Hostile criticism of Generals Buell, Rosecrans, and Thomas, the successive commanders of the Army of the Ohio, forms one of the salient features of the Memoirs. General Rosecrans particularly distinguished himself in the battles of Iuka and Corinth, in the autumn following the first occupation of the latter place. From General Sherman's account, however, the reader would suppose that General Rosecrans had behaved badly in both these actions. Of the battle at Iuka, he says:
In the early part of September the enemy in our front manifested great activity, feeling with cavalry at all points, and on the 13th General Van Dorn threatened Corinth, while General Price seized the town of Iuka, which was promptly abandoned by a small garrison under Colonel Murphy. Price's force was about eight thousand men, and the general impression was that he was en route for Eastport, with the purpose to cross the Tennessee River in the direction of Nashville, in aid of General Bragg, then in full career for Kentucky. General Grant determined to attack him in force, prepared to regain Corinth before Van Dorn could reach it. He had drawn Ord to Corinth, and moved him by Burnsville on Iuka, by the main road twenty-six miles. General Grant accompanied this column as far as Burnsville. At the same time he had dispatched Rosecrans by roads to the south, via Jacinto, with orders to approach Iuka by the two main roads coming into Iuka from the south, viz., the Jacinto and Fulton roads. ‘On the 18th General Ord encountered the enemy about four miles out of Iuka. His orders contemplated that he should not make a serious attack until Rosecrans had gained his position on the south; but, as usual, Rosecrans had encountered difficulties in the confusion of roads. His head of column did not reach the vicinity of Iuka till 4 P. M. of the 19th, and then  his troops were long drawn out on the single Jacinto road, leaving the Fulton road clear for Price's use. Price perceived his advantage, and attacked with vehemence the head of Rosecrans' column, Hamilton's division, beating it back, capturing a battery, and killing and disabling seven hundred and thirty-six men, so that when night closed in Rosecrans was driven to the defensive, and Price, perceiving his danger, deliberately withdrew by the Fulton road, and the next morning was gone. Although General Ord must have been within four or six miles of this battle, he did not hear a sound, and he or General Grant did not know of it till advised the next morning by a courier who had made a wide circuit to reach them. General Grant was much offended with General Rosecrans because of this affair; but in my experience these concerted movements generally fail, unless with the very best kind of troops, and then in a country on whose roads some reliance can be placed, which is not the case in northern Mississippi. If Price was aiming for Tennessee he failed, and was therefore beaten. He made a wide circuit by the south aid again joined Van Dorn.’ * * * *To what extent this action was a reverse for General Rosecrans, and in what degree General Grant was offended, the reports of the last-named officer will show:
 Subsequently, General Grant made an extended report of this battle, which bears date October 22d. The chief expression in it which can be construed into dissatisfaction with General Rosecrans' movements, is where he says, speaking of the delay of his column through the fault of a guide; ‘this caused some disappointment and made a change of plans necessary,’ and before closing his report he calls attention to the fact that this delay was ‘the fault of a guide.’ This report sums up the movement and its results as follows:
In his account of the battle of Corinth, which took place  about two weeks after the action at Iuka, General Sherman is still more unjust to General Rosecrans. The battle was a brilliant and most decisive one, and General Rosecrans' conduct throughout, such as merited and secured the highest praise, and a few days after his return from a long pursuit of the enemy, he was relieved and promoted to the command of the Army of the Cumberland, in place of General Buell. In regard to the affair at Corinth the Memoirs say:
Still by the 1st of October, General Grant was satisfied that the enemy was meditating an attack in force on Boliver or Corinth; and on the 2d Van Dorn made his appearance near Corinth, with his entire army. On the 8d he moved down on that place from the north and north-west. General Rosecrans went out some four miles to meet him, but was worsted and compelled to fall back within the line of his forts. These had been begun under General Halleck, but were much strengthened by General Grant, and consisted of several detached redoubts bearing on each other, and inclosing the town and the depots of stores at the intersection of the two railroads. Van Dorn closed down on the forts by the evening of the 3d, and on the morning of the 4th assaulted with great vehemence. Our men, covered by good parapets, fought gallantly, and defended their posts well, inflicting terrible losses on the enemy, so that by noon the rebels were repulsed at all points and drew off, leaving their dead and wounded in our hands. * * * * Meantime, General Grant at Jackson, had dispatched Brigadier-General McPherson with a brigade directly for Corinth, which reached General Rosecrans-after the battle; and in anticipation of his victory, had ordered him to pursue instantly, notifying him that he had ordered Ord's and Hurlbut's divisions rapidly across to Pocahontas, so as to strike the rebels in flank. On the morning of the 5th, General Ord reached Hatchie River at Davis' bridge, with four thousand men; crossed over and encountered the retreating army, captured a battery and several hundred prisoners, dispersing the rebel advance and forcing the main column to make a wide circuit by the south in order to cross the Hatchie River. Had General Rosecrans pursued promptly and been on the heels of this mass of confused and routed men, Van Dorn's army would surely have been utterly ruined; as it was, Van Dorn regained Holly Springs somewhat demoralized. General Rosecrans did not begin his pursuit till the next morning, the 5th, and it was then too late. General Grant was again displeased with him, and never became fully reconciled. General Rosecrans was soon after relieved, and transferred to  the Army of the Cumberland in Tennessee, of which he afterward obtained the command in place of General Buell, who was removed. ‘The effect of the battle of Corinth was very great. It was, indeed, a decisive blow to the Confederate cause in our quarter, and changed the whole aspect of affairs in West Tennessee. From the timid defensive, we were at once enabled to assume the bold offensive. In Memphis I could see its effects upon the citizens, and they openly admitted that their cause had sustained a death-blow.’The several insinuations against General Rosecrans (who had struck this death-blow), which the above extracts contain, are placed in their true light, through the telegrams sent by General Grant at the time of the movement, and his full report made later:
General Rosecrans' protest against giving up the pursuit, thus referred to by General Grant, was as follows:
In reply to this he received an order from the general commanding, directing him to desist from pursuit, and return with his command cautiously, but promptly, to Corinth.
It was decided, however, to order General Rosecrans back, on the ground that he was not strong enough, or sufficiently prepared, for such a pursuit as he designed to make. The following extract from orders issued by General Grant at Jackson, October 7th, shows that he then thought General Rosecrans had accomplished all possible for him to do in the place assigned him. 
General Grant closed his formal report of this battle as follows:
The following is the close of General Rosecrans' report of this battle:
Another report of General Rosecrans shows that General McPherson with his fresh troops, reached him just before sunset after the battle, and together with the whole command began the pursuit at daylight the next morning. Rosecrans' force in the battle of Corinth was fifteen thousand seven hundred infantry, and two thousand five hundred cavalry, an aggregate of eighteen thousand two hundred against an enemy of thirty-eight thousand. General Sherman admits that ‘beyond doubt the rebel army lost at Corinth fully six thousand men.’ The records set forth with sufficient clearness the brilliant character of the battle, the energy of the pursuit, and the satisfaction felt by General Grant at the results. So far as the differences which arose between Generals Grant and Rosecrans about this time, grew out of these movements, they appear to have had their origin chiefly in General Rosecrans' insisting upon pursuing the enemy beyond where General Grant considered it prudent to do so, and persisting in expressing his opinions against those of his commanding officer. But whatever the causes of difference were, General Grant's report, setting forth that an earlier pursuit than the one made was probably impracticable, is a full answer to General Sherman's version of the cause of trouble.