Doc.
152.-an English view of the civil war in America.
The effect of the civil war in
America upon
European commerce is certainly one of the most important questions which ever engaged public attention.
The commercial relations between this country and
America are so multifarious, that any disturbance of them must necessarily cause infinite perplexity and great pecuniary loss; but those perplexities and losses will be seriously aggravated if the policy, which the
British Government intends to pursue, is not defined with as much accuracy as possible.
The British Government, as the greatest power at sea, has the deepest interest in adopting a principle of action which, while it secures every advantage to commerce, will not limit the action of the
British Navy in the event of a war. Lord Palmerston, therefore, is acting with statesmanlike prudence in declining to bind himself to any course of action without the maturest deliberation.
And
Mr. Walpole deserves well of his country in lending the weight of his authority and influence to support Ministers in their cautious policy.
In the meantime it may be useful to endeavor to indicate the position which the States under
President Davis now occupy with relation to those under
President Lincoln, and the position which both of these Confederacies now occupy with relation to
Great Britain and the rest of the world.
In the first place, it is clear that, in the case of a rebellion in the territories of any government, other governments may adopt either of two lines of action: They may take no notice of the disturbance which is going on; or they may recognize the state of insurrection, and treat each of the contending parties as at war with each other.
This latter course has been adopted in the present instance by the
Foreign Minister, and in this respect he has acted with perfect prudence and in complete accordance with international law. Whether a province in a state of rebellion is to be treated as a provisionally independent power has always been considered a matter of discretion.
It may be said that where, as in the case of
America, half a continent has risen in arms against the other half, and has inaugurated an independent government — more especially when the peculiar
Constitution of the United States is considered — according to all precedent the
Southern Confederation must be treated as an independent power, and as entitled to belligerent rights.
But the recognition of those rights is a step not to be taken without the gravest consideration of its consequences.
No power was ever more free to act according to the clear dictates of justice and humanity than
Great Britain in relation to this conflict.
It is apprehended that in strict law,
President Lincoln is still entitled to treat all those American subjects who adhere to the cause of
President Davis as traitors, and to punish the South American cruisers as pirates.
As this principle, however, if strictly followed, would certainly lead to terrible bloodshed and intolerable atrocities, it is obvious that the
Northern and Southern combatants will treat each other as regular enemies, and observe, as far as possible, all the usages of war
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This, however, will take place without any recognition of the only ground on which such a claim could legally be based, the independence of the Southern Confederacy.
It is a political question worth considering, whether such a
de facto concession might not be made to the
Southern authorities by
England; an exemption from the liabilities of pirates, without acknowledging in them the belligerent rights, which would give them unnecessarily a title to interfere with our commerce, and raise a league of slaveholders to a place among the nations of the world.
The recognition of belligerent rights in the
South would render the relations of this country to either of the
American combatants precisely similar to the relations which subsisted during the
Crimean War between
Prussia on the one hand, and
Russia,
England, or
France, on the other hand.
If, indeed, the Declaration of
Paris had been signed by America, the case might have been different; but as that Declaration only bound those Governments which signed it, and as
America declined to do so, the law of Neutrals during war remains precisely as it was before the year 1854.
The result is that both
President Lincoln and
President Davis may issue letters of marque to those who respectively acknowledge their authority.
The lawfully commissioned vessels of war of either power are entitled to all the privileges usually accorded to the public vessels of war of an independent state, always on the supposition that the belligerent rights of the
South are acknowledged.
The right of search, which, notwithstanding the strange ideas of some journalists who ought to know better, has always been allowed to exist in time of war, will become capable of being exercised by the cruisers both of the
North and of the
South.
The doctrine of the
English Admiralty, according to
Chancellor Kent, on the right of visitation and search, and on the limitation of the right, has been recognized in its fullest extent by courts of justice in
America.
And although that right does not entitle a belligerent to search for his subjects or seamen, it does entitle him to search for enemy's property, contraband of war, or for men in the land and naval services of the enemy.
The
English and
French merchant ships and those of all neutrals must, therefore, expect to be searched by the armed vessels commissioned by either of the two rival
Presidents.
If in the course of searching a neutral friend's ship the goods of an enemy are discovered, it is the established law of
England that such goods are liable to confiscation.
If, therefore, a cargo of
Manchester goods belonging to a New York merchant were found on board an English ship by a Southern cruiser, a British court would hold that they ought to be confiscated.
But in American courts the result is more doubtful.
According to American jurists, the rule of public law, that the property of an enemy is liable to capture on the vessel of a friend, is now declared on the part of the
American Government to have no foundation in natural right; and that the usage which undoubtedly exists, rests entirely on force.
These doctrines were propounded when it was the object of
Americans to enlarge the rights of neutrals.
It remains to be seen whether they will be upheld in the present crisis.
If they are, the neutral powers may insist that the American cruisers shall not seize the goods of an enemy when found on board a neutral friend's ship.
On the other hand, if, in the course of searching an enemy's ship, the goods of a neutral friend are found, it is the admitted law of nations that such goods are not liable to be seized.
But the
Americans have carried this principle a step further; for it seems that the Supreme Court of the
United States has twice carried the principle of the immunity of neutral property on board an enemy's ship to the extent of allowing it to be laden on board an armed belligerent cruiser, and the
Court seems to have held moreover that the goods did not lose their neutral character even in consequence of resistance made by the armed vessel — provided the neutral did not aid in such armament or resistance — and this rule prevails notwithstanding the neutral had chartered the whole vessel, and was on board at the time of resistance.
A contrary decision has no doubt been given by the
English Judges.
But if the
Americans adhere to their opinion, it will be competent for any Englishman or Frenchman, or other neutral, to hire a fleet in the
South, which may be armed by the captains, to load the ship with corn or cotton, or any other merchandise; and even although the
American captains of these vessels resist the cruisers of the
North, the merchandise belonging to the neutrals will be quite safe and will be directed to be restored.
It is difficult to imagine any state of law more favorable to neutral nations than that which must prevail if the
American Judges adhere to the principles of those decisions which have been pronounced by the Supreme Court at
Washington.
It is hardly necessary to remark that the only way by which neutral ships can be excluded from the ports either of the
North or of the
South is by an effective blockade.
With regard to the
North, such a blockade is at present obviously out of the power of
President Davis.
With regard to the
South, it remains to be seen what number of ships
President Lincoln may be able to muster.
In the midst of the complications which must arise by the events of either Confederacy adopting principles of law different from those which have hitherto been proclaimed at
Washington, it might, perhaps, be advisable to settle the moot points by a temporary convention.
This is especially necessary in the case of the
Confederate States of the
South, because they may decline to be bound by the decisions which have already been pronounced by the Supreme Court of the
United States.--
London Daily News, May 9.
