- Letters of Gen. Halleck and Gen. Burnside -- correspondence with Secretary Stanton -- his professions of devotion -- the truth.
The following is the “brief note” referred to in the foregoing:
Note by the Editor.--There is no more sorrowful page in the story of men and of peoples than this, in which it becomes necessary, for the truth of history, to bring together the evidence of a war secretary's private treason to the general in the field, fighting his country's battles. It is unnecessary to draw on the countless sources of private evidence which exist, since the testimony of Secretaries Chase and Welles, and Postmaster-General Blair, his associates in Mr. Lincoln's cabinet, suffice, without extending the miserable record of Mr. Stanton's falsehood and shame, to show his continuous personal hostility to Gen. McClellan from the time of his entering the cabinet in January, at the precise date of writing the above telegram and letter of July 5, and during the rest of McClellan's campaigns. Mr. Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy in the cabinet with Mr. Stanton, in his work, “Lincoln and Seward,” New York, 1874, says: 
（P. 190) “With the change in the War Department in Jan., 1862, came the hostility of Secretary Stanton to McClellan, then general-in-chief.” （P. 191) “This unwise letter [the Harrison's Bar letter] and the reverses of the army, with the active hostility of Stanton, brought Halleck, a vastly inferior man, to Washington. . . . On coming to Washington, Pope, who was ardent and, I think, courageous, though not always discreet, very naturally fell into the views of Secretary Stanton, who improved every opportunity to denounce McClellan and his hesitating policy. Pope also reciprocated the commendations bestowed on him by Halleck, by uniting with Stanton and Gen. Scott in advising that McClellan should be superseded and Halleck placed in charge of military affairs at Washington. This, combined with the movements and the disasters before Richmond, and his own imprudent letter, enabled Stanton to get rid of McClellan at headquarters.” （P. 193) “But Pope was defeated, and the army, sadly demoralized, came retreating to the Potomac. The War Department, and especially Stanton and Halleck, became greatly alarmed. On the 30th August, in the midst of these disasters, and before the result had reached us, though most damaging information in regard to McClellan, who lingered at Alexandria, was current, the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Chase, called upon me with a protest, signed by himself and Stanton, denouncing the conduct of McClellan and demanding his immediate dismissal. Two other members were ready to append their names after mine. I declined to sign the paper, which was in the handwriting of Stanton; not that I did not disapprove of the course of the general, but because the combination was improper and disrespectful to the President. . . . I had doubted the wisdom of recalling the Army of the Potomac from Richmond, therein differing from Chase and Stanton. The object in bringing that army back to Washington, in order to start a new march overland and regain the abandoned position, I did not understand unless it was to get rid of McClellan . . . . The President never knew of this paper, but was not unaware of the popular feeling against that officer, in which he sympathized, and of the sentiments of the members of the cabinet, aggravated by the hostility and strong if not exaggerated rumors sent out by the Secretary of War. Both Stanton and Halleck were, however, filled with apprehensions beyond others, as the army of stragglers and broken battalions, on the last of August and first of September, came rushing toward Washington.” Mr. S. P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury in the same cabinet, writing shortly after Sept. 2, 1862, says:After Pope's defeat Mr. Chase says:From the day the President told me McClellan was beaten, and I saw his despatches announcing his retreat towards the James river, I never entertained a doubt of the necessity of withdrawing the army altogether, if it was to remain under his command, and I expressed this opinion at once to the President. The military men said that to attempt to withdraw the army would involve the loss of all its material, ammunition, guns, provisions, and stores.Mr. Chase then refers to the visit of Gen. Marcy at Washington (on which occasion Mr. Stanton's letter of July 5 was written), and what Gen. Marcy had said, and continues:The danger of withdrawal; the impossibility of strengthening the army for an advance on Richmond from the position to which it had retreated; the certainty that no vigorous effort would be made by  McClellan, by unexpected blows south of the James, to retrieve the disasters north of it; the possibility of the loss of the entire army-convinced me, and convinced the Secretary of War, that the command of the Army of the Potomac should be given to some more active officer. We proposed to the President to send Pope to the James, and give Mitchell the command of the army in front of Washington, which . . . had been placed under Pope. The President was not prepared for anything so decisive, and sent for Halleck and made him commander-in-chief(Schuckers's “Life, etc., of S. P. Chase,” p. 447).
The President . . . himself gave the command of the fortifications and the troops for the defence of Washington to McClellan. It was against my protest and that of the Secretary of War “(ibid. p. 450).” Aug. 29 Mr. Chase writes:On Aug. 30 Mr. Chase states that he and Mr. Stanton prepared and signed a paper expressing their judgment of McClellan (ibid. p. 456). Sept. 1 Mr. Chase states: “On suggestion of Judge Bates, the remonstrance against McClellan, which had been previously signed by Smith, was modified; and, having been further slightly altered on my suggestion, was signed by Stanton, Bates, and myself, and afterward by Smith. Welles declined to sign it, on the ground that it might seem unfriendly to the President, though this was the exact reverse of its intent. He said he agreed in opinion, and was willing to express it personally. This determined us to await the cabinet meeting to morrow” (ibid. p, 458). The testimony of Postmaster-General Blair will be found further on in connection with accounts of the cabinet meeting on Sept. 2, as given by Secretaries Chase and Welles. When Mr. Stanton had succeeded, as he supposed, in depriving McClellan of command by his ironical order of Aug. 30, and when the peril of the capital and country led Mr. Lincoln on Sept. 2 to appeal to McClellan to save them, Mr. Stanton openly declared, says Mr. Blair, that he would rather see the capital lost than McClellan restored to command.The Secretary of War called on me in reference to Gen. McClellan. He has long believed, and so have I, that Gen. McClellan ought not to be trusted with the command of any army of the Union, and the events of the last few days have greatly strengthened our judgment. We called on . . . Gen. Halleck and remonstrated against Gen. McClellan commanding. Secretary wrote and presented to Gen. H. a call for a report touching McC.'s disobedience of orders and consequent delay of support to Army of Virginia; Gen. H. promised answer to-morrow morning(Warden's “Account, etc., of S. P. Chase,” p. 456).