Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 18.
Reverend J. William Jones, Ed.

He immediately pointed out to the Confederate War Department that it was totally impracticable to attempt to hold Harper's Ferry, and that it was necessary to withdraw that portion of the army to a point near Winchester, Va., in order that it might support, and be supported by the forces under General Beauregard at Manassas. These views were at first rejected, but their adoption became a military necessity shortly afterwards, when his suggestions were adopted at a considerable loss in military stores and supplies.

That great and humilitating defeat of the Union army at Manassas was the result of his strategy and bravery. He moved his army from the vicinity of Winchester with such secrecy and celerity and formed a junction with General Beauregard at Manasses that General McDowell was not aware of the move when the action begun. Johnston commanded. He ranked Beauregard. The Union army made a terrific assault on the Confederate's left and drove it back and would have gained the victory, but for the fact that Johnston rallied his forces with marvellous speed and coolness, encouraged his men by his presence and example, and strengthened the position with reinforcements. He was in the thickest of the fight, and sometimes leading regiments to the charge whose officers had fallen. In this battle he displayed all the dash and genius of Napoleon at Austerlitz. He viewed the theatre of war as a skilful player would a game of chess. When the several parts or pieces were not properly supported, he considered that the game of war was badly played. Johnston's faculty for military combinations on a large scale, in which the several parts will support each other in any emergency, was one of his most prominent characteristics. Long before the battle of Seven Pines, where he was wounded and disabled, he demonstrated to the Confederate War Department the military necessity of withdrawing the Confederate forces south of the Rappahannock, and of making Richmond the seat of defensive operations. His views were at first strenously opposed, but their adoption soon became imperative, and the war in Virginia was afterwards conducted, to its close, on the general plan that he had suggested. Upon his recovery from his wounds he was sent to take command of the Armies of Tennessee and Mississippi. Both these armies were closely pressed by the Federal forces in the vicinity of Vicksburg and Chattanooga at points that were not in supporting distance of each other. His