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Late and Direct from Europe.
commercial views of the American war.

We publish below a late and very interesting article from Gore's Liverpool Commercial Advertiser, dated October 10, on the state of trade in Liverpool, and more especially in reference to the American war. As indicative of the effect that the fall of Port Royal will be likely to have upon the public mind in England, the Charleston Mercury, (which first published the article in this country,) says it will be found especially important.--The Mercury obtains its advices direct from Europe, and not through the medium of Yankee ports:

The most important item of American news which has been received since this day seen night is the capture by the Confederate troops, under Gen. Price, of the stronghold of Lexington. This is a valuable acquisition to the South, and its loss will be severely felt by the North.

The commercial intelligence is of a gloomy cast, as the belief was very general that the Banks would, after awhile, be obliged to suspend specie payments. Amongst the failures of the week was that of Messrs. C. W. and J. T. Moore, of New York--one of the oldest and most respectable firms in the dry goods trade. The total subscriptions to the Federal loan of £10,000,000, amounted only to 3,600,000; but the New York journals confidently assert that the Banks would take the fresh $10,000,000 required by the Government.--Some of the mills in the East, which had been either stopped or running short time, were again fully, and it is said, profitably employed, goods having advanced considerably, and being much wanted.

With whom is the balance of success?

Whether to superior generalship, or discipline, or pluck, or to greater patriotism or enthusiasm, or to whatever else it may be attributed, there can be no doubt of the fact that hitherto the balance of success has been with the South. This is not the place to discuss the why or the wherefore. Viewing the war and its consequences from a commercial point of sight, the fact alone attracts our attention; and we cannot but regard it as one of immense importance, removing, as we think it does, the prospect of peace from the proximate to the distant future. Were it otherwise, were the balance of success ever so little in favor of the North, we might, perhaps, have hoped that the Federal Government, conscious of its strength to crush the South, but at the same time admonished of its inability to retain military possession of it for any lengthened period, would have proposed an armistice for the purpose of negotiating a treaty of peace with the Confederate Generals.

As to the capture of Fort Hatteras, that is an insignificant item against all the reverses of the North. The disgrace of the battle of Bull Run would not be expunged by the success of a score of naval expeditions undertaken against a power without any navy whatever. The success of every expedition of this kind may be predicated with certainty. But what of that? What if Mobile, and New Orleans, and Galveston were in possession of the North, how would such an occupation influence the fortunes of the war?--Every way, say some wiseacres; these ports would then be open to the commerce of the world, and the cotton crop would be shipped to Europe. Ay, indeed! We in our simplicity supposed that it was the North who had blockaded these ports, to prevent the shipment of the cotton, which would have supplied to the South the sinews of war. Oh but the object is to take the cotton by force, and apply the proceeds of its sale to the conquest of its owners. What an ingenious device! If it were only practicable, it would, no doubt, be a master stroke of policy. But the cotton is not at the ports, nor will it be while the war lasts.

Long before the maturity of any portion of the crop, it was resolved that it should be kept at the plantations. There it is being put into sheds, without being baled or even ginned — stowed away in seed, so that, at the approach of an invading foe, a match might be promptly and efficaciously applied, to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy. The expeditions against the cotton ports, whether successful or not, are not, therefore, likely to materially benefit the North and cannot restore to it the balance of military success, which, up to the last advices from New York, was unquestionably with the South. If the Federal Government be desirous of liberating the new cotton crop for the benefit of the world, all they have to do is to raise the blockade, and thenceforth our supply of cotton will only be limited by the extend of the crop. We are really ashamed to be compelled to treat seriously such absurd speculations.

What are the prospects of peace?

What then are the prospects of peace while the balance of success is so decidedly in favor of the South? It must be confessed that they are both dim and distant. We see from the fact that the planters are stowing away their crops in the seed on their plantations, that the South is fully prepared for the occupation of its ports by the Federalists, and that the expectation is general in the Cotton States that the war will be a long one. The Times says: ‘ "From the stray facts which reach us from the South, it would appear that there is no intention of yielding, and that compromise with the North, even on the most favorable terms for slavery, would be rejected by the obstinate race which obeys Jefferson Davis." ’ We came to this conclusion long ago, and we are still of opinion, for the reasons which we have so often stated, that the South will resist to the death, that it will not voluntarily re-enter the Union, and that even in the improbable contingency of its being subdued after a long and sanguinary war, the North could never hold it as a conquered nation. We do not believe, either, that it can be subdued by force of arms, or that it will die of atrophy. Its internal resources are, within our knowledge, capable of enabling its population to carry on the war, however long it lasts, until they have completely conquered their independence. It is, therefore, sheer nonsense to talk of the ‘"approaching collapse of the Southern rebellion,"’ as some of our contemporaries do, who never could be persuaded that there was any vitality in the South, or that its ten millions of inhabitants could hold their own against the determined will of the twenty millions of the North. They will do so, nevertheless. The South is stronger in its right than the North in its might, and hence it is, that so far in the progress of the war, the balance of success remains with the former.

Is the Union worth fighting for?

To the North most assuredly it is. The material prosperity of the Northern States is bound up with the maintenance of the Union. With its final dissolution their glory departs. Without the Union, their prohibitory tariff will be the instrument of their speedy annihilation as a commercial nation. They have more, far more to lose, than the Southern States have to gain by the dissolution of the Union. The interests involved in its preservation are so vast that the Secretary of State of the Federal Government speaks of it, in an official document issued so recently as the 21st ult., from the Department of State at Washington, as ‘"the chief hope of humanity in all countries and for all ages."’ Exaggerated as this sentiment is, the source from which it emanates gives it sigificance. It proves that the Government of President Lincoln feel and know that the preservation of the Union is a question of overwhelming importance to the Northern States--that it is worth fighting for — worth maintaining, or trying to maintain, at almost any sacrifice of blood and treasure, even with the knowledge that every sacrifice will be futile, and that the chasm which now separates the Northern from the Southern States has grown so deep and wide that it will never more be spanned by the magnificent bridge of the old Federal Union.

The North must now learn the art of war; must create an army and navy, such as it never possessed since the time of Washington; and, if it fight for nothing else, it must henceforth fight for its national existence — for were it to yield ingloriously now, and acknowledge the Confederate States without proving that Secession cannot be attempted with impunity, and that all its strength would be put forth to crush it there would be no end of Secession movements, until several independent nations, with interests hostile to each other, had grown out of the once great United States.

Yes, the Union is worth fighting for, though we are thoroughly satisfied that it cannot be restored. The magnitude of the loss which the North will sustain by its dissolution surpasses that of the gain which secession will bring to the South. But both are great, and their vastness forbids us to hope for an early cessation of hostilities. It is too probable that the war will be continued, we will not say for years, but for many months to come, whatever great battles may be lost and won in the interval by either side. In the end, however, the balance of military success may be with the North, though it fail to reconstruct the broken bridge the reconstruction of which was the object of the war.

Cotton supply.

Before these remarks meet the public eye, the stock of American cotton here will be reduced to about 380,000 bales. This would be of comparatively little consequence, if we know that a large crop had been grown in America, and that the greater portion of it would find its way here as in former years.-- But it is of startling importance, when, as we are credibly informed, the present crop of America is likely to be a very short one, and in the face of the fact that not a single bale of it has yet reached any of the cotton ports, nor will do so during the continuance of the present war, whose termination cannot be foreseen by the most far-sighted politician.

As the year rolls on, this cotton supply question forces itself more and more upon our attention, and though for many months past we saw the approaching evil, while many of our contemporaries ridiculed our fears, we really stand aghast at the terrible reality of a dearth of cotton which is now confronting us. When the stock of American is brought down to 200,000 bales, as we fear it will be in less than six weeks, then prices of that description of cotton will be forced to a point which will compel spinners either to enormously curtail their consumption or to use East Indian cotton, against which they entertain so strong a prejudice. We are convinced that, even at this moment, few realize the extent of distress which a dearth of cotton must bring on this country especially.

The substitution, without further delay, of East India for American cotton, and an immediate general resort to short time, can alone enable us to tide over the coming winter with comparative safety. Strange that those most deeply interested are so blind to their own interests as to persevere in using American cotton almost exclusively, and in working their mills full time, while it is impossible to forecast the duration of the cotton famine.

The American crop is stowed away by the planters in the seed, to facilitate its destruction by fire if the Northern troops should penetrates to the plantations. This is by no means an impossible, or even a very improbable contingency. Naval expeditions against the South may bring it all to pass sooner than any of us imagine. And if such expeditions should effect a landing and penetrates inland, the only allies they would meet would be the negro population of the Confederate States. Terrible allies those. Such expeditions, if successful, might result not merely in the destruction of the present crop, but might prevent the planting of another, and so deprive us for years to come of our American supply of cotton, a calamity which can only be estimated by calling to mind the fact, that in 1860 we drew 85 per cent. of our total supply of cotton from America alone.

We are no alarmists; all we have hitherto foreshadowed has too surely come to pass — But we sincerely hope that the Federal Government will pause in their mad career before they inflict such a terrible calamity on the industrial population of the world. In view of such appalling danger we care not to have recourse to the figures of the cotton tables to show how rapidly our stock of the raw material is being used up by our manufacturers with a reckless prodigality.

Even the advancing prices of goods and yarns in Manchester serves for the time to increase our danger, because it causes many of the mills to continue working full time.

General trade.

The trade of the country has undergone no very material change since our last report.--Dullness is still prevalent, and while it is evident that the trade generally is not worse, it is difficult to say that it has improved.

At Bradford there has been a moderate demand for home requirements, but as regards the continental trade, the result of Leipsic Fair is writed for before it is considered prudent to enter upon large transactions.

The iron trade of Wolverhampton is but partially supported, although the probability of an early demand from North America is generally indulged in.

The Nottingham market for goods and yarns has advanced considerably, and the demand for hosiery has been very brisk.

A very active demand in the Leeds woolen cloth market is noticeable. It is said that London houses received large orders from country tailors and drapers.

The French treaty has had the effect of giving rise to considerable shipments of Manchester goods on French account.

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