bear, not upon individual citizens, but upon cities of States of such.
The basic principle upon which all such fabrics rested was the requisition system, under which the Federal head was simply endowed with the power to make requisitions for men and money upon the States or cities composing the league for Federal purposes; while the States alone, in their corporate capacity, possessed the power to execute and enforce them.
The first advance made by the English colonies in America in the path of Federal union ended with the making of our first Federal Constitution embodied in what is known as the Articles of Confederation.
Up to that point nothing new had been achieved; the fruit of the first effort was simply a confederation on the old plan, with the Federal power vested in a single assembly that could deal only through the requisition system with the States as States.
The same author last quoted then clearly shows that the idea, first conceived by Pelatiah Webster
, that a supreme Federal Government might be formed ‘acting directly upon the subject or citizen, and not upon the cities of States composing the league,’ was an original contribution by our Federal Constitution.
He says (Idem p. 822):
When the final analysis is made, it appears that our career as a nation has so far given birth to only three basic political ideas, which may be considered as original contributions to the science of politics :
（1) Constitutional limitations on legislative power, a State creation, from which resulted the power of courts to declare legislative acts null and void . . .
（2) Interstate citizenship, . . . which originated in the Articles of Confederation .
（3) The idea of supreme Federal Government strictly organized and operating directly on the citizen, and not on the States composing the federation . . .
The idea of a supreme Federal Government, such as that formed by our Federal Constitution, being, therefore, an absolutely new contribution by it to the science of politics, without any precedent in history, and the basic principle upon which it rests being that of the possibility of a divided sovereignty—a