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as possible, to acquaint the Commanding General with the nature of the enemy's movements, as well as to place with his column my cavalry force,’ p. 695.
Colonel Mosby tells us of Stuart's energetic action in Hooker's rear between the 27th of June and the 1st of July; but General Lee did not instruct him to destroy Hooker's trains, or to damage the canal, or to break Hooker's communication with Washington, or to burn the railroad bridge at Skyesville, but ‘after crossing the river (at Shepherdstown, or Seneca), you must move on and feel the right of Ewell's troops, collecting information, provisions, etc.’
It was a brilliant raid, executed with great skill and with marvellous endurance and intrepidity—but it was not ordered by General Lee, and the results were very unsatisfactory.
Does it not appear reasonable that General Stuart, having been, even if without fault of his own, delayed two days in crossing the Potomac, would then have felt, if he was to perform the service entrusted to him by General Lee on the 23rd of June, he must march with all possible haste, by the shortest practicable route, to place himself in touch with General Ewell?
Did he do this?
Or, did not his eager and aggressive nature lead him to undertake enterprises which greatly delayed his march?
The infantry of the Fifth Corps of the Federal army was only one day behind Stuart's column at Westminster, though when he began his movement that corps was in Virginia.
But there is a previous question.
When Longstreet and Hill had crossed the Potomac, and Hooker, learning the fact, had followed, the plans of the Confederate Commander, were, as I have stated, revealed to General Hooker, and the reason given for Stuart's march being made in rear of Federal army, no longer existed.
Should not that officer then have reverted to the other route and crossed at Shepherdstown so as to be able to carry out his instructions as promptly as possible?
Was not this course also the more important when he found that he could not cross the Potomac on the 25th, because the Federal columns were moving north?
His cavalry had been assigned a definite part in the campaign then opened — that is, to guard Ewell's flank, keep him informed of the enemy's movements, and
Richmond, VA. 1909.
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