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Chapter 18: the battle of South Mountain
Could the reader have seen with
Mr. Lincoln's eyes-sad, earnest, deep, penetrating as they were — the condition of the
Republic on September 2d and 3d, when the
Union army with broken ranks and haggard looks came straggling and discouraged to the protection of the encircling forts of
Washington, he would have realized the crisis.
Divisions in councilenvy and accusation among military leaders, unsatisfied ambition struggling for the ascendency-waves of terror gathering force as they rolled from
Washington through
Maryland and
Pennsylvania northwarda triumphant, hostile army, well organized, well officered, and great in numbers, under a chief of acknowledged character and ability, within twenty miles of the capital-these served to blow the crackling embers, and fan the consuming flame.
But
Abraham Lincoln, who cried to God for strength, was equal to this emergency.
He brought
Halleck over to his mind.
He checked the secret and open work of his ministers which he deemed too abrupt; he silenced the croakings of the war committees of Congress; he stirred all truly loyal hearts by cogent appeals to send forward men and money; he buried his personal preferences and called back
McClellan, his former though fretful lieutenant.
from the position of
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helplessness and semidisgrace to which he had recently been consigned by having his army turned over to
Pope piecemeal.
He gave
McClellan command of all the scattered forces then in and around the District of Columbia.
A vein of confidence in
McClellan as a safe leader ran through the forces — in fact, just the commander for that tumultous epoch, and
Mr. Lincoln's good judgment was sustained by the army.
McClellan accepted the trust without remonstrance and without condition, and at once went to work.
He refitted and reorganized, moving each division with caution by short marches northward; and this time he made proper provision for the defense of
Washington.
Slowness was wise then.
It gave proper supplies.
It arranged order, which soon replaced an unparalleled confusion and brought cheerfulness and hopefulness to us all.
Hooker became commander of
McDowell's old First Corps.
Sumner retained the Second. One division of the Fourth Corps was present under
Couch.
Porter still had the Fifth, and
Franklin the Sixth.
The Ninth was commanded by
General Cox after
Reno's death.
The Twelfth Corps was commanded by
General Mansfield; the cavalry by
Alfred Pleasonton.
After
Chantilly,
Lee, whom we left in force not far from
Centreville, after one day's delay for rest and refitting, marched to
Leesburg, near the
Potomac, in
Northwestern Virginia.
He was beginning an invasion of
Maryland and
Pennsylvania, for he could there obtain more supplies than
Virginia, denuded by the war, could furnish.
Such a movement also transferred the theater of the war beyond the borders of the
Confederacy.
Confederate hopes were based on
Maryland.
Would not a victory on her soil aid her downtrodden
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and oppressed people to set themselves forever free from Northern domination?
By September 7th the Confederate army had crossed the
Potomac above us at different fords between
Poolesville and Pdint of Rocks and bivouacked in the neighborhood of Frederick City, Md. The Confederate political leaders were disappointed with
Maryland.
It was too late for a few fire eaters to carry by storm the hearts of the
Union Marylanders.
So
Lee, though in a slave State abundant in resources, with here and there a sympathizing family, found himself virtually in a land of lukewarm attachments to his cause.
But few recruits joined him. The Confederate currency was not willingly received as money.
The stars and bars flying over some of the public buildings gave the people no satisfaction.
General Lee, though aided and encouraged by a few secession citizens, soon ceased his futile efforts, and gave his attention to the military problems before him.
Harper's Ferry, with an outpost at
Martinsburg, eighteen miles to the west, was commanded by a veteran Union officer of the regular army,
Colonel Dixon S. Miles.
He had under his authority about 13,000 men, including artillery and cavalry, while
General Julius White had a small force at
Martinsburg.
The Confederates, after crossing the
Potomac, below
Harper's Ferry, had completely turned
Miles's position.
McClellan then asked
Halleck to have Miles move from
Harper's Ferry up the
Cumberland Valley.
Halleck being unwilling, for he had much wrongheadedness concerning that historic place,
McClellan then requested the withdrawal of Miles to
Maryland Heights; but even this was denied him.
At this time the
Potomac, between
Harper's Ferry
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and
Maryland Heights, was not too deep to ford.
The country is rugged, and the
Shenandoah entering the
Potomac there from the south makes with it a right angle.
The two rivers after confluence break through the mountain chain and roll on eastward.
Between this increased torrent and the
Shenandoah are Loudon Heights.
Crossing from the
Maryland side the village of
Harper's Ferry is on a lower level than any of its environment.
The old armory and its dependencies were already in 1862 in ruins, and there was little else there.
A well-pronounced ridge called Bolivar Heights, two miles out toward the southwest, extended from the upper Potomac to the
Shenandoah.
To an unpracticed eye these heights signified a line of defense.
Colonel Dixon Miles, not realizing how completely
Loudon and
Maryland Heights commanded every nook and corner of his position, remained at
Harper's Ferry to defend it.
By September 12th our Army of the Potomac, well in hand, had worked its way northward to Frederick City.
Lee, after he was north of the
Potomac, had pushed off westward, crossing the
Catoctin Range, seizing and occupying the passes of the
South Mountain, with the intention to take
Harper's Ferry in reverse and pick up the garrison of
Martinsburg, that he might have via the
Shenandoah clear communications with
Richmond, and gain the prestige of these small victories, while he was making ready to defeat
McClellan's large army.
All the while this rich region of
Maryland gave him abundant supplies of animals and flour.
From the mountain passes
Stuart's cavalry was watching our slow and steady approach.
On the 13th inference and conjecture became a certainty.
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D. H. Hill lost one copy of
Lee's order of march and it was brought to
McClellan.
That order sent
Stonewall Jackson west from Frederick City, through
Middletown, to recross the
Potomac near
Sharpsburg, choke the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, capture
Julius White at
Martinsburg, and then close in on
Harper's Ferry, and be sure not to permit the
Union troops of
Colonel Miles to escape west or north.
McLaws, adding
Anderson's division to his own, was to branch off southward from the
Middletown road and, keeping north of the
Potomac, hasten to seize and hold
Maryland Heights, and thus to do his part in capturing
Harper's Ferry; while
Longstreet would halt at
Boonsboro, west of
South Mountain, and delay our westward march.
To make assurance doubly sure
Lee sent
Walker's division to hurry south to Cheek's Ford, cross the
Potomac there, and turn back by
Lovettsville, Va., and seize Loudon Heights.
Lee kept the new division of
D. H. Hill for his rear guard, to be gradually drawn in till it should join
Longstreet at
Boonsboro.
These instructions of the
Confederate leader were plain.
They were dated September 9th, and their execution began the morning of the 10th. Three days and a part of another passed before
McClellan had in his hand the hostile plan; he was three days too late for its prevention; yet if our troops at
Harper's Ferry could make a reasonably successful defense, two important things might follow: First,
Lee might be caught, as was
McClellan on the
Chickahominy, with an army worse divided, and be overwhelmed in detail; and second, the
Harper's Ferry force might be saved.
This view of the situation became current among us; the hope of officers and men was an inspiration as
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our columns marched off. The soldiers pressed forward eager to fulfill their new instructions.
Stonewall Jackson, having good roads, quickly led his noted marchers from
Middletown to
Williamsport, and September 11th crossed the
Potomac into
Virginia.
Getting wind of this,
General White during that night withdrew from
Martinsburg to
Harper's Ferry, but did not assume command over Dixon Miles.
Early on.the 13th
Jackson encamped just beyond the range of Bolivar Heights, near the village of
Halltown, in full view of
Miles's skirmishers.
Our
Colonel Ford, of the Thirty-third Ohio, with a brigade was across the river on
Maryland Heights.
McLaws drove in
Ford's farthest outpost the evening of the 11th, and on the 13th deployed his command for severer battle.
Colonel Ford gave up, with practically no fight at all, the vital point — the very citadel of
Harper's Ferry --spiked his four cannon, and crossed the river to swell the force already there.
His alleged excuse was that his own regiment refused to fight.
The Confederate division under
Walker had performed its part.
The morning of the 13th found them at the base of Loudon Heights; a few hours later cannon, supported by sufficient infantry, had crowned that convenient mountain.
Before night
Walker had concerted with
McLaws and closed up every eastward escape on the
Potomac.
At sunset of the 13th Miles's garrison was completely invested.
The whole story of the defense is a sad one--more than 13,000 of as good troops as we had were forced to surrender.
One would have thought that any army officer, one even as feeble as Dixond Miles, would have placed his
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strongest garrison on
Maryland Heights and defended it to the last extremity; and, indeed, while he ventured to remain at
Harper's Ferry, how could he have failed to fortify Loudon Mountain and hold its summit and nearer base?
Had this been done there would have been some reason for facing
Jackson along the
Bolivar Ridge.
Sunday evening my friend and classmate,
Colonel B. F. Davis, had obtained
Colonel Miles's permission, and with 1,500 Union cavalry forded the
Potomac and passed off northward.
He captured some of
Longstreet's wagons on the
Maryland shore, made a few prisoners, and, avoiding the
Confederate columns, joined
McClellan, the 16th, at
Antietam.
The Army of the Potomac was still
en route westward toward
Lee. On September 13th
McClellan simplified his organization.
The right wing was assigned to
Burnside, the left to
Franklin, and the center to
Sumner.
Burnside had two corps-
Hooker's and
Reno's;
Franklin two-his own and
Porter's;
Sumner two-his own and
Mansfield's. As each corps commander had three divisions, except
Mansfield and
Porter, who had two each, there were sixteen divisions, giving forty-seven brigades of infantry, the brigades averaging 1,800 strong.
Our cavalry division then counted five brigades of cavalry and four batteries.
We had, all told, some forty batteries of artillery generally distributed to the divisions for care and support in action.
Franklin with the left wing was sent from his camp south of Frederick City, the 14th, past
Burkittsville, and on through Crampton Pass into
Pleasant Valley, aiming for
Maryland Heights. Three requirements were named: To gain the pass, cut off, destroy or capture
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McLaws's command and relieve Miles.
“I ask of you,”
McClellan added, “at this important moment all your intellect and the utmost captivity that a general can exercise.”
Skirmishing began with the enemy before reaching
Burkittsville, and
Franklin's men swept on, driving the
Confederate pickets up the mountain defile until his advance came upon a force of Confederate artillery well posted.
General Howell Cobb, of
Georgia, was left back by
McLaws to defend this defile.
It was a strong position; but
Franklin came on with vigor and carried the first position by storm.
Cobb and his main force fell back, ran hastily to the top of the ridge, and there made another stand.
Our men after rectifying their lines followed on over rough ground on both sides of the narrow road till they approached the summit.
The crest was soon carried and
Franklin warmly congratulated his men for their sturdiness.
He took one piece of artillery and three Confederate flags.
Of our men 110 were killed and 420 wounded, while
Franklin buried 150 Confederate dead and held 300 as his prisoners.
Franklin camped in
Pleasant Valley the night of September 14th, only five miles from
Maryland Heights.
Had that position not been deserted,
Franklin could have drawn off the garrison at
Harper's Ferry from the grasp of
Jackson.
Of course,
Franklin was disappointed by
Miles's surrender and
McClellan chagrined, yet they had done their best.
In our march to attack
Lee's divided forces my small brigade belonged to the center in
Sedgwick's division.
We pushed our way northward a few miles up the valley just east of the
South Mountain, and skirmished
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with
Stuart's watching force, backing up our own cavalry in that direction.
Meanwhile,
Burnside's wing, followed by the remainder of
Sumner's forces, hurried straight forward to Turner's Gap on the direct road from
Frederick to
Hagerstown.
This part of the
South Mountain is a mountain indeed, much wooded, very rugged, and steep.
The
National road leads from one side straight up through the natural depression, which is named Turner's Gap.
A road to the right, called the old Hagerstown road, after leading to the north, comes back into the
National road at the summit.
Another highway crosses the mountain a mile or so to the south of the
National road, and is called the old Sharpsburg road. Should we ascend by the one to the right of the turnpike, we would wind around a spur and find a small valley between this spur and the main ridge.
This valley was occupied by the enemy.
The Confederates found a crossroad near the crest.
Along this crossroad
D. H. Hill arranged his brigades.
Both to the north and south of the
National road fine locations for cannon were selected and occupied by him. Some were placed so as to sweep a high point well to the north, rather too commanding to admit of possession by an enemy.
This, a sort of peak, every engineer called the key of the position.
From it two distinct mountain crests coursed off southward for a mile or more with hardly a break.
These crests protected the little summit valley and
D. H. Hill's Confederates held them.
The evening of the 13th
Pleasonton followed
Stuart to the mouth of the gap. Feeling instinctively that the
Confederates would occupy and defend such a defile he dismounted half of his men and sent them up the
old Hagerstown road. They were soon stopped by
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a heavy fire.
That night
Pleasonton contented himself with reconnoissances for information.
Early, the 14th,
Burnside having sent him an infantry brigade he so located a battery as to cover an advance, and sent the brigade up the
National road.
It had just started when
Cox, the division commander, arrived with another brigade and pushed it on to help the other.
They made a lodgment near the top of the mountain to the left of the
National road.
General Cox now brought up artillery and two brigades to the points gained, when
Garland's successor commanding that part of the
Confederate field undertook by desperate charging and rapid firing to regain the important crest.
But he could not. During the first part of the engagement when our men cleared the crest and made the first break,
General Garland lost his life.
D. H. Hill denounced that success of
Cox as a failure, because it did not secure the extensive crossroad behind him, and he gave the credit of its defense to
Garland, alleging that “this brilliant service cost us the life of that grand, accomplished, Christian soldier.”
The battle thus far had consumed five hours; there came then, as is usual, a mutual cessation from strife --a sort of tacit understanding that there would be some artillery practice and skirmishing only while each party was getting ready to renew the conflict.
Meanwhile,
Rosser had come to replace
Garland, and several Confederate brigades had been brought up and located for a rush forward, or for an effectual defense.
On our side
Reno's division had closed up to
Willcox's,
Sturgis's, and
Rodman's divisions.
The men of the
South, possessed of American grit, were wont to exhibit all the
elan of the
French in action.
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They were ready sooner than
Reno and charged furiously upon our strengthened line, aiming their heaviest blows against our right, upon which they had brought to bear plenty of cannon.
Though not at first prepared to go forward,
Reno's men stood firmly to their line of defense.
At last, not being satisfied with this, though volley had met volley, and cannon answered cannon,
Reno ordered his whole line to advance.
These orders were instantly obeyed and the forward movement started with enthusiasm.
Our charge, however, was checked here and there by countercharges, the
Confederates putting forward desperate efforts to break and hold back the advancing line.
After all, at dark, it seemed but a drawn battle to those in immediate contention on this front.
While examining his new line,
General Jesse L. Reno was killed.
Reno was one of our ablest and most promising commanders.
D. H. Hill's comment, considering his passion, was a compliment, when he said: “The
Yankees lost on their side
General Reno, a renegade Virginian, who was killed by a happy shot from the Twenty-third North Carolina.”
As
Reno was never a secessionist, and as he was always true to the flag of his country, to which several times he swore allegiance, no stretch of language could truthfully brand him as a deserter.
He was a true man, like such other
Virginians as
Craighill,
Robert Williams,
John Newton,
George H. Thomas, and
Farragut.
The most decisive work was on another front.
Hooker was at the head of his corps.
McClellan in person gave him orders on the field to press up the old Hagerstown road to the right and make a diversion in aid of
Reno's attack.
That movement was undertaken
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without delay.
Hooker's corps took on this formation:
Meade's division to the right,
Hatch's to the left;
Ricketts's in the center a little back in reserve.
Pleasonton sent two regiments of cavalry to watch the flanks.
Naturally expecting slow progress from
Reno,
Hooker thought the best diversion would be an immediate assault on whatever was before or near him.
The high peak before named, the key of the field, did not appear to be strongly occupied by Confederates; there was a battery discovered and thin lines to sweep the height, but that was all that was apparent.
So
Meade and
Hatch with their deployed lines went forward as fast as men could in climbing such a rough mountain.
They soon encountered an enemy; probably at first there were but three opposing brigades and a few pieces of artillery, but the resistance increased.
It was a rugged place where the
Confederates could and did take advantage of every obstacle to disable or hold back
Hooker's soldiers.
Longstreet, hastening up from
Boonsboro, was ascending the mountain about this time.
His brigades, as they came to the western crest, weary though they were from the march, were rushed into position and into hot battle; but our
Ricketts dispatched thither a brigade which, by a prompt change of front, stopped that danger, while
Meade had the satisfaction of crowning the desired peak.
That key was taken and batteries drawn up before sundown.
To cover the guns by barricades and arrange them to enfilade the two crests, artillerymen were not slow to accomplish.
They saw at once that they had a plunging fire upon the little mountain valley.
Meade had the summit peak, but lest it be retaken,
Hatch, to his left, struggled over the uneven ground
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through the forest, fighting his way forward.
He was so hard pressed that
Hooker sent him a brigade from
Ricketts to thicken his lines.
This help came when most needed; but while
Hatch during the rain of bullets was riding along and encouraging his soldiers to charge and take a fence line held by the enemy, he himself was severely wounded by a shot from behind that fence.
Doubleday then took
Hatch's place while the firing was still frequent and troublesome.
He tried a ruse: he caused his men to cease firing.
The Confederates, thinking they had cleared their front, sprang forward a few paces to receive from
Doubleday's ambush a sweeping volley-this broke up their alignments and they were chased back from the battle ground.
The woods which
Meade and
Doubleday had fought through, the minor combats continuing in the darkness of the night, resounded with the cries of wounded and dying men; while the many dead, especially on
Hatch's route, at dawn of the next day, showed the severity of the struggle.
Burnside had detached
General John Gibbon from
Hooker to keep up a connection with
Reno, but near night
Gibbon was sent up the
National road.
He kept a battery in the road well forward.
The Confederates from their crest began to fire as they got glimpses of this bold move both upon the brigade and the battery.
But
Gibbon's men by strengthening their skirmishers and steadily moving on pushed everything before them; they ran from tree to tree, or rock to rock, till the battery thus covered by them had worked ahead enough to be effective.
Then
Gibbon's battery began its discharges straight upon the
Confederate guns,. which had hitherto annoyed his march.
By its effective help the battery aided the regiments abreast of it
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to stretch out into lines as good and regular as the ragged, rocky slope would permit.
The men, taking a fresh impulse, clambered up over the rocks, driving their enemies-two regiments of them — from woods, crags, and stone fences.
The two Confederate regiments were then helped by three more, and our men were clogged for a time.
But
Gibbon in the end secured the gorge and slept on his battlefield.
I came to the scene of the conflict near the close of the contest.
The triumph was evident and welcome, but much tempered by our severe losses and by the presence of the wounded men who with fortitude were suppressing the evidences of pain.
Burnside was riding around among his troops.
They generally looked pleased and hopeful, but very weary.
They did not cheer.
About midnight
Hill and
Longstreet had drawn off their commands, leaving their dead and severely wounded in our hands.
The Confederates had here the advantage of position, of course.
We put more men than they into action.
We lost 325 killed and 1,403 wounded and 85 missing. The Confederate loss was about the same as ours in killed and wounded.
We took 1,500 prisoners. In spite of the
Harper's Ferry disaster our army took heart again, on account of our victory in the
battle of South Mountain, and reposed confidence in
McClellan.
The spot where
Reno fell is marked by a stone monument, erected to his memory by
Daniel Wise.
Friends and foes in that beautiful mountain valley fell asleep together.
Would that they awake in the likeness of the Man of Peace!
Very early in the morning of the 15th our division passed the troops of
Reno and
Hooker, and pressed
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forward down the western slopes of
South Mountain, through
Boonsboro in pursuit.
As we descended the mountain road thus early, I could see little puffs of smoke from many rifles and sudden clouds rolling up from cannon, yet, strange to say, could hear no sound.
The air was very clear, and the distance greater than it appeared.
Our own division's advance brigade and
Pleasonton's cavalry were skirmishing with
Lee's rear guard.
