Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 12.
Reverend J. William Jones, Ed.

In full reliance upon the information furnished from army headquarters, and by the cavalry that had been operating against Crittenden during the day, General Polk, at 8 P. M., wrote General Bragg of his disposition, and suggested, in order to make the expected attack overwhelming, that Buckner's corps be moved in supporting distance, the dispatch ending thus:

‘The enemy is moving with steady step upon my position, it is a strong one, and will no doubt attack early in the morning. My troops I cannot get into position in time to attack myself at so early as day-dawn. If I find he is not going to attacke, will attack him without delay.’

At day-dawn the Confederate cavalry were pushed out to develop the enemy, but none could be found. At 8:30 A. M., a brigade from each division was moved forward on each of the three roads, and still none could be found.

Then came the following dispatch from General Pegram:

To General Cheatham and General Armstrong.

Continued search served only to confirm General Pegram's opinion. Excepting the outposts in front of Lee and Gordon's Mills, there was no enemy east of the Chickamauga. Crittenden had crossed the river the day before, and was at Lee and Gordon's Mills. While this search for the enemy was going on, General Bragg arrived on the ground. General Polk explained the situation to him, and expressed the belief that from the Commanding General down all had been deceived. There had been no enemy to the front of Rock Spring since dark, the day before (the 12th). The reports of the immediate and threatening presence of the enemy delivered to General Polk on his arrival at Rock Spring the evening before had been founded upon Wilder's fierce and persistent assault on Pegram at Leet's tan-yard that afternoon, and upon a forced reconnoissance