Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 3

‘ [215] and cavalry, I determined to retire to the fortifications around Nashville, until General Wilson can get his cavalry equipped; he has now but about one-fourth the number of the enemy, and consequently is no match for him. I have two ironclads here with several gunboats, and Commander Fitch assures me Hood can neither cross Cumberland river, nor blockade it. I therefore think it best to wait here until Wilson equips all his cavalry. If Hood attacks me here, he will be more seriously damaged than yesterday. If he remains until Wilson gets equipments, I can whip him, and will move against him at once. I have Murfreesboroa strongly held, and therefore feel easy in regard to its safety. Chattanooga, Bridgeport, Stevenson, and Elk river bridge have also been strongly garrisoned.’

This determination of Thomas to remain on the defensive, after a victory, was in direct opposition to both the judgment and instincts of Grant. He preferred to take advantage of Schofield's success, and to press the enemy at once with the reinforced army, before the influence of defeat was gone. At eleven A. M. on the morning of the 2nd, he telegraphed: ‘If Hood is permitted to remain quietly about Nashville, you will lose all the road back to Chattanooga, and possibly have to abandon the line of the Tennessee. Should he attack you, it is all well; but if he does not, you should attack him before he fortifies. Arm, and put in the trenches, your quartermaster's employes, citizens, etc.’

The government shared very fully this anxiety of the general-in-chief, and an hour after sending his own despatch to Thomas, Grant received one from the Secretary of War: ‘The President feels solicitous ’