marked degree. At Yorktown, an order from the headquarters prohibited all music by bands, and all calls, by either drums or bugles; and they were not resumed until after the army had arrived at Harrison's landing. When the large masses of men which composed the Army of the Potomac were moving among the swamps of the Chickahominy, without any of the enlivening sounds of martial music, or the various well-known calls of an army life, the effect was very depressing, and caused the soldiers to exaggerate the issue that required of them to lose the most agreeable part of their profession. The army, however, had gone to the. Peninsula very enthusiastic; the soldiers always earnest and faithful in the discharge of their duties, and although the field for the campaign had been badly selected, and there were numerous drawbacks to disappoint their hopes, there were also several occasions won by their valor, when a bold, determined, resolute commander could have forced the result to a successful issue. campaign of Antietam. In this campaign I commanded the cavalry division of the army, and took the advance from Washington City through Maryland, and until the field of Antietam was reached, when I fought my command in front of the bridge leading from Keedysville to Sharpsburg, and held the centre of our army throughout the battle. The same mistakes were made in this campaign that characterized that of the Peninsula: the army was not moved with sufficient rapidity or vigor from the Peninsula, or through Maryland, and the enemy was again given time to prepare and concentrate. When the battle was delivered it was fought by detached commands, in such positions as to be unable to give or receive assistance from each other. Hooker, Franklin, and Sumner's corps were on the right, too distant to receive support from the rest of the forces, while Burnside's force was on the left, at least three miles from where my command was, without any troops being between us, and with Antietam creek, which was not fordable, behind us. Fitz John Porter's corps was behind my position, a mile and a half on the opposite sided of Antietam creek, as a reserve, but it was never brought into action except in small squads. Notwithstanding the disadvantages our army labored under from these arrangements, a decisive victory could have been won at four o'clock on the afternoon of the seventeenth of September, if a strong attack had been made on Sharpsburg from our centre. My command had cleared the enemy from my front, and were in high spirits, while the stubborn fighting of the army generally had told fearfully upon the rebels. I therefore recommended this attack, and requested to be permitted to take the initiative in it. The proposition was not approved and I was directed to hold the position I then had. The enemy were then so far off, falling back, my guns could not reach them, and the battle ended so far as my command was concerned. On the next day, the army was not permitted to advance, and on the nineteenth the enemy had crossed the Potomac and escaped. The rebel army had suffered so much more than ours in this campaign, and their ammunition was so much exhausted, that I was convinced a rapid and energetic pursuit would have routed them, if it had not caused Lee himself to surrender. Colonel Davis, of the Eighth New York cavalry, had, before the battle, destroyed all the ammunition belonging to Longstreet's corps, and the heavy demands of the fight had nearly exhausted the supply for the rest of their army. This, with the disappointment of the rebel soldiers at the failure of their enterprise to invade Pennsylvania, were advantages which should not have been thrown away. Another opportunity for success was offered when the army was at Warrenton, in the fall of 1862. The rebel force was then divided. Longstreet, and A. P. Hill, with their corps, being at Culpepper, while Stonewall Jackson and D. H. Hill were in the Shenandoah valley, at Front Royal. By crushing Longstreet at Culpepper, the army would cripple that of the rebels, and would cut it off from Richmond. Culpepper should have been occupied. It was at this time that General Burnside assumed command of the army, and unfortunately decided to march on Fredericksburg. the Fredericksburg campaign. The details of that campaign have already been so thoroughly examined by your honorable committee, as to leave nothing to be said in reference to it except, perhaps, that the cavalry bore no prominent part in it. campaign of Chancellorsville. In this campaign, my command was the First cavalry division of the Army of the Potomac, the First brigade of which, during the battle, was with General Stoneman on his raid toward Richmond, in rear of Lee's army. With one brigade, I preceded the Eleventh and Twelfth corps as far as Chancellorsville. The movements of the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth corps across the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers were very fine and masterly, and were executed with such secrecy that the enemy were not aware of them. For, on the thirtieth of April, 1863, I captured a courier from General Lee, commanding the rebel army, bearing a despatch from General Lee to General Anderson, and written only one hour before, stating to General Anderson he had just been informed we had crossed in force, when, in fact, our three corps had been south of the Rapidan river the night previous, and were then only five miles from Chancellorsville. The brilliant success of these preparatory movements, I was under the impression, gave General Hooker an undue confidence as to his
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Table of Contents:
Doc . 16 . operations in Tennessee .
Doc . 19 . the siege of Suffolk, Virginia .
Doc . 36 . General Rousseau 's expedition.
Doc . 59 . battles of Spottsylvania , Va: battle of Sunday , May 8 , 1864 .
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