Early in April, 1863,
Hooker, in command of the Army of the Potomac, became impatient, and resolved to put it in motion towards
Richmond, notwithstanding his ranks were not full.
Cavalry under
Stoneman were sent to destroy railways in
Lee's rear, but were foiled by the water in the streams.
After a pause,
Hooker determined to attempt to turn
Lee's flank, and, for that purpose, sent 10,000 mounted men to raid in his rear.
Then he moved 36,000 of the troops of his right wing across the
Rappahannock, with orders to halt and intrench at
Chancellorsville, between the Confederate army near
Fredericksburg and
Richmond.
This movement was so masked by a demonstration on
Lee's front by
Hooker's left wing, under
General Sedgwick, that the right was well advanced before
Lee was aware of his peril.
These troops reached
Chancellorsville, in a region known as “The wilderness,” on the evening of April 30, 1863, when
Hooker expected to see
Lee, conscious of danger, fly towards
Richmond.
He did no such thing, but proceeded to strike the
National army a heavy blow, for the twofold purpose of seizing the communications between the two parts of that army and compelling its commander to fight at a disadvantage, with only a part of his troops in hand.
Hooker had made his headquarters in the spacious brick house of
Mr. Chancellor, and sent out
Pleasonton's cavalry to reconnoitre.
A part of these encountered the Confederate cavalry, under
Stuart, and were defeated.
Lee had called “
Stonewall”
Jackson's large force to come up when he perceived
Sedgwick's movements.
Lee left General 20, 1870.
Early with 9,000 men and thirty cannon to hold his fortified position at
Fredericksburg against
Sedgwick, and, at a little past midnight (May 1, 1863), he put
Jackson's column in motion towards Chancelorsville.
It joined another force under
General Anderson at eight o'clock in the morning, and he, in person, led the
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Confederates to attack the Nationals.
Hooker had also disposed the latter in battle order.
Aware of the peril of fighting with the
Wilderness at his back, he had so disposed his army as to fight in the open country, with a communication open with the
Rappahannock towards
Fredericksburg.
At eleven o'clock the divisions of
Griffin and
Humphreys, of
Meade's corps, pushed out to the left, in the direction of Banks's Ford, while
Sykes's division of the same corps, supported by
Hancock's division, and forming the centre column, moved along a turnpike.
Slocum's entire corps, with
Howard's, and its batteries, massed in its rear, comprising the right column, marched along a plank road.
The battle was begun about a mile in advance of the
National works at
Chancellorsville, by the van of the centre column and Confederate cavalry.
Sykes brought up his entire column, with artillery, and, after a severe struggle with
McLaws, he gained an advantageous position, at noon, on one of the ridges back of
Fredericksburg.
Banks's Ford, which
Lee had strenuously sought to cover, was now virtually in possession of the Nationals, and the distance between
Sedgwick, opposite
Fredericksburg, and the army at
Chancellorsville was shortened at least 12 miles.
Meanwhile,
Slocum and
Jackson had met and struggled fiercely on the plank road.
Perceiving
Jackson endeavoring to flank
Slocum, and his strong column overlapping
Sykes's flank,
Hooker, fearing his army might be beaten in detail before he could successfully resist the furious onslaught of
Jackson, ordered its withdrawal behind his works at
Chancellorsville, the
Confederates following close in the rear of the retreating troops.
So ended the movements of the day.
Hooker's position was a strong one.
The
National line extended from the
Rappahannock to the
Wilderness church, 2 miles west of
Chancellorsville.
Meade's corps, with
Couch's, formed his left;
Slocum's, and a division of
Sickles's, his centre, and
Howard's his right, with
Pleasonton's cavalry near.
Lee's forces had the
Virginia cavalry of
Owen and
Wickham on the right, and
Stuart's and a part of
Fitzhugh Lee's on the left.
McLaws's forces occupied the bridge on the east of the
Big Meadow Swamp, and
Anderson's continued the line to the left of
McLaws.
Such was the general disposition of the opposing armies on the morning of May 2.
Lee was unwilling to risk a direct attack on
Hooker, and
Jackson advised a secret flank movement with his entire corps, so as to fall on
Hooker's rear.
Lee hesitated, but so much did he lean on
Jackson as adviser and executor that he consented.
With 25,000 men
Jackson made the perilous movement, marching swiftly and steadily through the thick woods, with
Stuart's cavalry between his forces and those of the Nationals.
But the movement was early discovered; the Nationals, however, believing it to be a retreat of the
Confederates towards
Richmond.
Sickles pushed forward
Birney's division to reconnoitre, followed by two brigades of
Howard's corps.
Birney charged upon the passing column, and captured a Georgia regiment, 500 strong.
but was checked by Confederate artillery.
The
Nationals now held the road over which
Jackson was moving.
Disposition was made to pursue the supposed fugitives, when
Jackson made a quick and startling movement towards
Chancellorsville, concealed by the thick woods, at six o'clock in the evening, suddenly burst forth from the thickets with his whole force, like an unexpected and terrible tornado, and fell with full force upon
Howard's corps (the llth), with tremendous yells, just as they were preparing for supper and repose.
Devens's division, on the extreme right, received the first blow, and almost instantly the surprised troops, panic-stricken, fled to the rear, communicating their alarm to the other divisions of the corps.
The Confederates captured men and guns and a commanding position, while the fugitives, in evident confusion, rushed towards
Chancellorsville, upon the position of
General Schurz, whose division had already retreated.
The tide of affrighted men rolled back upon
General Steinwehr.
While the divisions of
Devens and
Schurz were reforming,
Steinwehr quickly changed front, threw his men behind some works, rallied some of
Schurz's men. and checked the pursuit for a brief space.
But the overwhelming number of the
Confederates speedily captured the works.
These disasters on the right were partially relieved by
Hooker, who sent forward
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troops at the double-quick, under
Generals Berry and
French, and also a courier to apprise
Sickles, who had pushed some distance beyond the
National lines, of the disaster to the 11th Corps and his own peril.
He was directed to fall back and attack
Jackson's left flank.
He was in a critical situation, but
Pleasonton saved him by a quick and skilful movement, greatly assisting in checking the pursuit.
This was done long enough for
Pleasonton to bring his own horse-artillery and more than twenty of
Sickles's guns to bear upon the
Confederates, and to pour into their ranks a destructive storm of grape and canister shot.
Generals Warren and
Sickles soon came to
Pleasonton's assistance, when there was a severe struggle for the possession of cannon.
Meanwhile
Lee was making a strong artillery
attack upon
Hooker's left and centre.
Soon a great misfortune befell the
Confederate commander, in the loss of “
Stonewall”
Jackson, the strong right arm of his power.
Jackson had sent for
Hill, and was anxious to follow up the advantage he had gained by extending his lines to the left and cutting off
Hooker's communication with the
United States Ford.
While waiting for
Hill, he pushed forward with his staff, on a personal reconnoissance, and, when returning, in the gloom of evening, his men, mistaking them for National cavalry, fired upon them and mortally wounded the great leader.
No more fighting occurred in that part of the field.
Birney's division drove back the
Confederates at midnight, recovered some lost ground, and brought back some abandoned guns and caissons.
During the night a new line of intrenchments was thrown up by the Nationals; but
Hooker's forces were in a very perilous position on Sunday morning, May 3.
When he heard of the movement of
Jackson on Saturday morning, he had called from
Sedgwick Reynolds's corps, 20,000 strong, and it arrived the same evening.
Hooker's force was now 60,000 strong, and
Lee's 40,000.
The former ordered
Sedgwick to cross the river and seize and hold
Fredericksburg and the heights behind it, and then, pushing along the roads leading to
Chancellorsville, crush every impediment and join the main army.
Each army made disposition for a battle on Sunday morning.
Stuart advanced to the attack with
Lee's left wing, and when he came in sight of the Nationals he shouted, “Charge, and remember
Jackson!”
With thirty pieces of artillery presently in position on an elevation, his men made a desperate charge under cover of their fire, and were soon struggling with
Sickles's corps and four other divisions.
These were pushed back, and a fierce battle ensued, the tide of success ebbing and flowing for more than an hour.
During this struggle
Hooker had been prostrated, and
Couch took command of the army.
Almost the whole National army became engaged in the battle, at different points.
excepting the troops under
Meade and
Reynolds.
Couch fell back towards the
Rappahannock, and, at noon,
Hooker, having recovered, resumed chief command.
Lee's army was now united, but
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Hooker's was divided.
Sedgwick had seriously menaced
Lee's flank, but had not joined
Hooker.
After a hard conflict and the loss of 1,000 men,
Sedgwick had captured the
Confederate works on the heights back of
Fredericksburg, and sent
Early, their defender, flying southward with his shattered columns.
Intelligence of these events made
Lee extremely cautious.
Sedgwick, leaving
Gibbon in command at
Fredericksburg, marched for
Chancellorsville, when
Lee was compelled to divide his army to meet this new peril.
He sent
McLaws with four brigades to meet
Sedgwick.
At Salem church they had a sanguinary conflict.
The Confederates won, and the losses of
Sedgwick, added to those sustained in the morning, amounted to about 5,000 men.
Hooker, at the same time, seemed paralyzed in his new position, for his army appeared being beaten in detail.
On the following morning, perceiving that
Hooker's army had been much strengthened,
Lee thought it necessary to drive
Sedgwick across the
Rappahannock before again attacking the main body.
Early was sent to retake the
Heights of Fredericksburg, and he cut
Sedgwick off from the city.
Early was reinforced by
Anderson, by which
Sedgwick was enclosed on three sides.
At six o'clock in the evening the
Confederates attacked him. His forces gave way and retreated to Banks's Ford, and before morning the remains of
Sedgwick's corps had crossed the
Rappahannock over pontoon bridges.
Gibbon also withdrew from
Fredericksburg to
Falmouth that night, and, on Tuesday,
Lee had only
Hooker to contend with.
He concentrated his forces to strike
Hooker a crushing blow before night, but a heavy rain-storm prevented.
Hooker prepared to retreat, and did so on the night of May 5 and morning of the 6th, crossing the
Rappahannock and returning to the old quarters of the army opposite
Fredericksburg.
The losses of each army had been very heavy.
That of the
Confederates was reported at 12,277, including 2,000 prisoners, and that of the Nationals was 17,197, including about 5,000 prisoners. The latter also lost thirteen heavy guns, about 20,000 small-arms, seventeen colors, and a large amount of ammunition.
The Union
Generals Berry and
Whipple were killed.
