Col. John C. Moore, Confederate Military History, a library of Confederate States Military History: Volume 9.2, Missouri
Clement Anselm Evans, Ed.

‘ [92] have never witnessed such a picture of mute despair and grief as his countenance wore when he looked upon the defeat of those magnificent troops. He had never before known them to fail, and they had never failed, to carry the lines of any enemy in their front; nor did they ever to the close of their noble career at Blakely on the 9th of April, 1865, fail to defeat the troops before them. I mean no disparagement to any troops of the Southern Confederacy when I say the Missouri troops of the army of the West were not surpassed by any troops in the world.’ Gen. Martin Green commanded the Missouri division, and Colonel Gates one brigade and Colonel Cockrell the other.

Late in the evening the army bivouacked at Chewalla, but the best and bravest of its officers and men lay dead within the lines of the enemy. Every effort was made to bring some sort of order out of the chaos. Price had lost half his force. The other half were sullen and savage. They slept on their arms, and all through the night could hear the whistle of locomotives, indicating the arrival of reinforcements for the enemy. The loss on both sides was heavy. The Confederates fought in the open and their loss was consequently the heaviest. Their loss was 4,858 killed, wounded and captured. Of these 2,000 were prisoners. The Federals lost in killed and wounded 2,100 and in prisoners 300.

The enemy pressed the retreating army vigorously. Rosecrans' victorious forces were behind it, and three divisions of infantry and several thousand cavalry had been sent by forced marches from Jackson, Tennessee, to get in its front. It was necessary for it to cross the Tombigbee river and then the Hatchie. The first was crossed without opposition, but when the second was reached it was found to be held by the enemy. Thus the army was hemmed in between two rivers and two armies—a river and an army before, and a river and an army behind it—and there was no other known avenue of escape. When