can now be followed.
The reaction along the Mississippi
will be great, and Major-General Fremont
, with great respect for his courage and enterprise, is not the man, I fear, to conduct large columns successfully.
is any thing but safe.
is menaced, and my friends at Memphis
seem to be stirring from their rest under their General.
I regret that I cannot give any more interesting or important intelligence, but I have not been able to go out for the last two days to the camps, as in common with many people in Washington
, I was suffering a little from the weather — thunderstorms, rains, bad odors, which produce the usual results in garrisons and ill-drained cities.
However, it is some consolation that there is nothing of consequence doing.
There was an alarm the night before last.
Some foolish people got the loan of a steamer and a big gun, and went down the river with them.
When they were opposite one of the enemy's batteries, some three or four miles away, they fired their big gun, and “Oh'd,” no doubt, at the shot as it plashed short in the water, the enemy treating them with a proper silent contempt all the while.
Having done this, they returned in the evening and amused themselves by firing away as hard as they could just below the Long Bridge
— I believe without ball — and it may be imagined there was some commotion, as the reports shook doors and windows.
. is doing his best to get things into order, and the outskirts of the city and the streets are quieter at night; but there is rough work with Zouaves and others in Alexandria
— houses burnt, people shot, and such like sports of certain sorts of “citizen soldiery.”
They will soon be shouting
“money or blood
,” if not kept in order and paid
. These men form a marked exception to the general behavior of many regiments.
Doc. 4.-N. Y. Tribune narrative.
A correspondent of the New York Tribune
writing from Washington
, under date of July 23, gives the following account of the battle:
My narrative of this extraordinary battle can accurately embrace most of what occurred with the division under Gen. Tyler
, which opened the attack, which was, with the exception of one brigade, desperately engaged from the beginning to the end, and which, so far as I can judge from the course in which events ran, was the last to yield before the panic which spread through the army.
It is well understood that the conflict extended over a space of many miles, and that the experience of a single observer could grasp only those details which immediately surrounded him. The general progress and effects of the entire engagement were apparent from the advanced positions of Gen. Tyler
's action, and of these it will be possible for me to speak safely; but the particular movement of the divisions under Col. Hunter
and Col. Heintzelman
should be told of by others who accompanied them.
For the clear understanding of this record, the plan of battle, although often given, must be once more briefly set down.
The enemy's strength had been tested and affirmed by the hot skirmish of Thursday, the result of which did not justify a second serious attempt upon the same ground.
There was, moreover, abundant evidence that the entire line of defences along Bull Run
was equally formidable, and that any attack upon a single point would be extremely hazardous.
It was therefore determined to open the assault in two directions simultaneously, and to offer a feint of a third onset, to divert attention, and if possible, confuse the enemy's defence.
Accordingly, Col. Richardson
was left with a considerable battery of artillery and one brigade — the fourth of Gen. Tyler
's division — at the scene of the skirmish of Thursday, with directions to open heavily with cannon at about the moment of the real attack elsewhere.
The remainder of Gen. Tyler
's division, his 1st, 2d, and 3d brigades, with powerful artillery, but without cavalry, was sent to cross Bull Run
at a point a mile and a half or more to the right, upon a road known as the Stone Bridge
A stronger wing, comprising the divisions of Col. Hunter
and Col. Heintzelman
, was carried around a good distance to the right, with the purpose of breaking upon the enemy in flank and rear, and driving them towards Gen. Tyler
, by whom their regular retreat should be cut off. Col. Miles
' division remained at Centreville
in reserve, and had no part in the action.
Long before dawn, the three divisions which sustained the battle moved from Centreville
to the attack.
The march was slow, and, to a certain degree, irregular.
Even at that hour, there seemed a lack of unity and direct purpose among the officers, which sometimes was made too evdent to the troops not to affect their spirit and demeanor.
I believe it just to say that, at the very opening of the day, it was plain to all that real and sound discipline was abandoned.
I do not mean that this was the case with separate regiments, many of which were always prompt, sure, and perfectly at the disposal of their commanders, but with the brigades, the divisions, even the army, as a whole.
The march was continued until, at 5 1/2 o'clock, Gen. Tyler
's division had reached the place of its attack.
His Second and Third brigades, under Gen. Schenck
and Col. Sherman
, were arrayed in lines of battle, the former taking the left, and the latter, after some changes, the right of the road.
Skirmishers were pushed forward, who, when close upon Bull Run
, encountered the pickets of the enemy, and presently exchanged irregular shots with them, by which slight injuries were caused on both sides.
Nothing further was attempted by the infantry