[132c] “Of something that is, or that is not?”“Of something that is.”“A thought of some single element which that thought thinks of as appertaining to all and as being one idea?”“Yes.”“Then will not this single element, which is thought of as one and as always the same in all, be an idea?”“That, again, seems inevitable.”“Well then,” said Parmenides, “does not the necessity which compels you to say that all other things partake of ideas, oblige you also to believe either that everything is made of thoughts, and all things think, or that, being thoughts, they are without thought?”“That is quite unreasonable, too,” he said,
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