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Chapter 6: Jackson's Valley campaign
Before taking up the history of affairs before
Richmond in June, 1862, with
Lee at the head of the army, it is necessary to review events in the
Valley of Virginia.
This Valley constituted the only route by which a Confederate army could invade
Maryland and threaten
Washington City in rear.
Cool judgment at the head of affairs, after
Washington had once been fortified against an attack by open assault, might have laughed at any idea of real danger from such an invasion.
It should have been clear to all that no invasion could maintain itself long enough to carry on a siege, or to do more than to fight one great battle.
The trouble was the lack of railroad transportation.
Wagons alone would have to be relied upon to bring all supplies from
Staunton, Va., a distance via the
Valley roads of nearly 200 miles to
Washington.
But fear, approaching panic, took possession of
Washington whenever a Confederate force appeared in the
Valley, and every other operation would be suspended to concentrate all efforts upon driving it out.
This oversensitiveness of the
Federals cut its greatest figure in 1862, and was, more than once, the only salvation of
Richmond.
For the
Confederate generals understood it, and as the situation in front of
Richmond became more threatening, they sought more earnestly to reenforce the
Valley.
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It happened that
Stonewall Jackson had been assigned as the commander of the Valley District in Nov., ‘61, and the reader has already been told of the
battle of Kernstown, which he fought there on Mar. 23, ‘62.
After that battle he had fallen back with his division, about 8000 strong, to Swift Run Gap.
Ewell, with about as many more, was at
Gordonsville, and
Edward Johnson, with about 3000, was near
Staunton.
The Federals had made in
West Virginia two separate departments.
That of the
Shenandoah, under
Banks, included the
Valley in which
Banks had, in April, about 19,000 men near
Harrisonburg.
About 40 miles west in the mountains was
Fremont, commanding what was called the Mountain Department, in which he had about 15,000 men. About 3700 of these, under
Milroy, were at
McDowell, a point 25 miles west of
Staunton.
On April 29,
Jackson proposed to
Lee in
Richmond that he,
Jackson, should unite his own force and
Johnson's and attack
Milroy and
Fremont, and drive them back into the mountains.
Then returning quickly, and being joined by
Ewell, his whole force should fall upon
Banks.
Lee approved the project and committed its entire execution to
Jackson.
Ewell's division was brought up to Swift Run Gap to observe
Banks, while
Jackson concealed his object by marching his own division back across the
Blue Ridge toward
Charlottesville, and moving from a railroad station near
Charlottesville by rail to
Staunton.
Here he united with
Johnson and marched rapidly upon
Milroy.
He had started on April 30, and, taking a country road, had been three days in moving his guns and trains through 12 miles of mud to reach a metalled road.
He had intended to rest over Sunday, May 4, but news of
Fremont's cavalry having advanced, induced him reluctantly to put his infantry upon the cars and move to
Staunton on that day. On May 7, he left
Staunton, and on May 8 he confronted
Milroy at
McDowell.
Milroy had been reenforced by
Schenck's brigade.
Jackson kept most of his force concealed, and about 2500 Federals were advanced against him in the afternoon.
A sharp affair ensued with about 2800 of
Jackson's force, holding the crest of a steep
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Jackson's Valley campaign, May and June, 1862 |
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ridge more exposed to fire than was the enemy.
The latter only lost about 250 killed and wounded, while the
Confederates lost 498; but next morning the
Federals had retreated.
Jackson pursued for two or three days, going nearly to
Franklin, and then on May 12 turned back, damaging and obstructing all roads behind him, and thus practically neutralizing for a while
Fremont's whole force.
He now marched to unite with
Ewell and to strike at
Banks.
Friday, May 16, had been appointed by the
Confederate President a day of fasting and prayer, and it was spent in camp at
Lebanon Springs near
Staunton.
Meanwhile, during
Jackson's absence, the situation in the
Valley had changed.
Shields's division, about 9000 men, had been taken from
Banks and ordered to join
McDowell at
Fredericksburg, where the latter would await it before advancing to join
McClellan before
Richmond.
This reduced
Banks's force to about 10,000, and he had been withdrawn down the
Valley to
Strasburg, which he was ordered to fortify and hold.
Jackson had now with
Ewell's division about 16,000 men. On May 20 he arrived at
New Market, whence there were two roads to
Winchester.
The western, the most direct and shortest, going by
Strasburg, and the eastern, crossing the
Massanutten Mountains to
Luray, followed the valley of the
South Fork of the
Shenandoah to
Front Royal, about 12 miles east of
Strasburg.
Then, crossing the river, it united with the direct road at
Newtown, within 12 miles of
Winchester.
His march was by the eastern route and was conducted with such secrecy that the enemy had no idea that he was within 60 miles, when, at 1 P. M., May 23, his skirmishers attacked a Federal outpost at
Front Royal held by
Col. Kenly with about a thousand men and two guns.
Kenly, seeing a much superior force, set fire to his camp, and, crossing the
Shenandoah, also set fire to the bridge behind him, but
Jackson's men rushed in and saved it, though so damaged as to make the use of it slow and difficult.
Jackson, crossing at a ford with the 6th Va. Cav., under
Col. Flournoy, charged the enemy, capturing the two guns and 600 prisoners, the enemy losing 154 killed and wounded, and the
Confederates only 26.
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Even a more brilliant success might have resulted here but for an unfortunate failure of our staff service, as follows: —
As he approached
Front Royal from the south, about three and a half miles from the town, a rough country road diverged to the east and gave a second approach to the town by an obscure route of about eight miles over some steep hills.
The more surely to avoid the enemy's pickets and to execute a surprise,
Jackson had taken the head of his column by this road.
But after striking the enemy's pickets near
Front Royal, he sent back orders for the rear brigades to follow the short and nearly level highway to the town.
As usual at that time in the Confederate armies, the courier service was performed by a small detachment of cavalry, temporarily detailed; not by specially selected men, as was later practised.
In this case the courier selected to carry the order not only failed to deliver it, but took himself off, and was never heard of again.
It resulted that
Jackson waited in vain the whole afternoon for the coming up of most of his artillery and infantry.
Part of it only arrived after dark, completely exhausted by its laborious march; and one of his brigades, tired out, encamped four miles short of
Front Royal.
The cream of the whole occasion was thus lost.
Banks did not appreciate the situation until next morning, and only toward 10 o'clock did he get off from
Strasburg in retreat for
Winchester.
Jackson, too, was able to make only a late start, and, being delayed by forces sent out by
Banks to protect his right flank, he missed, by two hours, intercepting
Banks's infantry, though he captured and destroyed about 100 wagons, and took some prisoners.
There was much delay, also, from poor discipline in both the Confederate infantry and cavalry, especially in the latter.
It was not easy for either to resist the temptations offered by so many wagons loaded with articles of food and clothing, calculated to appeal strongly to Confederate wants.
But if time was thus wasted,
Jackson made it up by pushing his march for the greater part of the night.
It was 3 A. M. when he finally allowed his exhausted men to lie down and sleep, and
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they were now near enough to
Winchester to make it sure that
Banks could not get away without a battle.
Early in the morning
Jackson attacked
Winchester.
The enemy made a stubborn resistance, having good position but an inferior force.
He was finally, however, broken and driven from the town in great confusion.
Jackson, in his official report, says of the occasion:—
‘Never have I seen an opportunity when it was in the power of cavalry to reap a richer harvest of the fruits of victory.
Hoping that the cavalry would soon come up, the artillery, followed by infantry, was pressed forward for about two hours for the purpose of preventing by artillery fire a re-forming of the enemy; but as nothing was heard of the cavalry, and as but little or nothing could be accomplished without it in the exhausted condition of our infantry, between which and the enemy the distance was constantly increasing, I ordered a halt and issued orders for going into camp and refreshing the men.’
This had been the critical moment of
Jackson's whole strategic movement.
He had successfully concentrated a superior force upon his enemy, and routed him, and needed but his cavalry to reap the full fruits of a great success.
He had three regiments of cavalry, — the 7th under
Col. Turner Ashby, and the 2d and 6th, which, the day before, had been placed under the command of
Gen. Geo. H. Steuart.
Ashby's regiment was recruited in the
Valley and was noted for every good quality except discipline.
Being near their homes, the opportunity to loot the captured trains had been peculiarly seductive, and the regiment for some days was but little more than a company.
With his small force remaining,
Ashby, unfortunately, the night before, had ridden to
Berryville, fearing the enemy might attempt to escape by Snicker's Gap.
The 2d and 6th regiments under
Steuart were with
Ewell's troops on the right of the attack,
Jackson being with the left.
There was no reason, therefore, except our fatal facility of blundering, why these two regiments should not have been promptly at hand, and, for once, the spectacle be seen of a Confederate army reaping the fruits of victory.
The story is a curious one, and is told in
Jackson's official report as follows:—
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‘I had seen but some 50 of Ashby's cavalry since prior to the pillaging scenes of the previous evening, and none since an early hour of the past night.
The 2d and 6th Va. regiments of cavalry were under the command of Brig.-Gen. Geo. H. Steuart of Ewell's command.
After the pursuit had been continued for some distance beyond the town, and seeing nothing of the cavalry, I despatched my aide-de-camp, Lt. Pendleton, to Gen. Steuart with an order “to move as rapidly as possible and join me on the Martinsburg turnpike and carry on the pursuit of the enemy with vigor.”
His reply was that he was under the command of Gen. Ewell and the order must come through him. Such conduct and consequent delay has induced me to require of Lt. (now Maj.) Pendleton a full statement of the case, which is forwarded herewith.’
Pendleton tells how
Steuart, who was a graduate of
West Point and an officer of the old army, had refused and failed to obey
Jackson's order for immediate action, because not given through a division commander.
Gen. Jackson then goes on to say: —
About an hour after the halt of the main body had been ordered, Brig.-Gen. Geo. H. Steuart, with his cavalry, came up, and renewing the pursuit pushed forward in a highly creditable manner and succeeded in capturing a number of prisoners; but the main body of Banks's army was now beyond the reach of successful pursuit, and effected its escape across the Potomac.
Before reaching Bunker Hill Gen. Steuart was joined by Gen. Ashby with a small portion of his cavalry.
Upon my inquiring of Gen. Ashby why he was not where I desired him at the close of the engagement, he stated that he had moved to the enemy's left for the purpose of cutting off a portion of his force.
Gen. Steuart pushed on to Martinsburg, where he captured a large amount of army stores.
There is good reason for believing that had the cavalry played its part in this pursuit as well as the four companies had done under Col. Flournoy two days before in the pursuit from Front Royal, but a small portion of Banks's army would have made its escape to the Potomac.
This narrative shows how our efficiency was impaired by our deficiencies of discipline.
Our strategy, marching and fighting, had all been excellent.
Yet, owing to the failure of one courier, and a single mistake of narrow-mindedness in a general,
Banks had escaped with but trifling loss of men or material.
The campaign, however, had not been undertaken to capture men or material.
Its great object was to break up
McDowell's proposed march from
Fredericksburg to reenforce
McClellan in front
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of
Richmond.
This, it will be seen, was fully accomplished by the help of the following chapter of accidents and just at the critical moment.
McDowell had been ordered to march as soon as he was joined by
Shields's division.
It arrived on May 22.
Only one day was needed to equip it for the march to
Richmond, but the loss of three days followed.
Its artillery ammunition had been condemned by an inspector and a second day was lost, waiting for ammunition which had been delayed by the grounding of a schooner near
Alexandria.
Everything, however, was ready by the night of the 24th, and
McDowell was anxious to march on Sunday, the 25th.
But a third day's delay now ensued from
Mr. Lincoln's superstitious feeling that his chances of success might be improved by showing some special regard for the Sabbath.
McDowell's official report says:
1—
‘I was now ready to march with over 40,000 men and over 100 pieces of artillery.
Though I could have started, and would have started, Sunday, yet it was resolved not to march till Monday; this out of deference to the wishes of the President, who was with me at the time, having come down Friday night, and with the concurrence of the Secretary of War, on account of the day.’
When it is remembered that the distance to unite with
McClellan could have been easily covered within three marches, one is impressed with the influence of small events upon great matters, especially when the small events involve the loss of time, even of hours.
It has already been told how
McDowell did actually start, but,
having made only a part of a day's march, he was recalled, and sent after
Jackson.
Had he made even a full day, it is very doubtful if he would have been recalled.
On the morning of Sunday, the 25th, everything in
Washington was serene.
Those best posted, and in highest authority, confidently expected the early
fall of Richmond, and had good reason for their expectations.
Indeed, the
New York Herald that morning had had a leader headed, ‘
Fall of Richmond.’
By noon the papers were issuing extras headed, ‘Defeat of
Banks,
Washington in Danger.’
A volcanic eruption could scarcely have startled
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the administration more.
Telegrams were sent the governors of a dozen states calling for instant help to save the capital.
Reenforcements were rushed to
Williamsport and
Harper's Ferry to assist
Banks.
McDowell's march, already begun before orders could reach it, was countermanded, and half his force, under
Shields and
Ord, was hurried to the
Valley to attack
Jackson from the east, while
Fremont's 15,000 attacked from the west.
McDowell, who was a good soldier, appreciated that no force possible for
Jackson to have collected, could accomplish any serious results, and remonstrated, and begged in vain, to be allowed to carry out his projected march upon
Richmond.
When this was refused, he suggested that he be directed upon
Gordonsville, but this too was overruled, and
Shields and
Ord were directed to march upon
Strasburg, toward which point also
Fremont was approaching.
Meanwhile,
Jackson, having gone into camp about noon on Sunday, the 25th, when his infantry and artillery could no longer pursue the enemy, felt moved, even as
Lincoln had done, to recognize the Sabbath by making up for the services missed in the morning.
His official report says:--
‘On the following day (the 26th), divine service was held for the purpose of rendering thanks to God for the success with which He had blessed our arms, and to implore His continued favor.’
During the next two or three days he made demonstrations toward the
Potomac, advancing his troops to
Charlestown, and within two miles of
Harper's Ferry; but these demonstrations were only for their moral effect at the
North, and to occupy time, while he filled his wagons with captured stores and prepared a convoy of a double line of wagons near seven miles long and about 2300 prisoners. Only on the 30th did he put his columns in motion toward the rear.
Had his opponents acted boldly and swiftly, their positions would now have enabled them to cut off
Jackson's retreat and to overwhelm him. But the moral effect of his reputation doubtless caused some hesitation, and
Jackson's entire force and his whole convoy, with some skirmishing at
Front Royal with
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Shields, and at
Wardensville with
Fremont, passed between his converging foes at
Strasburg on the 31st, a portion of one of his brigades making in one day a march of 36 miles.
Besides the prisoners and stores brought off,
Jackson left about 700 Federal sick and wounded at
Winchester, and burned many stores for which he had no transportation.
Two guns and over 9000 muskets were saved.
After passing
Strasburg on the 31st, the race was continued up the main Shenandoah Valley, with
Jackson leading and
Fremont following in his tracks, while
Shields advanced up the
Luray Valley on the east.
At
New Market the road from
Luray enters the
Valley through Massanutten Gap, but
Jackson had sent cavalry ahead who burned the bridges by which
Shields might have had access.
At
Conrad's store another bridge across the
South Fork gave a road to
Harrisonburg, and
Shields rushed his cavalry ahead to gain possession of it, but again he was too late.
Meanwhile, there had been a severe rain-storm on June 2, and though
Shields could hear the guns of
Jackson's rear-guard and
Fremont's advance on the other side of the
Massanutten Mountains, he was powerless to cross.
On Thursday, June 5,
Jackson reached
Harrisonburg, and here diverged east to cross the
South Fork upon the bridge at
Port Republic.
On the 6th, in a severe cavalry affair of the rearguard,
Gen. Turner Ashby was killed.
Of the civilian soldiers whom the war produced, such as
Forrest,
Morgan, and others, scarcely one gave such early and marked indication of rare military genius as
Ashby.
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On the 7th
Jackson's advance at night reached the vicinity of
Port Republic.
This village is situated in the angle between the North and South rivers, which here unite and form the
South Fork of the
Shenandoah.
The
North River is the larger of the two, and the road from
Harrisonburg crosses it by a wooden bridge.
The
South River was fordable.
On the morning of Sunday, the 8th,
Jackson had sent two companies of cavalry across the river to scout on the
Luray road toward
Shields's advance.
About 8 A. M. these companies were driven back in a rout and followed into the village by a body of Federal cavalry, who, with four guns and a brigade of infantry following, formed
Shields's advance.
Jackson himself was in the village and narrowly escaped capture, riding across the bridge over the
North River. Three of his staff were captured, but afterward escaped.
Three brigades of infantry, however, and three batteries were near at hand, and the
Federals were soon brought under a fire that sent them back in confusion with a loss of about 40 men and two guns, which had been brought across the
South River.
As their leading brigade,
Carroll's, fell back, it met a second brigade of
Shields's division,
Tyler's, with artillery, and the two brigades, selecting a position about two miles north, decided to await the arrival of
Shields with the rest of the division.
Jackson left two brigades to protect the bridge, and with the remainder of his force marched back about four miles to
Cross Keys, where he had left
Ewell's division holding a selected position against
Fremont.
Fremont was now in reach of
Jackson, and, by all the maxims of war, should have exerted his utmost strength to crush him. He could afford to risk fighting his last reserves, and even to wreck his army, if he might thereby detain or cripple
Jackson, for other armies were coming to his help and were near at hand.
His attack, however, was weak.
He had about 10,000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, and 12 batteries.
Ewell had at first but 6000 infantry and 500 cavalry.
Fremont brought into play about all of his artillery, but he advanced only one brigade of infantry from his left flank.
This was repulsed and followed, and the whole of
Fremont's left wing driven back to the shelter of his line of guns.
Elsewhere there was no more
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than skirmishing and artillery duelling, of which the
Federals usually had the best with their superior metal and ammunition.
It was
Jackson's role to fight only defensive battle, until he had shaken off the superior force which beset him; so the battle lingered along all day, the casualties being:—
| Federal: | killed 114, | wounded 443, | missing 127, | total 684 |
| Confederate: | killed 41, | wounded 232, | missing 15, | total 288 |
During the night of the 8th,
Jackson returned to
Port Republic and improvised a foot-bridge to carry his infantry dry shod across the
South River.
Early next morning, leaving a rearguard of two brigades under
Trimble and
Patton to delay
Fremont, the rest of his force was put in motion to find and attack
Shields's two brigades, which had unwisely halted about two miles from
Port Republic the day before.
I say unwisely, because they were only about 4000 men and 16 guns, but they had a position so beautiful that they were excusable just for the chance of fighting from it.
From the river on the right it extended straight across a mile of open plain, along a hollow road running between good banks, strongly fenced, to a considerable ravine in the wooded foot-hills of the
Blue Ridge.
The key of the position was a high retired shoulder on the
Federal left, on which were posted seven guns, strongly supported by infantry sheltered in the near-by wood, and commanding every foot of the plain.
Jackson, this morning, proposed to himself a double victory, and he built the foot-bridge across the
South River to enable him to win it. He intended, by making a very early start, to fall upon
Shields's two brigades and crush them, and then doubling back upon his track to recross the rivers and meet
Fremont, whom he would expect to find advancing toward
Port Republic, against the opposition which
Trimble and
Patton would make.
It was a good plan and entirely feasible, but two things went wrong in its execution.
The first was with the foot-bridge over the
South River.
This was rudely constructed of a plank footway, supported upon the running-gear of wagons standing in the stream, which was about breast deep.
Such a bridge may be made quite serviceable,
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but this one was not strongly built, and before it had been in use long, it became impassable, except in single file.
This made the passage of each brigade over twice as long as it should have been.
The second trouble was
Jackson's impatience, which defeated his own purpose.
Winder's brigade, leading his column, began to cross the bridge about 4.45 A. M., and
Jackson was near the head of the column.
When the enemy's position was discovered, it was plain that the key position above noted was its most assailable point.
Time and blood would both have been saved by bringing up at once a force amply sufficient to overwhelm it. As he had five brigades at hand, and an abundance of artillery, there need have been no failure, and no more delay than the time needed to bring up his troops.
Going into battle before enough troops were brought up, was sure to result in more or less disaster.
Winder's brigade, about 1500 strong, with two batteries, first attacked the
Federal centre.
It was not only badly repulsed, but the enemy gave a counterstroke, pursuing the fugitives and capturing a gun which they succeeded in carrying off. Other troops were arriving to reenforce
Winder, but they were arriving too slowly.
The Federal commander saw a chance to defeat his adversary by taking him in detail, and was swift to take advantage of it. He brought forward two fresh regiments from his left to reenforce an advance from his centre.
In vain
Jackson himself rode among his own old brigade, exposing his life freely and endeavoring to rally them.
Their thin lines had been for the time practically wrecked against superior numbers in a position almost impregnable.
Fortunately, at the critical moment, relief came suddenly.
Jackson had recognized the key position held by the enemy's seven-gun battery, early in the morning, and had directed
Taylor's fine La. brigade to attack it, and later, sent a second brigade to follow
Taylor.
Their approach was made through forest, and the enemy were unaware of it.
Taylor urged his march to the utmost, and was admonished by the sounds of the battle in the open country on his left that his friends were in need of assistance.
So, without
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waiting for the brigade which followed him, he broke cover and charged boldly on the
Federal battery at just the critical moment for
Jackson on the left.
The sudden bursting out of so severe a battle at this vital point at once relieved the pressure upon
Winder's centre.
Taylor had a desperate fight, the battery being taken and retaken and taken again, before six of its guns and all of its caissons were finally held, and its fire opened upon the now retreating Federals.
Taylor's brigade lost 288 men in this action, but accomplished its victory before the arrival of its support.
It was now about 10.30 A. M. About nine
Jackson had realized that he would not be able to accomplish the double victory he had hoped for, and had sent word to
Patton and
Trimble to come across the bridges at
Port Republic and to burn them.
They had not been followed closely by
Fremont.
He only showed up on the opposite bank at noon, having had but seven miles to come.
He had a pontoon train, but made no effort to cross, and confined his activity to cannonading the
Confederates from the north bank, wherever he could find an opportunity, during the whole afternoon.
It accomplished little harm except to the
Federal wounded, driving off the ambulances which were gathering them.
Jackson pressed the retreat of
Tyler's two brigades for about nine miles down the river, capturing about 500.
He then withdrew by roads which avoided
Fremont's guns on the west bank, and went into camp between midnight and dawn on the 10th in Brown's Gap on the
Blue Ridge, some of his regiments having marched over 20 miles.
The casualties in this action were as follows, the
Federals having but two brigades engaged and the
Confederates four:—
| Confederate: | killed 94, | wounded 703, | missing 36, | total 833 |
| Federal: | killed 67, | wounded 393, | missing 558, | total 1018 |
The entire casualties for the whole campaign sum up as follows for the two armies:—
| Confederate: | killed 266, | wounded 1580, | missing 36, | total 1903 |
| Federal: | killed 269, | wounded 1306, | missing 2402, | total 3977 |
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When, in his retreat,
Jackson had gotten safely past
Strasburg, the
Federal War Department gave up all hope of capturing him, and began to take measures to renew
McDowell's advance upon
Richmond.
One of
McDowell's divisions,
McCall's, had been held at
Fredericksburg, and, about June 6, it had been sent by water to join
McClellan upon the
Peninsula.
On the 8th orders were sent for
McDowell himself with
Shields's and
Ord's divisions to march for
Fredericksburg; but before these orders could have any effect there came the news of
Jackson's sharp counterstrokes at
Cross Keys and
Port Republic, which had the purely moral effect of causing the order to be countermanded.
It remained countermanded, and
McDowell and his two divisions were kept in the valley about
Front Royal until June 20.
This delay took away his last possible chance to reenforce
McClellan before
Lee took the offensive.
Indeed, the movement to
Fredericksburg, resumed about June 20, was stopped on June 26 by the formation of a new army to be commanded by
Gen. John Pope.
It comprised the entire forces of
Fremont,
Banks, and
McDowell, and was charged with the duty of overcoming the forces under
Jackson.
So we may now leave him and his gallant but wearied foot cavalry to enjoy about five days of rest on the banks of the
Shenandoah, and take up the story of
Lee before
Richmond.
