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North can bring into the field, of the native race, are the hardy and adventurous men of the Northwestern States. It is only the soldiers drawn from this quarter, and those recruited from the foreign races, that have done any good fighting on their side in this war, or that give any promise of persisting in the fight. The best regiments under the command of McClellan on the Potomac are those which he drew from the Northwest. But the Northwestern people are infinitely more solicitous for the opening of the Mississippi to free navigation and for subduing the States lying towards its mouth under the same political jurisdiction with themselves, than they are to secure the valueless city of Washington, or the inconsiderable State of Maryland to the Union. Already have the notes of complaint been sounded in the Northwest against the withdrawal of their regiments into the unprofitable field of action on the Potomac, to the neglect of the vital interests of the Northwest which concentrate upon the Mississippi river. This proposition may be assumed as true for the rest of the struggle; that the Northwest are hereafter to provide the great body of troops for the Northern armies, and that the Middle and Eastern States will be expected to contribute, as their quota of aid, the arms, munitions, clothing, and supplies of all kinds required for the war. As a general rule, good artisans are great cowards, as the regiments of New England and New York have abundantly demonstrated in the field. It is the rural districts only that furnish brave volunteers; and it is only in the granary of the great West that the North can recruit any troops worth bringing into the field. It is a mistake to suppose that the Northwest are disaffected to this Lincoln war. They are even more fierce and determined than the Yankees of the East, whose zeal in every. thing is measured by the rule, what does it pay? Lincoln himself is a true index of Northwestern feeling in this regard, and certainly have the people of the Northwest more to lose by the destruction of the Union than any other portion of the Northern population If they are cut off from the navigation of the Mississippi, they are in a manner cut off from the world and hemmed in on every side. They have Great Britain on the North; the Yankees on the East, who prey upon their industry; and the hostile South below them. They have no access to market except over foreign territory, or over railroads owned by corporations that have no souls, composed of Yankees who have no honesty or conscience. The Northwest are in a predicament that compels them to fight; and it would be the most imbecile folly and blindness for the South to expect anything else but a formidable struggle with that young and giant community. In this point of view the condition of Kentucky and Missouri presents a topic of absorbing and vital interest to the Southern Confederacy. The South can never consent that any portion of territory lying South of the Ohio or Missouri rivers shall belong to an enemy.--If possible, the question of boundary rises superior to a question of State Sovereignty; inasmuch as the self-preservation of eleven sovereign States is of superior importance to the mere political integrity of two divided and distracted communities. The time has undoubtedly arrived when the South must assume the power to treat Kentucky and Southern Missouri as a part of her own territory. It had been better, and more consistent with the law-abiding spirit and policy of the South, to await the formal secession of those States, and their formal accession to the Southern Confederacy; but their revolutionary condition now precludes these legal measures. The voice of the people has no organ of expression; and, even if it had, the exigencies of the times would not permit the slow and formal processes usual to legal procedure. Kentucky and Missouri can no longer be respected as forbidden ground to the South. They are both essential parts of the South. They must be ours, or we must in future continually consent to the presence of an enemy in the heart of our territory. To wait now for the formal secession of those States from the North, is to wait for an impossible event. It may, perchance, be true that a majority of voters in Kentucky are for Union as against secession; even that case does not change the necessity which would impel the South to seize the State and fix her boundary upon the Ohio. But a large majority, both of Southern Missourian and of Kentuckian are with the South. The distractions of the times prevent the formal demonstration of this fact; and the South is bound to assume it. To wait for formal political action in revolutionary times, is to lose the kernel by sticking in the bark. Kentucky can only secede by revolutionary act; and the South may save the necessity of that by action of her own in strict conformity with her belligerent rights. The North are not stopping to enquire of the constitutionality of this or that of their measures. Their whole conduct and policy is usurpation; and it follows that many of their measures can only be met and counteracted by retaliation. The South have acted upon retaliatory principles repeatedly in the progress of this controversy. Her march into the territory of Kentucky was justified upon these principles. And where can a case be found more urgent for continuing this policy than in Kentucky and Missouri, where the enemy are preparing the most formidable of all their measures against us.? We sincerely trust that the Confederate Government will dismiss all qualms and scruples about the legality of inaugurating a vigorous and decided policy in the quarter in which the North is concentrating forces so great and preparing operations against us so formidable. A foolish qualm and hesitation may in three weeks turn over three-fourths of the Kentucky fighting men into the regiments of the enemy, who might otherwise be enlisted under the flag of the Confederacy.
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