The Mobile
Advertiser, of May 28th, (the very day on which
Halleck reports
Corinth as evacuated,) has the following.
‘
The state of susper s and deep anxiety of the public mind at the present moment, to learn the condition of affairs at
Corinth, leads us to give our speculations as to what will probably be the result of the course and policy of our
Generals in command.
From our knowledge of affairs at that point, we are led to believe that it was the policy of our
Generals to have brought on a decisive battle with the enemy before he could have fort fled his positions and entrenched himself so as to cover a disastrous defeat.
We know that he has been working with the pick and spade night and day for weeks, and it may be that the opportunity so eagerly sought for of making a successful attack upon him has passed.
If this be so, to risk a battle under these circumstances would be productive of no final results, and only be attended with great slaughter of human life.
With this view, as we gaze on the great chess board of the present contest, it strikes us that it would be the policy of our
Generals to fall back from
Corinth by retrograde movement, force his enemy to leave his works, and advance to the plains beyond the woods and hills of
Corinth, where he could no longer receive their protection and the advantage of his fortifications.
The Federals have over and over again expressed their fears that we might fall back from
Corinth, and their great dread of being forced to follow us further South, which they say they have a greater horror of than a battle.
’
There are other considerations well known to many of our readers, and not necessary to particularize, which render our longer occupation of
Corinth a matter of at least doubtful expediency.
But of this our
Generals are the best judges, and we have confidence that they will decide wisely.
Under these circumstances, and from our knowledge of the fact that our army is prepared to make either a forward or retrograde movement, we shall not no surprised to heat at any moment either of a battle being fought, or of
Corinth being evacuated.
As for the defences of
Corinth, we know they are very strong, and that
Halleck with his host could never gain the rear of our battlements.
But this is not the question.
We are not calculating the chances of our defeat, but those of a decisive, telling victory over the enemy, which shall secure to us not only a masterly triumph, but all the points and advantages of capture and conquest.
Let the public mind, then, be prepared for either event, and, come what may, let us only be the more firmly determined on our liberty and independence.
If the order should be "forward, " the public heart would leap with joy and hope, because they would feel that such a movement would not be made without a fair prospect of success.
So, on the other hand, the order to fall back from
Corinth should be received, if regretfully, at least with the confidence that the good of the cause demands it. Within a few days at farthest the anxiety on this subject will doubtless be relieved.
