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Chapter 35:
- An intrigue in Richmond against Gen. Johnston.
-- evidence of it.
-- Gen. Bragg's visit to Atlanta.
-- removal of Gen. Johnston from command.
-- the battles of Atlanta.
-- engagements of the 20th, 22d, and 28th July.
-- Sherman's designs on the Macon road.
-- unsuccessful raids of Stoneman and McCook.
-- Hood's great mistake.
-- he sends off his cavalry towards Chattanooga.
-- Sherman moves on the Macon road.
-- defeat of Hardee at Jonesboroa.
-- Hood evacuates Atlanta, and retreats to Lovejoy's Station.
-- Sherman's occupation of Atlanta.
-- his order for its depopulation.
-- atrocious character of this measure.
-- the fall of Atlanta a serious disaster for the Confederates.
-- visit of President Davis to the military lines in Georgia.
-- his speech at Macon.
-- he betrays to the enemy the new military design.
-- Hood's new movement to Tennessee.
-- Sherman follows to Gaylesville.
-- he turns back and determines to traverse the State of Georgia to the sea.
-- his correspondence with Grant.
-- how the enterprise was a plain one.
-- no peril or genius in it.
-- Errors of the Hood
-- Davis strategy.
-- Hood's Tennessee campaign.
-- he loses the great opportunity of the campaign at Spring Hill.
-- Schofield effects a retreat to Franklin.
-- battle of Franklin.
-- heroic conduct of the Confederate troops.
-- remarkable loss among their general officers.
-- battle of Nashville.
-- Gen. Grant's fears that Hood would invade Kentucky.
-- probable effect of such a movement.
-- the enemy's plan of battle.
-- the second day's fight.
-- Hood's assurance of victory.
-- a Confederate brigade gives way before a skirmish line of the enemy.
-- a disgraceful panic and rout.
-- Hood escapes across the Tennessee River.
-- his losses.
-- the whole scheme of Confederate defence terminated West of the Alleghanies
Gen. Lee had moved from the
Rapidan to
Richmond, with an increase of reputation at each stage of the retreat.
It is curious that when
Gen. Johnston moved from the
Northern frontier of
Georgia to
Atlanta, even with greater success, he should not have experienced similar tokens of approbation.
The fact was that he was the subject of a deep intrigue in
Richmond, to displace him from the command of an army, whose affections and confidence he had never ceased to enjoy; and even while he was moving in the march from
Dalton, his removal from command was secretly entertained in
Richmond.
There is a certain delicate evidence of this, which the historian should not spare.
While the march referred to was in
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progress, a letter written by
Gen. J. B. Hood to one who was supposed to have more than an ordinary concern, an affectionate interest in his career, declared then his confident anticipation of being soon elevated from the position of corps commander to the head of the Army of Tennessee.
There was other evidence of the intrigue in
Richmond.
Gen. Bragg, the “military adviser” of
President Davis, visited
Johnston in his lines around
Atlanta; never apprised him that his visit was of an official nature; put together everything he could to make a case against
Johnston, and returned to
Richmond with the alarming report that he was about to give up
Atlanta to the enemy 1 Of this nonsense
Gen. Johnston has written: “The proofs that I intended to hold
Atlanta are, the fact that under my orders the work of strengthening its defences was going on vigorously, the communication on the subject made by me to
Gen. Hood, and the fact that my family was in the town.
That the public workshops were removed, and no large supplies deposited in the town, as alleged by
Gen. Bragg, were measures of common prudence, and no more indicated the intention to abandon the place than the sending the wagons of an army to the rear, on a day of battle, proves a foregone determination to abandon the field.”
But the Presidential fiat was to go forth in the face of all facts.
On the night of the 17th July it was known in the Army of Tennessee, that a despatch had been received from
Richmond, removing
Johnston from command, and appointing in his place
Gen. J. B. Hood.
The news struck a chill in the army, such as no act or menace of the enemy had ever done.
To
Sherman it was the occasion of new spirit.
When he heard that
Hood was to be his future antagonist, he jumped to his feet, made a significant motion around his forefinger, and exclaimed: “I know that fellow.”
Gen. J. B. Hood had been appointed by
President Davis as “a fighting General,” and was prompt to vindicate the cheap reputation that had procured for him such a command.
With some reinforcements from the
Southwest and levies of
Georgia militia,
Gen. Hood had now under his command an effective force of forty-one thousand infantry and artillery, and ten thousand cavalry.
With reference to other Confederate forces in the field, his army was a large one, although it gave him but little margin for fanciful attacks and useless sacrifice of life.
The battles of Atlanta.
As
Sherman approached
Atlanta, two of his corps had swung around upon the
Augusta road, destroying this line of communication, while
Thomas took his command across
Peach Tree Creek, directly in front of the
Confederate entrenchments.
While the enemy's right on the creek
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was in marching column,
Hood, in the afternoon of the 20th July, directed an attack upon it, designing to take advantage of a gap between two of its divisions.
The attack was led by
Walker's and
Bates' divisions of
Hardee's corps; and the massed troops, in admirable order, burst through the gap in the enemy's lines, and for a time appeared about to destroy his forces on the right.
But a double fire was brought to bear upon their lines along the deep hollow they had penetrated; and the attack was drawn off in good order, but after a half hour of deadly work, in which the killed and wounded were counted by thousands.
The loss of the enemy was about two thousand; that of the
Confederates probably twice as large, as they were the assaulting party, and terribly exposed on the line of attack.
Next day,
McPherson moved forward, and established a line east and south of
Atlanta, and within three miles of the town.
His command stretched beyond the Atlanta and Augusta Railroad, which he had torn up.
Hood now hastily swung around
Hardee's corps, followed by the others, and brought the bulk of his army against
McPherson.
Hardee moved against the enemy's extreme left, drove him from his works, and captured sixteen pieces of artillery.
Gen. McPherson was shot dead as he rode along the line.
Meanwhile,
Cheatham attacked the enemy's centre with a portion of his command, and took six pieces of artillery.
Affairs looked gloomy for the enemy; he had been repulsed at several points, he had lost much artillery, and the stream of bleeding men going to the rear told how severely he suffered in the conflict.
But about this time the enemy succeeded in concentrating his artillery, and
Gen. Sherman sent word to
Logan, who had succeeded
McPherson, to mass his troops in the centre and charge.
Exhausted, wasted, and bleeding, the
Confederate columns gave way, abandoning most of the artillery they had captured in the early part of the day. The attack of the 22d was like that of the 20th-one of the most reckless, massive, and headlong charges of the war, where immense prices were paid for momentary successes, and the terrible recoil of numbers gave a lesson to the temerity of the
Confederate commander.
Hood's attempt on the
Federal left being frustrated, he fell back to his inner line of works.
The intentions of
Sherman appear now to have been to swing his army to
Hood's extreme right, threatening the
Macon road, and having in co-operation a great cavalry raid upon his rear.
Stoneman was sent with five thousand cavalry, and
McCook with four thousand men, to meet on the
Macon road near Lovejoy's Station, where they were to destroy the rail, and also to attack and drive
Wheeler's command.
Stoneman requested permission to be allowed to proceed to
Macon to release the
Federal prisoners confined there.
Sherman left this at his own discretion, in case he felt he was able to do so after the defeat of
Wheeler's cavalry.
But
Stoneman did not fulfill the conditions He got down in front of
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Macon, without going to
Lovejoy's, and, in attempting to retreat, was hemmed in by
Iverson, and was himself captured, together with one thousand of his men and two guns.
McCook returned after losing five hundred men as prisoners.
The cavalry raid was a decided failure, or as
Sherman mildly expressed it, “not deemed a success.”
On the 28th July
Hood made a partial attack along the
Lickskillet-road, which he had occcupied with
Stewart's and
Lee's corps.
The conflict was desultory and without result on either side.
After five hours of action,
Hood retired with a loss of about fifteen hundred killed and wounded.
We have already noticed that
Sherman did not have force enough to invest
Atlanta completely.
This was the great point in
Johnston's calculations, when they were upset at
Richmond; for
Sherman, reduced to strategy, would have found his master in the cool and dexterous
Johnston, whereas in
Hood he had plainly his inferiour to deal with — a commander who had indeed abundant courage, but a scant brain with which to balance it.
Sherman's army was not large enough to encircle
Atlanta completely, without making his lines too thin and assailable.
He never contemplated an assault upon its strong works.
It was his great object to get possession of the
Macon road, and thus sever
Atlanta entirely from its supplies.
It was not sufficient to cut the road by raids; it must be kept broken, and to accomplish this it was clearly necessary to plant a sufficient force south of
Atlanta.
While
Sherman meditated such a movement,
Hood made the very mistake that would secure and facilitate it, and thrust into the hands of his adversary the opportunity he had waited for. He sent off his entire cavalry towards
Chattanooga to raid on the enemy's line of communication — a most absurd excursion, since
Sherman had enough provisions accumulated this side of that place to last him until he could restore his communications, and had also formed a second base at
Allatoona.
Instantly, the
Federal cavalry was on the
Macon road.
With his flanks easily protected,
Sherman followed quickly with his main army.
On the 31st August,
Howard, on the right, had reached
Jonesboroa, on the
Macon road, twenty miles southeast of
Atlanta;
Thomas, in the centre, was at
Couch's; and
Schofield, on the left, was near Rough-and-Ready, still closer to
Atlanta.
Hood had no alternative now but to make a battle on or near the line of the
Macon road, and there settle the fate of
Atlanta.
He might have moved out of the city on the north, and have overwhelmed what of
Sherman's army — the Twentieth corps--was left there; but he would then have been in a country destitute of supplies.
He determined to make the battle near
Jonesboroa, and the corps of
Lee and
Hardee were moved out to attempt to dislodge the enemy from the entrenched position he held
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across
Flint River The attack failed with the loss of more than two thou sand men. On the evening of the 1st September, the enemy's columns converged upon
Jonesboroa, and
Hardee's corps, finding itself about to be flanked and overwhelmed, withdrew during the night, after having been cut up by two severe engagements, and with the loss of eight guns.
That night, finding his line of supply cut off, and the sum of his disasters complete,
Hood determined to abandon Altanta.
He blew up his magazines, destroyed all his supplies that he could not remove, consisting of seven locomotives and eighty-one cars loaded with ammunition, and left the place by the turnpike roads.
He moved swiftly across the country towards
Macon.
The next morning
Sherman moved south to catch the retreating army, but at
Lovejoy's, two miles beyond
Jonesboroa, he found
Hood strongly entrenched, and, abandoning the pursuit, returned to
Atlanta.
Sherman announced: “
Atlanta is ours, and fairly won.”
His army entered the city on the morning of the 2d September, and the successful commander rode through the streets to his headquarters without parade or ostentation.
Hie declared that his army, wearied by an arduous campaign, needed rest, and that he proposed to give it an interval of repose within the defences of
Atlanta.
But the period of military inaction was to be employed in launching measures of the most extraordinary cruelty against the non-combatant people of
Atlanta.
Gen. Sherman was the author of the sentiment, “War is cruelty, and you cannot refine it,” which was caught up in the
Northern newspapers as a bit of very sententious and elegant philosophy, when, in fact, denying, as it did, that war had any law of order or amelioration, it was a mere plagiarism from the bloody and detestable code of the savage.
This extraordinary doctrine
Sherman at once proceeded to put in practice by depopulating
Atlanta, and driving from their homes thousands of helpless women and children.
It was the most cruel and savage act of the war.
Butler, the tyrant of New Orleans, had only banished registered enemies.
Sherman issued a sweeping edict, covering all the inhabitants of a city, and driving them from their homes to wander as strangers, outcasts and exiles, and to subsist on charity.
Gen. Hood, while he received the exiles within his lines, took occasion to protest, writing to
Gen. Sherman himself of the measure his sinister mind had devised: “It transcends in studied and ingenious cruelty all acts ever before brought to my attention in the dark history of war.”
But all protests were unavailing.
In vain the
Mayor of
Atlanta had pointed out to
Gen. Sherman that the country south of the city was crowded already with refugees, and without houses to accommodate the people, and that many had no other shelter but what they might find in churches, and out-buildings; that among the exiles were many poor women in an advanced state of pregnancy; that the consequences would be woe, horrour, and suffering,
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which could not be described by words.
Sherman was inexorable.
He affected the belief that
Atlanta might again be rendered formidable in the hands of the
Confederates, and resolved, in his own words, “to wipe it out.”
The old and decrepit were hunted from their homes; they were packed into railroad cars; tottering old age and helpless youth were crowded together; wagons were filled with wrecks of household goods; and the trains having deposited their medley freight at Rough-and-Ready, the exiles were then left to shift for themselves.
The fall of
Atlanta was a terrible blow to the Southern Confederacy; a reanimation of the
North; the death of “the peace party” there; the date of a new hope of the enemy and of a new prospect of subjugation.
“On that day,” said the Richmond
Examiner, “
McClellan's nomination fell still-born, and an heir was born to the Abolition dynasty.
On that day, peace waved those ‘ white wings,’ and fled to the ends of the morning.
On that day, calculations of the war's duration ceased to be the amusements even of the idle.”
President Davis had declared, when he removed
Johnston, that “
Atlanta must be held at all hazards.”
It was the most important manufacturing centre in the
Confederacy; it was the key to the network of railroads extending to all portions of the
Gulf States; it was “the Gate City” from the north and west to the southeast; it was an important depot of supplies, and commanded the richest granaries of the
South.
Such was the prize of the enemy.
The catastrophe moved
President Davis in
Richmond, and mortified the vanity that had so recently proclaimed the security of
Atlanta under the command of
Hood.
He determined to visit
Hood's new lines, to plan with him a new campaign, to compensate for the loss of
Atlanta, and to take every possible occasion to raise the hopes and confidence of the people.
It is remarkable that the visits of the
Confederate President to the armies were always the occasions of some far-fetched and empirical plan of operations, and were always accompanied with vapours and boasts that unduly exalted the public mind.
Mr. Davis never spoke of military matters without a certain ludicrous boastfulness, which he maintained to the last event of the war. It was not swagger or affectation; it was the sincere vagary of a mind intoxicated with conceit when occupied with a subject where it imagined it found its
forte, but where in fact it had least aptitude.
Mr. Davis, as a military commander or adviser, was weak, fanciful, to excess, and much too vain to keep his own counsels.
As he travelled towards
Hood's lines, he made excited speeches in
South Carolina and
Georgia.
At
Macon he declared that
Atlanta would be recovered; that
Sherman would be brought to grief; and that this Federal commander “would meet the fate that befell
Napoleon in the retreat from
Moscow.”
These swollen assertions, so out of character, were open advertisements to the enemy of a new plan of operations.
It appears
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that the unfortunate vanity of
President Davis completely betrayed him. Referring to this period,
Gen. Grant writes: “During this time
Jefferson Davis made a speech in
Macon, Georgia, which was reported in the papers of the
South, and soon became known to the whole country, disclosing the plans of the enemy,
thus enabling Gen. Sherman to fully meet them. He exhibited the weakness of supposing that an army that had been beaten and fearfully decimated in a vain attempt at the defensive could successfully undertake the offensive against the army that had so often defeated it.”
The new offensive movement of
Hood, advised by
President Davis, was soon known to the country.
Not satisfied with the revelation at
Macon,
President Davis addressed the army, and more plainly announced the direction of the new campaign.
Turning to
Cheatham's division of Tennesseeans, he said: “Be of good cheer, for within a short while your faces will be turned homeward, and your feet pressing
Tennessee soil.”
On the 24th September,
Hood commenced the new movement to pass to
Sherman's rear and to get on his line of communications as far as
Tennessee.
The first step was to transfer his army, by a flank movement, from Lovejoy's Station on the Macon Railroad, to near
Newman on the
West Point road.
The significance of this might have escaped the enemy, but for the incautious language of
President Davis at
Macon, which at once gave rise to the supposition that this movement was preliminary to one more extensive.
Sherman was instantly on the alert, sending his spare forces, wagons, and guns, to the rear, under
Gen. Thomas, and, at the same time, sending
Schofield,
Newton, and
Corse to take up different points in the rear of
Atlanta.
On the 27th,
Hood moved towards the
Chattahoochee.
On the 1st October, the enemy made a reconnoissance towards
Newman, and discovered that
Hood had crossed the
Chattahoochee River on the 29th and 30th of September.
Sherman immediately followed.
On the 5th October, when
Hood's advance assaulted
Allatoona,
Sherman was on
Kenesaw Mountain, signalling to the garrison at
Allatoona, over the heads of the
Confederates, to hold out until he relieved them.
Hood moved westward, and, crossing the
Etowah and
Oostanaula Rivers by forced marches, attacked
Dalton on the 12th, which was surrendered.
Passing through the gap of
Pigeon Mountain, he entered
Lafayette on the 15th.
From this place he suddenly moved south to
Gadsden, Alabama, where he rejoined his trains, to make his fatal march towards
Nashville.
Sherman waited some time at
Gaylesville, until he became fully assured of the direction taken by
Hood; and then abruptly prepared to abandon the pursuit, return to
Atlanta, and mobilize his army for a march across the broad
State of Georgia to the sea. His calculation was a plain and precise one.
Gen. Thomas, at
Nashville, could collect troops from the
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whole Department of the Mississippi;
Rosecrans was able to send him reinforcements from
Missouri;
Sherman detached two corps--the Fourth and Twenty-third--to move, by the way of
Chattanooga, to the relief of
Thomas; and there was little doubt that with this force
Thomas could ho d the line of the
Tennessee, or if
Hood forced it, would be able to concentrate and give a good battle.
Sherman was left in command of four army corps, and two divisions of superb cavalry — a force of about sixty-thousand men. When
Hood wandered off in the direction of
Florence,
Sherman was left free to complete his arrangements, and there was nothing to interfere with his grand projected march to the sea. In October,
Gen. Grant, who was watching closely the development of the wretched
Davis-
Hood device to find some compensation for the loss of
Atlanta, telegraphed
Sherman: “If you were to cut loose, I do not believe you would meet
Hood's army, but would be bushwhacked by all the old men, little boys, and such railroad guards as are still left at home.”
With nothing, of course, to fear from such an opposition,
Sherman telegraphed his determination “to make a wreck of the road, and of the country from
Chattanooga to
Atlanta, including the latter city; send back all his wounded and worthless, and with his effective army, move through
Georgia,
smashing things, to the sea.”
The march would, indeed, have been a perilous enterprise, if there had been any considerable force in
Sherman's front, or on his flanks.
As it was, nothing opposed his march to the sea, and he had simply to pass through the gate-ways which the stupidity of the
Davis-Hood campaign had left open.
It is amusing to the student of history to have such a plain march entitled a grand exploit, when it was only a question of so many miles motion a day.
Sherman knew very well that there was nothing to oppose him; he knew that the
Confederacy had been compelled to throw all its fighting power on its frontiers, for
Grant had told him “it was but an egg-shell;” he knew that the conscription had exhausted the interiour; he knew that the country he would traverse was peopled with non-combatants, women, and children; he knew that this country abounded with supplies, which the difficulties of transportation had withheld from
Richmond.
He simply proposed to take plain advantage of these circumstances, and march to the sea-board.
There was no genius in this; no daring; it was merely looking the situation in the face.
It is said that had
Sherman failed he would have been put down as one of the greatest charlatans of the age. But there was no chance of failure when there was nothing to dispute the march.
If, indeed, he had attempted the movement with a Confederate army in his front or on his flank, it is highly probable that the adventure would have taken rank with his movement in 1862 on
Vicksburg, the greatest
fiasco of the war, and his experiment with “the strategic triangle” in 1863, a piece of charlatanism and of dis. ordered execution that should have decided his reputation.
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It had been the original design of the enemy to hold
Atlanta, and by getting through to the west, with a garrison left on the southern railroads leading east and west through
Georgia, to effectually sever the east from the west.
In other words it was proposed in the great campaign of 1864 to repeat the experiment of bisection of the
Confederacy, first accomplished when the enemy gained possession of the
Mississippi River.
It was calculated of course to fight from
Atlanta to the sea, and that the second stroke of bisection would be accomplished by cutting through a hostile array.
In originating with
Hood the movement north of
Atlanta,
President Davis simply saved the enemy all the trouble he had contemplated, cleared the way of opposition and opened a plain and unencumbered way to his original design, with an invitation to execute it without fear and at leisure.
We must leave here the story of
Sherman's march to follow the erratic campaign of
Hood.
When the latter was ready to leave
Florence,
Sherman was far on his way on his march towards
Savannah; and the country beheld with amazement the singular spectacle of two antagonistic armies, both at once acting on the offensive, day after day marching away from each other, and moving diametrically apart.
To appreciate what insanity must have inspired such a campaign on the
Confederate side, we may remark the utter want of compensation in the two movements.
Even throwing out of consideration the great fact that
Hood's movement to the north uncovered
Georgia and left her undefended to the sea, while itself encountered a second army of the enemy, yet even if
Hood was successful, an invasion of Northern territory would be no possible equivalent for that of the
South, where the ravage and loss of material resources might be vital; and even in the least circumstance, the season of the year, the
Confederate troops, badly clothed and shod, were put at the disadvantage of marching northward, while the enemy sought the genial clime of a Southern latitude.
On the 20th November,
Gen. Hood commenced to move his army from
Northern Alabama to
Tennessee.
He pushed forward as if to cut off
Schofield's retreat from
Pulaski; this Federal commander having taken position there, with the greater part of two army corps, and an aggregation of fort-garrisons from the surrounding country, while
Thomas remained at
Nashville.
Schofield fearing that his position was about to be flanked, abandoned
Pulaski, and attempted by a forced march to reach
Columbia.
The want of a good map of the country, and the deep mud through which the army marched, prevented
Hood overtaking the enemy before lie reached
Columbia; but on the evening of the 27th of November the
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Confederate army was placed in position in front of his works at that place.
During the night, however, the enemy evacuated the town, taking position on the opposite side of the river, about a mile and a half from the town, which was considered quite strong in front.
Late in the evening of the 28th November,
Gen. Forrest, with most of his command, crossed
Duck River, a few miles above
Columbia, and
Hood followed early on the morning of the 20th, with
Stewart's and
Cheatham's corps, and
Johnson's division of
Lee's corps, leaving the other divisions of
Lee's corps in the enemy's front at
Columbia.
The troops moved in light marching order, the object being to turn the enemy's flank by marching rapidly on roads parallel to the
Columbia and Franklin pike, at or near
Spring Hill, and to cut off that portion of the enemy at or near
Columbia.
The enemy, discovering the intentions of the
Confederates, began to retreat on the pike towards
Spring Hill.
About 4 r. M.,
Hood's infantry forces,
Cheatham in the advance, commenced to come in contact with the enemy, about two miles from
Spring Hill, through which place the
Columbia and Franklin pike runs.
The enemy was at this time moving rapidly along the pike, with some of his troops on the flank of his column to protect it.
Cheatham was ordered to attack the enemy at once, vigorously, and get possession of this pike.
He made only a feeble and partial attack, failing to reach the point indicated.
The great object of
Gen. Hood was to possess himself of the road to
Franklin, and thus cut off the enemy's retreat.
Though owing to delays the signal opportunity to do this had passed at daylight, there was yet a chance of dealing the enemy a heavy blow.
Stewart's corps and
Johnson's division were arriving upon the field to support the attack.
Stewart was ordered to move his corps beyond
Cheatham's, and place it across the road beyond
Spring Hill.
He did not succeed in getting the position he desired, owing to some misunderstanding of orders, and, night falling, he went into bivouac.
About midnight, ascertaining that the enemy was moving in great confusion-artillery wagons and troops intermixed-
Gen. Hood sent instructions to
Cheatham to advance a heavy line of skirmishers against him, and still further impede and confuse his march.
This was not accomplished.
The enemy continued to move along the road in hurry and confusion, within hearing, nearly all the night.
Thus was lost a great opportunity of striking the enemy, and his line of retreat secured in the face of the
Confederates without a battle.
Much of the disaster that was now to ensue in his campaign
Gen. Hood attributed to the fact that “some of his
Generals had failed him at
Spring Hill.”
There was nothing left now but to pursue the enemy.
At daylight
Hood's army followed as fast as possible towards
Franklin,
Stewart in the advance,
Cheatham following, and
Lee with the trains, moving from
Columbia on the same road.
The Confederates pursued the
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enemy rapidly, and compelled him to burn a number of his wagons.
He made a feint as if to give battle on the hills about four miles south of
Franklin, but as soon as
Hood's forces began to deploy for the attack, and to flank him on his left, he retired slowly to
Franklin.
Gen. Hood had learned from despatches captured at
Spring Hill, from
Thomas to
Schofield, that the latter was instructed to hold that place till the position at
Franklin could be made secure, indicating the intention of
Thomas to hold
Franklin and his strong works at Murfreesboroa.
Thus
Hood knew that it was all-important to attack
Schofield before he could make himself strong, and that if he should escape at
Franklin, he would gain his works about
Nashville.
The nature of the position was such as to render it inexpedient to attempt any further flank movement, and he therefore determined to attack the enemy in front, and without delay.
Battle of Franklin.
On the 30th November
Stewart's corps was placed in position on the right,
Cheatham's on the left, and the cavalry on either flank, the main body on the right under
Forrest.
Johnson's division of
Lee's corps also became engaged on the left during the action.
The line advanced at 4 P. M., with orders to drive the enemy, at the point of the bayonet, into or across the
Big Harpeth River, while
Gen. Forrest, if successful, was to cross the river and attack and destroy his trains and broken columns.
The troops moved forward most gallantly to the attack.
They carried the enemy's line of hastily-constructed works handsomely.
They then advanced against his interiour line, and succeeded in carrying it also, in some places.
Here the engagement was of the fiercest possible character.
The Confederates came on with a desperation and disregard of death, such as had been shown on few battle-fields of the war. A Northern writer says: “More heroic valour was never exhibited by any troops than was shown here by the rebels.”
The devoted troops were mowed down by grape and canister.
Many of them were killed entirely inside of the works.
The brave men captured were taken inside the enemy's works on the edge of the town.
The struggle lasted till near midnight, when the enemy abandoned his works and crossed the river, leaving his dead and wounded.
It is remarkable that in this hard-fought battle the
Confederates used no artillery whatever;
Gen. Hood's explanation being that he was restrained from using that terrible arm “on account of the women and children remaining in the town.”
Victory had been purchased at the price of a terrible slaughter.
Hood's total loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners was 4,500.
Among the killed was
Maj.-Gen. P. R. Cleburne,
Brig.-Gens. John Adams,
Strahl and
Granbury; while
Maj.-Gen. Brown,
Brig.-
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Gens. Carter,
Manigault,
Quarles,
Cockrell, and
Scott were wounded, and
Brig.-Gen. Gordon captured.
Battle of Nashville.
The next morning
Gen. Hood advanced upon
Nashville, where
Schofield had retreated, and where
Thomas lay with his main force.
He laid siege to the town on the 2d December, closely investing it for a fortnight.
The opinion long prevailed in the
Confederacy that in this pause and the operations of siege,
Hood made the cardinal mistake of his campaign; and that if he had taken another course, and struck boldly across the
Cumberland, and settled himself in the enemy's communications, he would have forced
Thomas to evacuate
Nashville, and fall back towards
Kentucky.
This was the great fear of
Gen. Grant.
That high Federal officer, in his report of the operations of 1864, has written: “Before the
battle of Nashville I grew very impatient over, as it appeared to me, the unnecessary delay.
This impatience was increased upon learning that the enemy had sent a force of cavalry across the
Cumberland into
Kentucky.
I feared
Hood would cross his whole army and give us great trouble here.
After urging upon
Gen. Thomas the necessity of immediately assuming the offensive, I started west to superintend matters there in person.
Reaching
Washington city, I received
Gen. Thomas's despatch announcing his attack upon the enemy, and the result as far as the battle had progressed.
I was delighted.
All fears and apprehensions were dispelled.”
On the night of the 14th December,
Thomas decided upon a plan of battle, which was to make a feint on
Hood's right flank, while he massed his main force to crush in
Hood's left, which rested on the
Cumberland, and where the cover of the
Federal gunboats might be made available.
The k runt of the action did not fall until evening, when the enemy drove in the Confederate infantry outposts on the left flank.
Hood, however, quickly ordered up troops from his right to stay the reversed tide of battle; and the remainder of the day was occupied by the enemy in sweeping the
Confederate entrenchments with artillery fire, while here and there his infantry attempted, in vain, to find a weak spot in their lines.
Under cover of the night
Hood re-formed his line, and in the morning was found in position along the
Overton Hills, some two miles or so to tile rear of his original line.
The new position was a strong one, running along the wooded crests of closely-connecting hills; while the two keys to it were the
Granny White and Franklin pikes, leading to
Franklin,
Columbia,
Pulaski, and so down the country to the
Tennessee River.
Thomas' overwhelming numbers enabled him to throw heavy columns against
Hood's left and centre.
But every attack of the enemy was repulsed.
It was
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four o'clock in the evening, and the day was thought to be decided for the
Confederates, when there occurred one of the most extraordinary incidents of the war. It is said that
Gen. Hood was about to publish a victory along his line, when
Finney's Florida brigade in
Bates' division, which was to the left of the
Confederate centre, gave way before the
skirmish line of the enemy!
Instantly
Bates' whole division took the panic, and broke in disorder.
The moment a small breach was thus made in the
Confederate lines, the whole of two corps unaccountably and instantly fled from their ditches, almost without firing a gun. It was a disgraceful panic; muskets were abandoned where they rested between the logs of the breastworks; and everything that could impede flight was thrown away as the fugitives passed down the
Granny White and Franklin pikes, or fled wildly from the battle-field.
Such an instance of sudden, unlooked-for, wild retreat, the abandonment of a victory almost won, could only have happened in an army where thorough demoralization, the consequence of long, heavy, weary work, and of tremendous efforts without result-in short, the reaction of great endeavours where success is not decided, already lurked in the minds of troops, and was likely to be developed at any time by the slightest and most unimportant circumstance.
Fifty pieces of artillery and nearly all of
Hood's ordnance wagons were left to the enemy.
His loss in killed and wounded was disgracefully small; and it was only through want of vigour in
Thomas' pursuit that
Hood's shattered and demoralized army effected its retreat.
Forrest's command, and
Walthal, with seven picked brigades, covered the retreat.
The situation on the
Tennessee River was desperate;
Hood had no pontoon train, and if he had been pressed, would have been compelled to surrender; but as it was,
Thomas' great error in resting upon his victory at
Nashville enabled a defeated Confederate army to construct bridges of timber over the
Tennessee River, while the
Federal gunboats in the stream were actually kept at bay by batteries of 32-pounders.
Hood succeeded in escaping across the
Tennessee, but only with a remnant of the brilliant force he had conducted across the river a few weeks before, having lost from various causes more than ten thousand men, half of his
Generals, and nearly all of his artillery.
Such was the disastrous issue of the
Tennessee campaign, which put out of existence, as it were, the splendid army that
Johnston had given up at
Atlanta, and terminated forever the whole scheme of Confederate defence west of
the Alleghanies.