1 Cf. 435 B-C ff.
2 Practically all editors reject τὸ λογιστικόν. But Apelt, p. 525, insists that δέξεται cannot be used without a subject on the analogy of 453 Dἔοικεν, 497 Cδηλώσει and δείξει, hence we must retain λογιστικόν, in the sense of “ability to reckon,” and he compares Charm. 174 B and the double sense of λογιστικόν in Rep. 525 B, 587 D, 602 E. He says it is a mild mathematical joke, like Polit. 257 A.
3 Cf. Phileb. 26 Cτὸ . . . πλῆθος. Cf. Friedländer, Platon, ii. p. 492, n. 2.
4 Here again the concept is implied (Cf. on 564 B, p. 313, note e and Introd. pp. x-xi). Cf. Parmen. 132 C, 135 B, Phileb. 16 D, 18 C-D, 23 E, 25 C, Aristot.Eth. Nic. 1130 b 2ἑνὶ ὀνόματι περιλαβεῖν, and εἰς ἓν κεφάλαιον ἀπερειδοίμεθα, 581 A, Schleiermacher's interpretation of which, “so würden wir uns in der Erklärung doch auf ein Hauptstück stützen,” approved by Stallbaum, misses the point. For the point that there is no one name for it Cf. What Plato Said, p. 596, on Soph. 267 D.
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