The scene of a severe engagement between the
American and
Spanish troops near
El Caney, while the
American army was on its march towards
Santiago.
After the engagement at
Las Guasimas (q. v.), the time up to June 30 was spent in concentrating the
American troops and making preparations for farther advance.
To the northeast of
Santiago was the village of
El Caney, and on the same side, some 2 to 3 miles from it, were the
San Juan hills and blockhouses.
It was decided to attack and carry these positions without further delay.
There were but four light batteries, of four guns each, in the army, and
Lawton's division, assisted by
Capron's battery, was ordered to move out that day —June 30—and make an attack early in the morning of July 1 towards
El Caney.
Then, after carrying
El Caney, he was to move by the road of that name towards
Santiago, and take a position on the extreme right of the line.
Grimes's battery, of the 2d, attached to
Kent's division, had orders the same afternoon to prepare the way next morning for the advance of
Kent's and
Wheeler's divisions on the
San Juan hills, the attack of which was to be delayed by the infantry till
Lawton's guns were heard at
El Caney.
About this time news was brought that the
Spanish General Pando, with reinforcements of 8,000 men, was making rapid approach, and would probably soon enter
Santiago from the northwest.
Early on July 1
Lawton was in position,
Chaffee's brigade on the right,
Ludlow's on the left, and
Miles's in the centre.
The conflict opened at 6 A. M., and soon became general.
The naturally strong position of the enemy was rendered doubly so by stone block-houses and forts.
After two hours fighting
Bates's brigade was ordered from the rear to the support of
Lawton, and the battle continued.
It was in these assaults that the 71st Regiment of New York Volunteers participated.
The
Spaniards fought with great obstinacy, but were slowly and surely driven from their intrenchments and forced to retire.
After
Lawton had become well engaged,
Grimes's battery from the heights of El Pozo opened fire on the
San Juan block-houses very effectively.
The
Spanish replied with field-pieces and smokeless powder.
They soon had our range, while their smokeless powder made it difficult to determine their exact locality.
The troops of
Wheeler's and
Kent's divisions, which had up to this time been partially concealed, were ordered to deploy—Wheeler to the right, towards
Lawton, and
Kent to the left.
We here quote
General Shafter:
In the mean time Kent's division, with the exception of two regiments of Haw-
[40]
kins's brigade, being thus uncovered, moved rapidly to the front from the forks previously mentioned in the road, utilizing both trails, but more especially the one to the left, and, crossing the creek, formed for attack in the front of San Juan Hill.
During this formation the 2d Brigade suffered severely.
While personally superintending this movement, its gallant commander, Colonel Wikoff, was killed.
The command of the brigade then devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel Worth, 13th Infantry, who was soon severely wounded, and next upon Lieutenant-Colonel Liscum, 24th Infantry, who, five minutes later, also fell under the terrible fire of the enemy, and the command of the brigade then devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel Ewers, 9th Infantry.
While the formation just described was taking place, General Kent took measures to hurry forward his rear brigade.
The 10th and 2d Infantry were ordered to follow Wikoff's brigade, while the 21st was sent on the right-hand road to support the 1st Brigade, under General Hawkins, who had crossed the stream and formed on the right of the division.
The 2d and 10th Infantry, Col. E. P. Pearson commanding, moved forward in good order on the left of the division, passed over a green knoll, and drove the enemy back towards his trenches.
After completing their formation under a destructive fire, and advancing a short distance, both divisions found in their front a wide bottom, in which had been placed a barbed-wire entanglement, and beyond which there was a high hill, along the crest of which the enemy was strongly posted.
Nothing daunted, these gallant men pushed on to drive the enemy from his chosen position, both divisions losing heavily.
In this assault Colonel Hamilton, Lieutenants Smith and Shipp were killed, and Colonel Carroll, Lieutenants Thayer and Myer, all in the cavalry, were wounded.
The battle of July 1, called the battle of
El Caney, was over, with the
Americans strongly holding all they had gained during the day. The losses were very heavy, and the reputed coming of
General Pando made it necessary at once to continue the struggle the next day, and gain a decided victory before the
Spanish could be strengthened.
The troops had advanced and carried certain positions, but the enemy was evidently in stronger ones, and it was necessary to drive him out at once.
During the afternoon of July 1 the two remaining batteries were brought up and placed in position near
Grimes, and directed to play on the enemy's trenches.
General Duffield's brigade, composed of the 33d and 34th Michigan and a Massachusetts regiment, was ordered to assault Aguadores, a small outpost.
During the afternoon and night of July 1 the
American lines were rearranged and strengthened, and on the morning of the 2d the enemy himself opened the battle by making a fierce assault.
But while
Kent and
Wheeler remained behind their works repelling numerous assaults,
Lawton advanced his lines and gained strong and commanding positions on the right.
On the morning of July 3 the fighting was
[
41]
renewed, but the enemy soon gave way and the firing ceased.
See
Spain, War with.
The Roosevelt reports.—The following are the two reports by
Lieut.-Col. Theodore Roosevelt, detailing the gallantry of the “Rough Riders” in the
San Juan Hill fight, which were not made public till Dec. 22, 1898.
The first report is as follows:
Col. Leonard Wood, commanding 2d Cavalry Brigade.
Sir,—On July 1 the regiment, with myself in command, was moved out by your orders directly following the 1st Brigade.
Before leaving the campingground several of our men were wounded by shrapnel.
After crossing the river at the ford, we were moved along and up the right bank under fire, and were held in reserve at a, sunk road.
Here we lost a good many men, including
Captain O'Neill killed and
Lieutenant Haskell wounded.
We then received your order to advance and support the regular cavalry in the attack on the intrenchments and block-houses on the hills to the left.
The regiment was deployed on both sides of the road and moved forward until we came to the rearmost lines of the regulars.
We continued to move forward until I ordered a charge, and the men rushed the block-house and rifle-pits on the hill to the right of our advance.
They did the work in fine shape, although suffering severely.
The guidons of Troops E and G were first planted on the summit, though the first men up were some of A and B troopers, who were with me. We then opened fire on the intrenchments on a hill to our left, which some of the other regiments were assailing, and which they carried a few minutes later.
Meanwhile we were under a heavy fire from the intrenchments along the hills to our front, from where they also shelled with a piece of field artillery until some of our marksmen silenced it. When the men got their wind we charged again and carried the second line of intrenchments with a rush.
Swinging to the left, we then drove the Spaniards over the brow of the chain of hills fronting on
Santiago.
By this time the regiments were much mixed, and we were under a very heavy fire both of shrapnel and from rifles, from the batteries, intrenchments, and forts immediately in front of the city.
On the extreme front I was myself in command, with fragments of the six cavalry regiments and the two batteries under me. The
Spaniards made one or
[
42]
two efforts to retake the line, but were promptly driven back.
Both
General Sumner and you sent me word to hold the line at all hazards, and that night we dug a line of intrenchments across our front, using the captured
Spanish intrenching tools.
We had nothing to eat except what we captured from the Spaniards, but their dinners had fortunately been cooked, and we ate them with relish, having been fighting all day. We had no blankets or coats, and lay by the trenches all night.
The
Spaniards attacked us once in the night, and at dawn they opened a heavy artillery and rifle fire.
Very great assistance was rendered us by
Lieutenant Parker's Gatling battery at critical moments.
He fought his guns at the extreme front of the firing-line in a way that repeatedly called forth the cheers of my men. One of the
Spanish batteries which was used against us was directly in front of the hospital, so that the
Red Cross flag flew over the battery, saving it from our fire for a considerable period.
The Spanish Mauser bullets made clean wounds, but they also used a copperjacketed or brass-jacketed bullet which exploded, making very bad wounds indeed.
Since then we have continued to hold together.
The food has been short, and until to-day we could not get our blankets, coats, or shelter-tents, while the men lay all day under the fire of the
Spanish batteries, intrenchments, and guerillas in trees, and worked all night in the trenches, never even taking off their shoes; but they are in excellent spirits, and ready and anxious to carry out any orders they receive.
At the end of the first day the eight troops were commanded, two by captains, three by first lieutenants, two by second lieutenants and one by the sergeant whom you made acting lieutenant.
We went into the fight about 490 strong; eighty-six were killed or wounded, and there are half a dozen missing.
The great heat prostrated nearly forty men, some of them among the best in the regiment.
Besides
Captain O'Neill and
Lieutenant Haskell,
Lieutenants Leahy,
Devereaux, and
Case were wounded.
All behaved with great gallantry.
As for
Captain O'Neill, his loss is one of the severest that could have befallen the regiment.
He was a man of cool head, great executive ability, and literally dauntless courage.
The guerillas in trees not only fired at our troops, but seemed to devote themselves especially to shooting at the surgeons, the hospital assistants with Red Cross bandages on their arms, the wounded who were being carried in litters, and the burying parties.
Many of these guerillas were dressed in green uniforms.
We sent out a detail of sharp-shooters among those in our rear and also along the line where they had been shooting the wounded, and killed thirteen.
To attempt to give a list of the men who showed signal valor would necessitate sending in an almost complete roster of the regiment.
Many of the cases which I mention stand merely as examples of the rest, not as exceptions.
Captain Jenkins acted as major, and showed such conspicuous gallantry and efficiency that I earnestly hope he may be promoted to major as soon as a vacancy occurs.
Captains Lewellen,
Muller, and
Luna led their troops throughout the charges, handling them admirably.
At the end of the battle
Lieutenants Kane,
Greenwood, and
Goodrich were in charge of their troops, immediately under my eye, and I wish particularly to commend their conduct throughout.
Corporals Waller and
Fortescue, and
Trooper McKinley, of Troop E;
Corporal Rhoades, of Troop D;
Troopers Albertson,
Winter,
McGregor, and
Ray Clark, of Troop F;
Troopers Bugbe,
Jackson, and
Waller, of Troop A;
Trumpeter McDonald, of Troop L.;
Sergeant Hughes, of Troop B, and
Trooper Geieren, of Troop G, all continued to fight after being wounded, some very severely; most of them fought until the end of the day.
Trooper Oliver B. Norton, of Troop B, who with his brother was by my side all throughout the charging, was killed while fighting with marked gallantry.
Sergeant Ferguson,
Corporal Lee, and
Troopers Bell and
Carroll, of Troop K,
Sergeant Dame, of Troop E;
Troopers Goodwin,
Campbell.
and
Dudley Dean,
Trumpeter Foster, of Troop B, and
Troopers Greenwold and
Bardehan, of Troop A, are all worthy of special mention for coolness and gallantry.
They all merit promotion when the time comes.
But the most conspicuous gallantry was shown by
Trooper Rowland.
[
43]
He was wounded in the side in our first fight, but kept in the firing-line; he was sent to the hospital the next day, but left it and marched out to us, overtaking us, and fought all through this battle with such indifference to danger that I was forced again and again to berate and threaten him for running needless risks.
Great gallantry was also shown by four troopers whom I cannot identify, and by
Trooper Winslow Clark, of Troop G. It was after we had taken the first hill; I had called out to rush the second, and, having by that time lost my horse, climbed a wire fence and started towards it. After going a couple of hundred yards, under a heavy fire, I found that no one else had come.
As I discovered later, it was simply because, in the confusion, with men shooting and being shot, they had not noticed me start.
I told the five men to wait a moment, as it might be misunderstood if we all ran back, while I ran back and started the regiment, and as soon as I did so the regiment came with a rush.
But meanwhile the five men coolly lay down in the open, returning the fire from the trenches.
It is to be wondered at that only
Clark was seriously wounded, and he called out as we passed again to lay his canteen where he could reach it, but to continue the charge and leave him where he was. All the wounded had to be left until after the fight, for we could spare no men from the firing-line.
Very respectfully,
Theodore Roosevelt,
Lieutenant-Colonel, 1st United States Volunteer Cavalry.
The second and more important report is as follows:
camp Hamilton, near
Santiago De Cuba,
July 20, 1898.
Brig.-Gen. Leonard Wood, commanding 2d Brigade Cavalry Division.
Sir,—In obedience to your directions I herewith report on the operations of my regiment from the 1st to the 17th inst., inclusive.
As I have already made you two reports about the first day's operations, I shall pass over them rather briefly.
On the morning of the first day my regiment was formed at the head of the 2d Brigade, by the
El Paso sugar-mill.
When the batteries opened the Spaniards replied to us with shrapnel, which killed and wounded several of the men of my regiment.
We then marched towards the right, and my regiment crossed the ford before the balloon came down there and attracted the fire of the enemy, so that at that point we lost no one.
My orders had been to march forward until I joined
General Lawton's left wing, but after going about three-quarters of a mile I was halted and told to remain in reserve near the creek by a deep lane.
The bullets dropped thick among us for the next hour while we lay there, and many of my men were killed or wounded.
Among the former was
Captain O'Neill, whose loss was a very heavy blow to the regiment, for he was a singularly gallant and efficient officer.
Acting Lieutenant Haskell was also shot at this time.
He showed the utmost courage, and had been of great use during the fighting and marching.
It seems to me some action should be taken about him.
You then sent me word to move forward in support of the regular cavalry, and I advanced the regiment in column of companies, each company deployed as skirmishers.
We moved through several skirmish lines of the regiment ahead of us, as it seemed to me our only chance was in rushing the intrenchments in front instead of firing at them from a distance.
Accordingly we charged the blockhouse and intrenchments on the hill to our right against a heavy fire.
It was taken in good style, the men of my regiment thus being the first to capture any fortified position and to break through the
Spanish lines.
The guidons of G and E troops were first at this point, but some of the men of A and B troops who were with me personally got in ahead of them.
At the last wire fence up this hill I was obliged to abandon my horse, and after that went on foot.
After capturing this hill we first of all directed a heavy fire upon the
San Juan Hill to our left, which was at the time being assailed by the regular infantry and cavalry supported by
Captain Parker's Gatling guns.
By the time
San Juan was taken a large force had assembled on the hill we had previously captured, consisting not only of my own regiment, but of the 9th and of
[
44]
portions of other cavalry regiments.
We then charged forward under a very heavy fire across the valley against the
Spanish intrenchments on the hill in the rear of the
San Juan Hill.
This we also took, capturing several prisoners.
We then formed in whatever order we could, and moved forward, driving the
Spanish before us, to the crest of the hills in our front, which were immediately opposite the city of
Santiago itself.
Here I received orders to halt and hold the line of hill-crest.
I had at the time fragments of the 6th Cavalry Regiment and an occasional infantryman under me— three or four hundred men all told.
As I was the highest there, I took command of all of them, and so continued until next morning.
The
Spaniards attempted a counter attack that afternoon, but were easily driven back, and then until after dark we remained under a heavy fire from their rifles and great guns, lying flat on our faces on a gentle slope just behind the crest.
Captain Parkhurst's Gatling battery was run up to the right of my regiment, and did most excellent and gallant service.
In order to charge the men had, of course, been obliged to throw away their packs, and we had nothing to sleep in and nothing to eat. We were lucky enough, however, to find in the last block-house captured the
Spanish dinners still cooking, which we ate with relish.
They consisted chiefly of rice and pease, with a big pot containing a stew of fresh meat, probably for the officers.
We also distributed the captured Spanish blankets as far as they would go among our men, and gathered a good deal of
Mauser ammunition for use in the Colt rapid-fire guns, which were being brought up. That night we dug intrenchments across our front.
At three o'clock in the morning the Spaniards made another attack upon us, which was easily repelled, and at four o'clock they opened the day with a heavy rifle and shrapnel fire.
We lay all day long under this, replying whenever we got the chance.
In the evening at about eight o'clock the Spaniards fired three guns, and then opened a very heavy rifle fire, their skirmishers coming well forward I got all my men down into the trenches, as did the other command near me, and we opened a heavy return fire.
The Spanish advance was at once stopped and after an hour their fire died away.
This night we completed most of our trenches, and began to build bomb-proofs.
The protection afforded our men was good, and next morning I had but one man wounded from the rifle and shell fire until twelve o'clock, when the truce came.
I do not mention the officers and men who particularly distinguished themselves, as I have nothing to add in this respect to what was contained in my two former letters.
There were numerous Red Cross flags flying in the various parts of the city, two of them so arranged that they directly covered batteries in our front, and for some time were the cause of our not firing at them.
The Spanish guerillas were very active, especially in our rear, where they seemed by preference to attack the wounded men who were being carried on litters, the doctors and medical attendants with Red Cross badges on their arms and the burial parties.
I organized a detail of sharpshooters and sent them out after the guerillas, of whom they killed thirteen. Two of the men thus killed were shot several hours after the truce had been in operation, because, in spite of this fact, they kept firing upon our men as they went to draw water.
They were stationed in the trees, as the guerillas were generally, and, owing to the density of the foliage and to the use of smokeless powder, it was an exceedingly difficult matter to locate them.
For the next seven days, until the 10th, we lay in our line, while the truce continued.
We had continually to work at additional bomb-proofs and at the trenches, and as we had no proper supply of food, and utterly inadequate medical facilities, the men suffered a good deal.
The officers chipped together, purchased beans, tomatoes and sugar for the men, so that they might have some relief from the bacon and hardtack.
With a great deal of difficulty we got them coffee.
As for the sick and wounded, they suffered so in the hospitals, when sent to the rear, for lack of food and attention that we found it best to keep them at the front, and give them such care as our own doctors could.
As I mentioned in my previous letter, thirteen of our wounded men continued to
[
45]
fight through the battle, in spite of their wounds, and of those sent to the rear many, both of the sick and wounded, came up to rejoin us as soon as their condition allowed them to walk; most of the worst cases were ultimately sent to the States.
On the 10th the truce was at an end and the bombardment reopened.
So far as our lines were concerned, it was on the
Spanish part very feeble.
We suffered no losses and speedily got the fire from their trenches in our front completely under.
On the 11th we were moved three-quarters of a mile to the right, the truce again being on, nothing happened here except that we continued to watch and do our best to get the men, especially the sick, properly fed, and having no transportation and being able to get hardly any through the regular channels, we used anything we could find, captured Spanish cavalry horses, abandoned mules which had been shot, but which our men took and cured; diminutive, skinny ponies, purchased from the Cubans, etc. By these means and by the exertions of the officers, we were able from time to time to get supplies of beans, sugar, tomatoes and even oatmeal, while from the
Red Cross people we got our invaluable load of rice,
corn-meal, etc. All of this was of the utmost consequence, not only for the sick, but for those nominally well, as the lack of proper food was telling terribly on the men. It was utterly impossible to get them clothes and shoes; those they had were in many cases literally dropping to pieces.
On the 17th the city surrendered.
On the 18th we shifted camp to here, the best camp we have had, but the march hither under the noonday sun told very heavily on our men, weakened by underfeeding and overwork, and the next morning 123 cases were reported to the doctor, and I now have but half of the six hundred men with which I landed four weeks ago fit for duty, and these are not fit to do anything like the work they could do then.
As we had but one wagon, the change necessitated leaving much of my stuff behind, with a night of discomfort, with scanty shelter and scanty food for the most of the officers and many of the men. Only the possession of the improvised pack-train alluded to above saved us from being worse.
Yesterday I sent in a detail of six officers and men to see if they could not purchase or make arrangements for a supply of proper food and proper clothing for the men, even if we had to pay for it out of our own pockets.
Our suffering has been due primarily to lack of transportation and of proper food or sufficient clothing and of medical supplies.
We should now have wagon sheets for tentage.
Very respectfully,
Theodore Roosevelt.
