[478a]
that opinion is a different1 thing from scientific
knowledge.” “Yes, different.” “Each
of them, then, since it has a different power, is related to a different
object.” “Of necessity.” “Science, I
presume, to that which is, to know the condition of that which is. But
opinion, we say, opines.” “Yes.”
“Does it opine the same thing that science knows, and will the
knowable and the opinable be identical, or is that impossible?”
“Impossible by our admissions,2” he said.
“If different faculties are naturally related to different objects
Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6 translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1969.
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