they did not retire until it was supposed that the torpedoes were removed and the way was clear.
Then the
Benton advanced to the point where the boats had ceased work, some twelve
[
287]
hundred yards from the fort, or as near as the boats could operate against such a fire.
At this point the
Yazoo River was very narrow and only one iron-clad could pass up at a time.
There was no room for two vessels to fight abreast, consequently the
Benton had to bear the brunt of the battle, which lasted two hours. During this time the
Benton received many heavy blows from the enemy's shot and shells, while her consorts had to lie idle, for if they threw shells over the
Benton they might endanger on board.
Although the
Benton was much cut up her efficiency was not impaired.
She was hit on her bow casemates, which were “shot-proof,” thirty times without damage, but plunging shots passed through her decks.
Lieut.-Commanding
Gwinn, stood on the upper deck
during the whole action, as he was of opinion that a pilot-house or casemate was no place for the commander of a ship of war in battle.
This idea cost him his life, for he was struck with a fifty-pound rifle shell which tore away the muscles of his right arm and breast.
His executive officer,
Acting Lieutenant George P. Lord, was severely wounded, and ten of the crew were killed and wounded.
It was impossible for gun-boats alone to capture the works at Haines' Bluff, as but one vessel at a time could operate against them.
Their reduction required a combined Army and Navy attack.
The Confederates proved themselves good artillerists but had two of their guns dismounted by the
Benton's fire.
The gallant commander of the
Benton notwithstanding his dreadful wounds, lingered two days and died in the admiral's cabin deeply regretted by every officer and man in the squadron.
The gunboats withdrew from before Haines' Bluff for it appeared evident that
Vicksburg could not be taken from that direction.
General Sherman came to the same conclusion with regard to attacking it from the
Chickasaw Bayou.
He met with no loss in withdrawing his troops to the transports, but in the assault he lost in killed, wounded, and missing, seventeen hundred men, a large number considering the short time his Army was actually engaged.
The soldiers had to work their way back to the
Yazoo through heavy rains, and the hardships they encountered in the march can hardly be realized by those who did not share them.
That evening the sun came out again as if to let the soldiers dry themselves and all the signs promised fair weather.
Rear-Admiral Porter being still hopeful, proposed to run the iron-clads at night close up under the forts and attack at close quarters with grape and canister, while a division of the Army disembarked and assaulted Haines' Bluff in the rear.
General Sherman approved the plan and
General Steele and his division Were assigned to co-operate with the Navy on the following night, but the good weather indications proved a delusion and a snare, and on the afternoon of the day when the attack was to have been made on Haines' Bluff, a fog set in that shut out all objects at a distance of fifty feet, and this continued until the next day.
The proposed expedition could do nothing on such a foggy night, At noon the following day it began to rain again heavier than ever and the land almost disappeared from sight.
There was no longer any chance for a successful attack on Haines' Bluff and nothing was left but for the Army and Navy to retire from the scene where they had been so unsuccessful.
General Sherman, on visiting the rearadmiral on board his flag-ship, opposed further operations and at once proposed that
Vicksburg should be given up for the present, and as his troops were somewhat demoralized he must go with them to attack
Arkansas Post and secure a success which would impart new confidence to them.
He desired the admiral to go along with the gun-boats, and this being agreed to, preparations were made to start next day on the new expedition.
The following morning
General Sherman learned that
Major-General McClernand had arrived at the mouth of the
Yazoo to take command of
Sherman's Army.
This was a surprise to every one, for although it was known that
McClernand had received orders to proceed to
Illinois and raise troops for the purpose of undertaking the
siege of Vicksburg, yet it never was supposed
[
288]
that he would take command of forty thousand men of
Grant's Army, without even paying the latter, his superior officer, the compliment of informing him of his intention.
However,
General McClernand came with such orders from
Washington that
Sherman unhesitatingly agreed to turn over the command to him.
As
Admiral Porter did not come under Army rule and knew exactly the terms on which
General McClernand had received his orders, he declined to have anything to do with the proposed expedition to
Arkansas Post, unless
General Sherman should go in command of the troops.
To this
McClernand agreed, only stipulating that he should accompany the expedition.
So the matter was arranged, and the expedition started.
The last act of the Navy in the
Yazoo was one to be remembered by the
Confederates who, finding that our troops were re-embarked and ready to depart, determined to pounce on the rear transports and give them a parting remembrance.
Two regiments made an attack with field-pieces which were hauled along the road made by
Sherman's soldiers, but unfortunately for the enemy they mistook the
Lexington,
Marmora,
Queen of the West and
Monarch--the two latter
Colonel Ellet's rams — for transports.
Before the
Confederates could fire a second round, these vessels opened on them with shrapnel, grape and canister, cutting them up and sending them flying in all directions without the loss of a man on our side.
In the meantime the transports steamed down the river in good order leaving nothing behind that could be of any use to the enemy.
The following named vessels took part in the
Yazoo expedition:
Black Hawk, (flagship)
Lieutenant-Commander K. R. Breese,
Benton,
Lieutenant-Commander Wm. Gwinn,
Baron DeKalb,
Lieutenant-Commander Jno. G. Walker,
Carondelet,
Commander Henry Walke,
Louisville,
Lieutenant-Commander E. K. Owen,
Cincinnati,
Lieutenant-Commander G. M. Bache,
Lexington,
Lieutenant-Commander James W. Shirk,
Signal, Acting-Volunteer-
Lieutenant John Scott,
Romeo,
Acting-Ensign R. B. Smith,
Juliet, Acting-Volunteer-
Lieutenant Edward Shaw,
Forest Rose,
Acting-Master Geo. W. Brown,
Rattler.
Lieutenant-Commander Watson Smith,
Marmora, Acting-Volunteer-
Lieutenant Robert Getty,
Monarch, (ram)
Queen of the West, (ram)
Colonel Chas. Ellet, Jr.
The second attack on
Vicksburg terminated quite as unsatisfactorily as the first, and every one came to the conclusion that
Vicksburg could only be conquered by a long and troublesome siege which would severely test the endurance of both parties.
