[441a]
three existing kinds that composed its structure, the moneymakers, the
helpers, the counsellors, so also in the soul there exists a third kind,
this principle of high spirit, which is the helper of reason by nature
unless it is corrupted by evil nurture?” “We have to
assume it as a third,” he said. “Yes,” said I,
“provided1 it shall have been shown to be something different
from the rational, as it has been shown to be other than the
appetitive.” “That is not hard to be shown,”
he said; “for that much one can see in children, that they are
from their very birth chock-full of rage and high spirit, but as for reason,
1 It still remains to distinguish the λογιστικόν from θυμός, which is done first by pointing out that young children and animals possess θυμός(Cf. Laws 963 E, Aristotle Politics 1334 b 22 ff.), and by quoting a line of Homer already cited in 390 D, and used in Phaedo 94 E, to prove that the soul, regarded there as a unit, is distinct from the passions, there treated as belonging to the body, like the mortal soul of the Timaeus. See Unity of Plato's Thought, pp. 42-43.
Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6 translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1969.
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