Still Later from the North.
We have received through the courtesy of
Maj. Norris, of the Signal Corps, Northern papers of the 27th.
They contain very dull accounts of
Christmas.
In New York everything was quiet — in
Philadelphia the same case, and in
Washington it would have been so, too, but for a visit from ‘"
President"’
Lincoln to the wounded soldiers, who were much cheered thereby and the ‘"
President"’ much gratified.
Christmas day in New York was on livened by the funeral of several officers of the Irish Brigade, attended by
Brig. Gen. Meagher and others.
It was doubtless a cheering scene.
The correspondence from the army shows the army to be still (or a part of it,) at
Falmouth, the letter-writers declaring that
Burnside is a commander of ‘"dash,"’ but his ‘"dash"’ falled through an accident.
Mr. Upsher, of
Indians, it is said, It to be the successor of
Mr. Smith, as
Secretary of the Department of the Interior.
The New York
Herald is now very anxious to know the
results of the North Carolina expedition.
It don't think they will amount to much.
A row occurred between
Washington and New York on Wednesday night, by a negro demanding a sleeping both on a railroad car, and being
sustained by Vice President Hamlin in the demand.--The conductor, however, overruled the ‘"
Vice President,"’ and the negro was ejected.
The following items from the
Washington correspondence of the New York
Herald, dated the 25th inst., will be found interesting:
The President Exsected to Veto the bill Creating the New State of West Virginia.
There is reason to believe that the
President will return to Congress, with his objections, the bill for the erection of
West Virginia into a separate State.
Col. Forney and the weak Sacked Republicans.
Col. Forney's organ is busy whipping in weak backed Republicans, who are already croaking about the necessity of recognizing the Southern Confederacy.
In this list are found a number of Republican members of Congress, who openly express despair of the success of the
Federal Government under its present military administration, and declared that, under existing circumstances, no more troops can be raised, even by draft, in the States which they represent.
The negroes and the military service
The most intelligent and cunning contrabands here say that colored then will not enlist in the black regiments proposed to be raised, unless they can be absolutely assured of having political privileges equal with the whites at the end of the war.
The President's first of January Proclamation.
There is reason to believe that in the
President's 1st of January Proclamation, in reference to negro emancipation, he will except such States and parts of States as have furnished evidences of loyalty, but have been prevented by the presence of a hostile army from complying with the terms of his proclamation of the 22d of September A strong protest has been presented to him from
Tennessee, signed by
Gov. Johnson and a large number of the most noted loyal Tennessean, claiming to be exempt from the emancipation proclamation upon the ground that, if an opportunity were offered to the people of
Tennessee to express themselves, unmistakable evidences of the loyalty of a majority of them would be shown; but that the occupation of their soil by contending armies has prevented the holding of elections, as required in the preliminary proclamation, and precluded for the present any other representation of the loyalty of the people than can be furnished by the assurances of men of undoubted patriotism, who are familiar with the people of that State, Similar representations have been made on the part of the people of the 8th Congressional District of
Virginia, known as the
Harper's Ferry District, composed of the counties of
Hampshire, Page,
Warren,
Clarke,
Berkeley,
Jefferson,
Frederick,
Morgan, and
Loudoun.
Numerous letters have been received here by the
Marshal of the District of Columbia, a native of that section, and other prominent residents of
Washington, complaining bitterly of the failure of
Gov. Pierpoint to order an election.
There was a time when it might have been held with comparative safety, and the
Union sentiment of the district been freely represented.
The responsibility for the Fredericksburg disaster — report of the Congressional Committee on the War.
[From the N. Y. Herald, 26 h.]
The report of the Congressional Committee on the
War fixes the responsibility for the disaster at
Fredericksburg beyond the shadow of a doubt.
When
Gen. Burnsides white-watching letter to
Gen. Halleck was cagey published in anticipation of this report, the radical press raised a shout of exultation.
They cried, ‘"See here, the War Department,
Stanton, and
Halleck are as innocent as the child unborn.
Nobody is to blame but
Burnside himself; he admits it, and every other General ought to follow his noble example."’
Burnside little thought, when he gave this certificate of character, extorted from his generosity when he visited
Washington after the battle, that so base a use would be made of it by the radical journals, and we think it very unlikely that he or any other General will ever again write such a letter during the present war. It was a trap laid for
Burnside to trip him up and make him the scapegoat of the calamity.
It hears internal evidence that the points in it were suggested by another, and are not the natural emanation of his own mind.
It is more remarkable for what it than what it contains.
There is not a word in it about the failure to have the pontoons at
Falmouth at the proper time, which all the evidence taken by the committee shows to have been the prime cause of the disaster, and but for which it could not by any possibility have happened.
The sworn testimony of
General Burnside himself corrects the erroneous impression which his inconclusive letter is calculated to make on the superficial reader.
That testimony is fully conferred by the other
Generals, and ‘"leaves no peg whereon to hang a doubt."’ What does
General Burnside testify ? His evidence is explication several points, proving the imbecility of the War Department as leading inevitably to the result which has now become history.
In the first place, he swears that, to his ‘"surprise,"’ while on the march to
Richmond, and in command of a corps, he was visited by an officer attached to the War Department, who brought an order appointing him to the command of the army, ‘"In a violent snow storm, with the army in a position that he knew little of;"’ in fact, be ‘"knew less than any other corps commander of the positions and relative strength of the several corps."’ He told
General Buckingham, the bearer of the order, that he ‘ "did not want the command; that it had been offered to him twice before, and that he did not feel he could take it."’ He also told his staff officers the same thing, and that he had expressed his opinion to the War Department ‘"over and over again that he was not competent to command such an army as this;"’ that
McClellan ‘"could command the Army of the Potomac better than any other General in it;"’ and that ‘"he (
Burnside) did not think there was any one who could do as much with that army as
Gen. McClellan."’ It was only on being assured that, as a soldier, he was not at liberty to disobey that he yielded at last to the peremptory order from the War Department.
Here was in under the first, which led to the catastrophe at
Fredericksburg.
An able General, of a comprehensive mind, and yet attentive to the most minute details — which was the leading characteristic of
Napoleon and
Washington — a General to whom friends and enemies alike paid the tribute of praise, the
Prince de Joinville on his staff, and the Prussian officer who fought against him in the rebel service, (whose narrative we published yesterday,) doing equal homage to his masterly skill — a General who had led the whole Army of the Potomac in numerous pitched battles — the army which he had himself created, and who had thus gradually gained by practice the skill necessary to move large bodies of men — was removed without cause from the command of those troops who also worshipped him — removed in the presence of the enemy — an act which military writers, military experience, and common sense, agree to condemn.
Campaigns have often been lost by such folly.
Ney's failure at Quatre Bras, preliminary to the
battle of waterloo--a failure which had a fatal influence on the result — is attributed to his being placed suddenly in command of troops of whom he knew nothing.
In his case it was necessity; in the substitute on of
Burnside for
McClellan it was choice.
The American General was removed when he was rapidly advancing against the enemy, and another was put in his place who had proved himself a good commander of 20,000 men, as several other
Generals in the army had done, but who candidly stated that he felt incompetent to lead so large an army as
McClellan's. This is no discredit to
Gen. Burnside, but to those who perpetrated the folly of forcing him into the position.
The genius for leading small bodies and large bodies is entirely different.
Beauregard did very well with 30,000 men; but when he took command of 100,000 he failed
Pope behaved very well with a small, independent command, and with a portion of a great army; but when he took command of large army in
Virginia he made a sad business of it.
Jackson is an enterprising brilliant General, with 20,000 or 30,000 men under his command; but give him the army that
Lee commands, and the chances are ten to one that he would fail.
The genius of
McClellan is very like that of
Lee, and he is the only man we know of at present who is able to cope with him.
Gen. Scott indicated him as the best commander for the whole army, and it is the rashest presumption on the part of more civilians--third rate lawyers — to remove him from it, and put in his place General untried upon a large scale.
It is true, that the greatest
Generals the world ever saw took command of armies without ever having led a regiment against the enemy, Peter the
Great,
Conde,
Frederick, and
Napoleon, are examples, But these are exceptions to the general role, and we would be woefully deceived by following the exceptions instead of the rule — Even
Napoleon — a General of such surpassing genius — did not suddenly assume the command of large armies.
It was only by degrees that he acquired the skill to wield vast masses of men.
McClellan with his larger experience and greater military knowledge, would not have assailed so strong a position as that of the enemy behind
Fredericksburg.
It he had decided to move by that route, he would have turned the position above or below
Burnside, after this lesson, will, perhaps, do better next time, and he may yet prove himself able to lead to victory an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men.--There can be no doubt that the removal of
McClellan and the substitution of
Burnside, in the middle of a winter campaign, while the army was on the march, was one main cause of the disaster which followed.
It is pretended that he was removed for disobedience of orders.
It is yet to be proved that he ever disobeyed any positive orders it was in his power to fulfill.
If he did so, why has he not been court martialed ? And does it not seem strange to every one that the abler General should be hampered by orders while the less experienced, we are told, had a
carte Blanche?
The more immediate cause of the disaster is proved to be the delay on the part of the War Department in sending forward the pontoons, as agreed to by
Gen. Halleck.
With his usual foresight,
Gen. McClellan, on the 6th of November, had dispatched an order to have the pontoons in the vicinity of
Harper's Ferry sent to
Washington, with a view to their being taken thence to
Falmouth in the event of his upon a change of base.
On the 7th or 8th.
Burnside received the order investing him with the command
Halleck and
Meigs went down to
Warrenton, and on the nights of the 11th and 12th of November discoursed with
Burnside the plan he proposed, and part of that plan was that
Halleck should send down pontoons immediately to
Falmouth for the purpose of crossing the river.
So important was haste that he then and there sent a dispatch to
Gen. Woodbury, commanding the engineer brigade, to transport all the pontoon and bridge materials to
Aquia Creek.
On the 14th,
Burnside, feeling uneasy that he had received no intelligence that the pontoons had started, telegraphed to
General Woodbury and
Major Spaulding.
It turned out that this was the first time that they had ever heard of the pontoons.
Although
Burnside had sent his plan to the authorities at
Washington on the 9th, it was not till the 19th that the pontoons started, and they did not arrive till the 22d or 23d of November--ten days toe late, and when
Lee had ample time to concentrate his troops and fortify his position.
Gen. Woodbury testifies that he did not receive information in time as to the movement which was about to be made.
‘"The Quartermaster's Department was almost totally destitute of mesas.
With the very short notice given him, there was only one possible way of supplying the army with a pontoon train in time.
Had the emergency been made known to him in any manner he would have disregarded the forms of service and seized teams, teamsters and wagon masters or instant service wherever be could find them; but he had no warrant for such a course, which, after all, could only have been carried out by the authority of the
General-in-Chief."’
Gen. Meigs,
quartermaster, testifies that he did his best to forward the pontoons; that the time was too short in which to send them
Gen. Halleck.
being examined, declared that he did not hold himself responsible for anything more than to give the order.
He did not consider it his business to see it carried out, but thought it was
Gen. Burnside's business to look after the pontoons in
Washington.
This is cool.
Burnside was suddenly placed in command of a large army, and was to leave it and go to
Washington to look after pontoons, which
Halleck and
Meigs had already under taken to send him, and when the
Secretary of War, too, was there to see the matter attended to !
Burnside, indeed, says that if he had thought the authorities would have neglected it he would have sent his own officers for the pontoons But
Halleck deceived him, and never informed him that he would not or could not do what he had promised.
Gen. Burnside positively swears that the ‘"nonarrival of the pontoons at the time he expected prevented his crossing at the time he expected to cross, and interfered with the success of his plan."’
Gen. Sumner swears that he ‘"could have taken
Fredericksburg and the heights on the other side of it at any time within three days after his arrival if the pontoons had been there,"’
Gen. Sumner adds that the army was ‘ "demoralized"’ in consequence of the battle, and that ‘"there was a great deal too much croaking and not sufficient confidence"’
Gen. Franklin testifies that if the pontoons had been ready at the time of the arrival of the army the troops ‘"would have immediately crossed the driving the enemy — perhaps five hundred or one thousand men — and they would have occupied those very heights they had to attack, and the crossing would have been permanent and successful"’ Again, he says:
‘
"I would like to impress as firmly upon the
Committee as it is firmly impressed upon my mind the fact
that this whole disputer has resulted from the delay in the arrival of the pontoons Whoever is responsible for that delay is responsible for all the disasters which have followed" ’
This is plain speaking.
And he adds, that he does not believe they could have crossed at the time they did had the enemy chosen to prevent is,
General Hooker deposes, that
Hallock, or
Meigs, promised to have the pontoons down and everything ready in three days. When
Sumner arrived there were only five hundred rebels at
Fredericksburg; ‘"but,"’ he adds ‘" the same mishap was made there that had been made all along through the war"’
From
Gen. Halleck's own testimony it does not appear that he is of any use whatever at
Washington.
He acts the part of a mere clerk, copying orders but not seeing that they are carried out. He neither plans campaigns, nor gives efficient assistance to the
Generals who do plan and fight them.
The necessary supplies were withheld from
McClellan at
Harper's Ferry, at the time that the radical journals were clamoring against him for not moving on, and so it has been in the case of
Burnside Gen. Franklin swears that, notwithstanding the delay of the pontoons, the position of the enemy would have been captured had more, men been on the field on the day of battle.
Whose fault is that?
Is it not boasted that we have 800,000 men in arms?
Is it not the fault of
General Halleck and the
Secretary of War that we had not enough men at the decisive point?
It seems that there are not only no military men at
Washington to carry on the war, but not even men of common sense.
The only suggestion
Burnside received from headquarters was a caution not to attack too soon, while all his
Generals agree that, from the imbecility which rules at the capital, his attack was delayed too long, and thus failed.
There is abundant ground in this report for the most determined action of both Houses of Congress, and we trust that immediately after the recess a joint resolution will be adopted, calling upon the
President to remove
Stanton and
Halleck,
Meigs, and the whole batch of incompetent officials, whose delays paralyze the best efforts of the
Generals in the field.
And, to aid in the same result, we would suggest that a great meeting be called in this city to give expression to public opinion, and send a deputation to
Mr. Lincoln.--The meeting intended to be held last Saturday was postponed till fuller information could be obtained of the facts.
The official report of the Congressional Committee has furnished it on oath from the best sources, and now is the time for the people to act.
